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Abstract 
-II_ 
The cent ra l  purpose of t h i s  study is t o  present spec i f ic  
syntact ic  and semantic analysis of tha t  area of grammar k n m  
as  the  grammar of focus, In par t icular ,  t h e  thes is  presents 
a specif ic  grammatical analysis of the  syntactic and semantic 
inter-re la t ions  which ko1.d between pseudo-cleft sentences, 
c l e f t  sentences, and non-clefted sentences. It is argued t h a t  
pseudo-cleft sentences derive from two syntact ic  sources. Or.e 
source is  a transformational source, i n  which the phrase mark- 
e r  f o r  the corresponding non-clefted sentence is  incorporated 
in to  the  deep phrase marker fo r  the  pseudo-cleft sentence. 
The other source is  a source i n  the  base (specif ical ly  the  
base expansion NP-be-NP), i n  which pseudo-cleft sentences a re  
generated i n  essentially their surface form. It is argued 
tha t  no semantic ambiguity can be associated with t h i s  dual i ty  
of source, and hence, an unambiguous surface s t n c t u r e  may 
deriva from more than one deep s t ruc ture  source. With regard 
t o  c l e f t  sentences, it is argued tha t  these derive syntact ical-  
l y  from pseudo-clef t sentences. Finally, a specif ic  semantic 
notation is proposed t o  represent focus-presupposition re la -  
tions. It is shown'that corresponding pseudo-cleft, c l e f t ,  
and non-clefted sentences receive ident ica l  representations 
in t h i s  notation, even though t h e i r  deep s t ruc ture  represen- 
ta t ions  are formally d i s t inc t .  It i s  fur ther  skotm t h a t  the  
semantic notation developed f o r  f~cus-presupp~si t iarn re la t ions  
has uses i n  other areas of t h e  gqimar,  specif ical ly ,  t ha t  
Interpret ive principles f o r  anaphoric expressions u t i l i z e  
t h i s  notat  ion, 
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INTRODUCTION 
The central  purpose of t h i s  study is t o  pres'ent specific 
syntactic and semantic analyses within a part icular  area of 
English grammar, namely that  which we can label as  the  'gram- 
mar of focus' . This term is intended t o  delineate an area of 
grammar which has t o  do with the pa r t i t im ing  of a sentence 
in to  portions which are  'prominent', 'novel I ,  'emphasized', 
and so forth, as -posed t o  portions which a re  'presupposed', 
"assumed ' , or  ' anaphoric ' . 
In particular, t h i s  area of grammar has t o  do with s e t s  
of sentences such as the following: 
(1) What caused the greatest devastation in  the 14th 
century was the  plague. 
(2) It was the plague tha t  caused the greatest devasta- 
t ion in  the 14th century. 
(3) THE PLAGUE caused the greatest devastation i n  the 
14th century. 
Such sentences are intui t ively judged as  being quite similar 
and related in  various ways. Each of the sentences above has 
the same constituent as its -3 focus namely the constituent 
the plague. This constituent, in each sentence, i s  understood 
as being semantically promknent, or  novel (in a sense made 
more precise i n  Chapter 31, with respect t o  the surroundfrig 
material. The remainder of the  material i n  these sentences 
i s  said t o  be 'presupposed' or non-prominent. 
In  this study r e  investigate the syntactic and semantic 
inter-relationships which hold among se t s  of sehtences such 
as (11, (2), and (3). m e  most important &i& of t h i s  thesis 
i s  t o  present concrete and specific grammatical analysis of 
these grammatical inter-relations. The work presented i n  
th i s  study f a l l s  naturalby in to  two parts. 
In t he . f i r s t  half of the thesis  we present a syntactic 
analysis of pseudo-cleft and c l e f t  sentences. In Chapter 1, 
the syntactic derivation of pseudo-cleft sentences i s  dis- 
cussed. We attempt t o  show that  pseudo-cleft sentences (such 
as (1) ) are  syntactically related t o  non-cleftsd sentences 
(such as (3) ) ,  and that  a theory of pseudo-cleft sentences 
must provide for  d.eep structure representat ions of pseudo- 
c l e f t  sentences which - incorporate the  phrase markers fo r  the 
correspon.dlng non-clefted sentences. In t h i s  regard, we Eol- 
low Bach and Peters f 19681 and Chamsky [f967]. m i l e  any 
theory must express a syntactic relat ion holding between 
pseudo-cleft sentences and non-cfsfted sentences, we go o.rr t o  
argue that  pseudo-cleft sentences also derive from a second, 
independent s o m e  within the grammar, namely, s base 
expansion of NP-be-NP. Thus. it merges that  pseudo-cleft 
sentences a r e  i n  some ways syntactically independent from 
non-clef ted sentences, and w e  present posit ive evidence for  
t h i s  position. Finally, two trans£ o m t f  onal theories of 
pseudo-cleft sentences a r e  compared (i.e. tha t  of b c h  and 
Peters [ 19681 and that  of Chcmsky [1967]), and we argue i n  
favor of so-called 'extraction analyses'. 
In Chapter 2, w e  argue tha t  pseudo-cleft sentences and 
c l e f t  sentences (i; e. (I) and (2)) must be syntactically re- 
lated. It is  proposed that  c l e f t  sentences derive syntac- 
t i ca l ly  from pseudo-cleft sentences by a rule which extra- 
poses the i n i t i a l  clause of the  pseudo-cleft sentence. n u s ,  
it emerges that  the  syntactic tnter-relat  ions holding between 
sentences (I), (2) and (3) a r e  expressed by deriving (1) from 
(3) (in the sense that  the phrase marker for (3) is incorpor- 
ated into the deep str"c.ture phrase marker fo r  (1)); and by 
deriving (2) f r m  (1). 
Throughout the first half sf the thesis,  the evidence 
presented for  specific syntactic analyses is formal in  nature, 
i. e. it i s  evidence from the  formal shape of sentences, rather 
than evidence from meaning, as  such. In particular, the evi- 
dence corks ists i n  argument e f ram syntactic distribution, for  
example, arguments dealing with syntactic agreement patterns, 
distribution of derived phrases, and.so forth. 
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In the second half of the  thesis we investigate the seman- 
t i c  inter-relationships holding between pseudo-cleft, c le f t ,  
and n~n-clef ted  sentences. In  Chapter 3 we begin with a cm- 
sideration a€ scanantic ambiguities i n  pseudo-cleft sentences, 
concluding that  there are  no semantic ambiguities which can 
be associated with the dual source for  pseudo-cleft sentences. 
We then proceed to  a discwsion of the semantic representation 
of se t s  of related clef ted and non-clefted sentenees. The 
primary task of Chapter 3 is t o  develop a semantic notation 
for focus-presupposition relations and t o  show Row se t s  of 
sentences such as  (I) ,  (21, and (3) are  assigned identical 
focus-presupposition representat%ons within t h i s  notetien. 
We follow the general approach f i r s t  outlined by Choasky 
[ 19691, i. e. , an approach i n  which focus-prestrpposition rela-  
tions a re  determined by semantic interpret5ve rules operating 
on the level of (phonetically interpreted) surface structures. 
It emerges that  se t s  of sentences such as ( I ) ,  (2), arzd (3) 
are assigned identical semantic representations, even though 
the i r  syntactic deep structure representations are not identi- 
cal .  
Finally, i n  Chrapter 4, we disauea ways i n  which the se- 
mantic notation developed i n  Chapter 3 can be extended t o  
other parts  of the grammar. SpecifAcally, that  chapter deals 
with semant i e  interpretive principles for  enapkorie 
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expressions, and w e  attempt t o  show that t he  notation f o r  
focus-presupposition re la t ions  plays a crucfal  r o l e  i n  the  
interpretat  ion of cer ta in  anaphoric expressions. 
While the  primary purpose of t h i s  thes is  i s  t o  present 
specific grammatical analysis f o r  a range of data, some of 
the  work presented here has d i r ec t  bearing on c e r t a i n  theore- 
t i c a l  issues of current in te res t .  The theoret ical  framework 
adopted i n  t h i s  thes is  i s  tha t  which has been discussed and 
developed i n  par t icu lar  by Ckomsky ([ 19671, [ 19691, [ B970]), 
Jackendoff ([1969]), and bonds ([1970]), and wh%cl,~ has come 
t o  be labeled generally a s  the  ' Interpret ive '  framework. 
There a r e  two specif ic  theore t ica l  assumptions of t h i s  
par t icular  framework which are  of relevance f o r  t h i s  study: 
I. There is  a level  of syntact ic  deep s t ructure ,  inde- 
pendent of semantic representation. In par t icular ,  
t h i s  is the  level  which i s  formed by the  ru les  of 
the base, which forms the  output of l ex ica l  inser- 
t ion  rules ,  and the input t o  t ransfomatfsnr .  
11. The leve l  of syntactic surface s t ruc ture  i s  available 
a s  an input f o r  semantic interpret ive rules,  and thus 
the  semantic representation cf sentences is not de- 
$ 
fined exclusively by t h e  level. of deep structure.  
Confirmation of I, above, is fourad i n  t h e  derivation of 
pseudo-cleft sentences. We attempt t o  show tha t  the pseudo- 
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c l e f t  can derive from two syntactic sources, and fur ther  tha t  
no ambiguity can be associated with t h i s  dual i ty  of source. 
Hence, an unambiguous sentence can derive from two formally 
d i s t inc t  deep structures.  This is consistent  only with a 
theory i n  which deep s t ruc ture  representations a re  d i s t i n c t  
from semantic representations. (For recent work dealing with 
the notion of deep structure,  see S.R. Anderson [f~r thcoming,  
b] and P. CuPicover [ 19701 .) 
Notice, incidentally,  tha t  the  claim tha t  an unambiguous 
sentence can have more than one deep s t ruc ture  source does 
not represent a departure from standard transformational 
theory. For example, within the framework developed by Katz 
and Postal [1964], it i s  logically necessary t o  assign t o  an 
ambiguous surface s t ruc ture  more than one deep s t ruc ture  re- 
presentation (the number of sources being equnl t o  the  number 
of possible sources). This is simply a consequence of the 
assumption that  the  semantic interpretat ion of a sentence must 
be exp l i c i t ly  and d iscre te ly  represented i n  the deep s t ruc ture  
phrase marker, and tha t  only t h i s  level determines semantic 
interpretat ion.  However, the converse i s  not true. Even 
within the  Katz-Postal framework, it i s  logical ly  possible 
\ 
f o r  an unambiguous surface s t r u c t u r e . t o  derive from more than 
one deep structure,  each deep s t ruc ture  source being formally 
d is t inc t .  This is because within tha t  framework the l eve l  of 
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syntactic deep s t ructure  is d i s t i n c t  from the  level  - of seman- 
t f c  representation, and therefore there  exhsts a logical  
poss ib i l i ty  tha t  semantic in te rpre t ive  ru les  can assign the  
same semantic readings t o  formally d i s t i n c t  deep s t ruc ture  
phrase markers. 'We argue tha t  t h i s  logical  poss ib i l i ty  is  i n  
fac t  ins tant ia ted i n  the  case of pseudo-cleft sentences. 
Turning now t o  theoret ical  assumption 11 above, through- 
out Chapters 3 and 4 we argue fo r  in te rpre t ive  principles 
which operate on sur face  s t ructures .  In  Chapter 3 we present 
arguments tha t  focus-presuppasftfon re la t ions  must be deter- 
mined on surface s t ructures:  i .e . ,  t ha t  the  relevant generali- 
zations a r e  surface s t ruc tu ra l  generalizations i n  the  sense 
that  the focus-presupposition r e l a t i m a  of a sentenco a r e  
determined by the  surface derived phrase s t ruc ture  of a sen- 
terce, as well as  various fac tors  of intonation. In Chapter 
4 w e  present arguments tha t  in te rpre t ive  principles fo r  ana- 
phoric expressions must operate on surface s t ructures  a s  well, 
since these must make cruc ia l  use of focus-presupposition re- 
l a  t ions. 
While t h e  work i n  t h i s  thes i s  is  approached f r m  an Pn- 
terpret ive point oE view, it is not$ our purpose t o  present 
negative argments against other possible a l ternat ives .  In 
part icular,  t h i s  thes is  is  not intended t o  cons t i tu te  a c r i t i -  
cism of the  theoret ical  posit ion which i s  known a s  "Generative 
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Smamtics" (cf .  Lakoff [1969]). It ,is not c lear  et t h i s  t i n e  
whether in fact the two approaches represent genuine alterna- 
tives or merely variants of some sort (for discussion o f  t h i s  
issue, see  Chmsky [ l970 ) ) .  Therefore, it must be emphasized 
that the central 'purpose of th is  thesis is t o  present facts  
which any theory must account for, and t o  present analyses 
which a l l  theories must adopt i n  sane form. 
CHAPTER 1 
THE SYNTACTIC DERIVATION OF PSENDO-CLEFT SENTENCES 
1. Terminology 
We take the t e rn  pseudo-cleft t o  r e fe r  t o  the c l a s s  of 
copula constructions of the  f o l l ~ w i n g  s o r t :  
(1) a. The one Nixon chose was Agnew. 
b. The thing which Herman bought was tha t  tarantula,  
c. The place where he f i n a l l y  ended up was Berkeley. 
d. The time a t  which John arrived was 5 o'clock. 
e. The reason Fillmore sent Perry was t o  exploit t h e  
Japanese. 
f. The way H e  did tha t  was by using a decoder. 
(2) a. Who Mixon chose was Agnew. 1 
b, What Herman bought was tha t  tarantula. 
c. Where he f i n a l l y  ended up was i n  Berkeley. 
d. When John arrived was a t ' 5  o'clock. 
e. Why Fillmore sent Perry was t o  exploit t h e  
Japanese. 
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f .  How he did t h a t  was by using a decoder. 
The i n i t i a l  r e l a t i v e  clauses of (1) have f u l l  l ex i ca l  heads, 
while those of (2) do not have l ex i ca l ly  rea l ized  heads. ' We 
r e f e r  t o  t h e  clauses of (I) a s  "bound" r e l a t i ves ,  and those 
of (2) a s  "free" kela t ives .  I n  each case  w e  r e f e r '  t o  t h e  
post-copular const i tuent  as  t h e  - focus of t h e  pseudo-cleft, 
and the  post-copular posi t ion a s  t h e  focus posi t ion.  
me es sen t i a l  fea ture  t h a t  d is t inguishes  pseudo-cleft 
sentences from other  copula construct ions i s  t h a t  t h e  initial 
clause of t h e  pseudo-cleft contains what i s  e s sen t i a l l y  a 
semantic variable,  a semantic 'gap' which must be ' f i l l e d '  o r  
speci f ied  by t h e  focus i t e m ,  In t h i s  respect ,  pseudo-cleft 
sentences a r e  r e l a t ed  t o  WH questions and their answers, 
which a l s o  en te r  i n t o  a r e l a t i o n  of speci f ica t ion.  Notice 
t h a t  sentences such a s  those of (1) contain r e l a t i v e  clauses 
whose heads function as var iables  ranging over given semantic 
classes.  Thus, - one a c t s  a s  a var iab le  rangdng over the c l a s s  
of humans, th in% ranges over t h e  c l a s s  of inanimates, and s o  
for th .  In t h e  sentences of (2),  t h e  WH words of t h e  free 
r e l a t i v e s  function a s  semantic var iables ,  again ranging over 
appropriate classes. The focus item%must specify a value f o r  
t h e  var iab le  of t h e  clause, and it thus follows t h a t  t h e  focus 
item must belong t o  t h e  appropriate semantic c l a s s ,  i .e . ,  t he  
c l a s s  represented by t h e  variable.  
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Related t o  t h i s  i s  the f ac t  tha t  pseudo-cleft sentences 
enter in to  paraphrase relat ionships with non-clefted sen- 
tences, in the  sense tha t  i f  the  var iable  of t he  clause were 
replaced by the  focus i t e m ,  a well-formed sentence should 
resul t .  FOP example, sentences such as (1) and (2) have 
paraphrases of the  following s o r t :  2 
(3) Nixon chose Agnew. 
(4 )  Heman bought that  tarantula.  
. . .  
(This parallelism with non-elefted sentences has i n  fact  been 
taken as  the central  fac t  t o  be acc~un ted  f o r  i n  transfjbrma- 
t ional  analyses of pseudo-cleft sentences.) In sum, a 
necessary charac ter i s t ic  of the  pseudo-cleft is  the  existence 
of a semantic var iable  (or 'gap') contained i n  a f r e e  or 
bound rela t ive.  Further, t h i s  var iable  is specified by the  
focus item, and i n  t h i s  way t he  pseudo-eleft is analogous i n  
function t o  question-answer pairs .  
2, Motivations fo r  a Transformational Analysis of Pseudo-Clef t 
Sent enzes 
A s  w e  have mentioned, grammarians have viewed t h e  para- 
l l e l i sm  between pseudo-cleft and non-clefted sentences as t h e  
cen t r a l  f ac t  t o  be accounted f o r  i n  t h e  ana lys i s  of pseudo- 
c l e f t  sentences. For exerrile, Bach and Peters  [I9681 i n  
presenting t h e i r  analys is  discuss sentences such a s  : 
(5) a. What John counted was t h e  pigeons. 
b. John counted t h e  pigeons. 
They note t ha t  both sentences a r e  understood t o  have t h e  same 
grammatical re la t ions ,  and t h a t  v io la t ions  of s a l ec t iona l  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  i n  one w i l l  be matched i n  t h e  o ther  (e. g., the  
impossibi l i ty of a s ingular  count nourr a s  t h e  object  of 
count). Bach and Peters  go on t o  make t h e  claim t h a t  whatever 
-
can f i t  i n t ~  the  frame (6a) can a l s o  f i t  i n t o  t h e  frame (6b): 
(6) a. What John counted was . 
-
b. John counted 
- 
The d i s t r i bu t ion  of items i n  post-copular pos i t ion  is  thus 
held t o  be a function of t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of these  items i n  
non-cleftecl sentence.?. Beth and Peters go on t o  s t a t e :  
$ (7) ". . . it is c l e a r  t h a t  i n  any theory with a modicum 
of explanatory adequacy t h e  most highly valued 
grammar compatible with these  data w i l l  assign 
t o  a pseudo-cleft sentence a deep s t ruc ture  con- 
ta ining a phrase marker closely resembling the .- 
deep s t ruc ture  of the  corresponding unclcft  ed 
sentence. 1 t 
Part of the  motivation fo r  (7) consists  i n  arguments 
from s imi lar i ty  of grammatical re la t ions  and se lec t  ional 
res t r ic t ions .  However, arguments of a more interest ing sor t ,  
which go beyond s imi lar i ty  of grammatical re la t ions ,  have 
a l so  been advanced. The azgurnents i n  question e r e  based on 
the observation tha t  in ce r t a in  pseudo-cleft sentences there 
is  a grammatical dependence, o r  g r a m t  i c a l  connectedness, 
between the  focus item and the  i n i t i a l  clause. 
Consider, f o r  example, arguments based on the  dis t r ibu-  
t ion  of ref lexive pronouns, which have been presented by 
J.R. Ross [ c l a s s  lectures] ,  and Bach and Peters [1968]. 
Take the following sentences : 
(8) a. What John did was wash 
$ 
b, What John wants Mary t o  do i s  wash 
herself  j 
(Starred f o r m  indicate impsasibf l i t y  of coreferent i a l i t y  
with s m e  i tem i n  the preceding cla&se.) The dis t r ibut ion  
of ref lexive foms  i n  ($a-b) is pa ra l l e l  with the  dis t r ibu-  
t ion  of such foms  i n  non-clefted sentences, such as:  
(9) a. John washed 
*himse;lf 
b. John wants Mary t o  wash 
To capture t h i s  fact ,  analyses proposed so fax (Chmsky 
[1967], Bach and Peters [l968], 9 . R .  Ross [c lass  lectures],  
bonds  [1970]) meet the  condition specified i n  (7), i. e. t he  
pseudo-cleft deep s t ruc ture  fo r  sentences such as  (8) contains 
an embedded phrase marker f o r  sentences such as (9). In  t h l s  
way, such theories express the  generalization t ha t  the  
d is t r ibut ion  of reflexives i n  pseudo-cleft end nsn-clefted 
sentences is governed by the  same principles.  In t h i s  sense, 
then, we use the  term 'grammatical connectedness' : t he  
appearance of ref lexive pronouns i n  ps eudo-e lef t sentences 
such a s  those of (8) is  n ~ t  a rb i t ra ry  o r  independent of any- 
th ing e l se  wllthin these sentences. Retheq the  d is t r ibut ion  
\ 
of such foms  i s  'governed' by t h e  i n i t i a l  clauses. To 
capture t h i s  fact ,  a t rsansfomtional  analysis which meets 
condition (7) is  required. 3 
If we were t o  assume otherwise, i, e., t ha t  pseudo-cleft 
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sentences bear no t r a n s f ~ r m a t  ional  relat ionship t o  non-clefted 
sentences, it would then be cost ly  t o  account f o r  the  f ac t s  
manifested i n  (8). F i r s t  w e  would note tha t  the  r e f l ~ a i v i z a -  
t i sn  r u l e  (or principle)  which operates within s ingle  clauses 
could not operate on sentences such as  (81, s ince the  reflex- 
ive  pronoun is  dominated by a dif ferent  - S node than i ts  
antecedent. Therefore, some extensicn of the r u l e  would be 
necessary. However, such an extension of the  r u l e  would be 
merely a restatement of t he  ru le  with some ad-hoc provision 
added t o  allow reflexives t o  appear i n  pseudo-cleft sentences. 
( i .e .  t o  a l l m  the  copula t o  intervene between the  ref lexive 
and i t s  antecedent), This is  the  case simply because the  
f ac t s  of (8) and (9) a r e  completely paral le l .  
Such d is t r ibut iona l  arguments can be extended i n  various 
ways. For example, consider the  interact ion of the  dis t r ibu-  
t ion  of ref lexive £oms with the d is t r ibut ion  of derived 
phrases i n  focus position: 
(10) a. What John i s  is  eager t o  please (himself), 
b. What John i s  is  easy t o  please (*hFmself). 
We note tha t  derived surface phrases may appear i n  focus 
\ 
position, which i n  i t s e l f  presents problems f o r  e theory 
which would generate pseudo-clef t sentences completely 
4 independently of mon-clefted sentences. Further, onewoufd 
be faced with the  problem of accounting f o r  the  f ac t  that  the  
ref lexive may appear i n  (10a) but not i n  (lob). HoweVer, 
theories which adhere t o  pr inciple  (7) have a natural  aecaunt 
f o r  sentences suck as  those of ( lo) ,  s ince t h e  pseudo-cleft 
deep s t ruc ture  would incorporate the  phrase markers for t he  
following non-clefted .-.ntenr. q: 
(11) a. John i s  eager ty please (himself). 
b. John is  eesy t o  please (*himself). 
These would be represented with phrase markers of roughly the  
following form: 
(12) a. [ John be eager [John please 
b. [ [PRO please John) be easy ] 
These would be f i r s$  subject t o  operations whlhch would map 
them onto sentences such as  ( l l ) ,  and these i n  turn would be 
subject t o  some s o r t  of c l e f t i a g  operation. In t h i s  way, 
the  f a c t s  of (10) and (11) would be accounted fo r  i n  e 
unitary fashion. For such reasons, then, e t rensf ornational 
analysis of pseudo-cleft sentences i s  motivated. 5 
The fundamental claim embodied by a transformational 
analysis is that  r e s t r i c t ions  on pseudo-cleft sentences a r e  
pa ra l l e l  with r e s t r i c t  ions on non-clefted sentences. ahis  
c l a b ,  however, needs t o  be qualif ied somewhat a t  the outset ,  
i n  tha t  not a l l  r e s t r i c t ions  on pseudo-clefts e r e  re la ted  t o  
r e s t r i c t ions  i n  non-clefted sentences, In  par t icular ,  s ince 
pseudo-clef t sentences contain re la t ive  clauses, they- are  
bound t o  res t r ic t ions  on relatives.  For example, consider 
the following: 
(13) a. *What I forced was B i l l  t o  leave. 
b. *what I forced B i l l  was t o  leave. 
c. What I forced B i l l  t o  do was leave. 
The ungrammatieality of sentences such as  (13a) and (l3b) has 
nothing t o  do with the apecif i e  transfornaatisnal derivation 
of pseudo-cleft sentences, but is a consequence of the fac t  
that in  any event there a r e  no re la t ive  clauses of the 
f ol lming form : 
(14) a. *What I forced. 
b. *!&at I forced B i l l .  
The fac ts  of (13) and (14) a r e  naturally related t o  facts 
concerning the distribution o£ pro-f oms : 
(15) a. *I forced something. 
b. *I forced B i l l  something. 
Therefore, we must recognize a t  the outset that  not a l l  
restr ict ions on pseudo-cleft sentences can be related t o  
restr ict ions on non-clefted sentences. 
% 
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3. Transf omat  ional !theories of Pseudo-Clef t Sentences 
3.1. The Extraction Theory. The transformational 
analysis of pseudo-cleft sentences which we adopt i n  t h i s  
study is  tha t  proposed by Chomsky [I9671 and bonds  [1970], 
which we re fe r  t o  a s  the  Extraction Theory. The essent ia l  
fea ture  of t h i s  analysis is that  t h e  focus posit ion i s  empty 
a t  t h e  deep s t ruc ture  level,  and is f i l l e d  by t h e  extraction 
trans£ ormat ion, which operates on an embedded clause. For 
example, the  deep s t ruc ture  f o r  sentences such a s  (16) would 
be (17) (taken from Chmaky [1967]) : 
(16) a. What John read was a book about himself. 
b. What John did was read a book about himself. 
A 
it s2 be A Pred 
I 
A 
I I - 2  
John ~ a s t  V NP 
L 
I b 
read absok  PP 
A 
a b ~ u t  John 
$ (The symbol Pred i s  here used merely a s  an abbreviation for 
7 t he  various category nodes which can appear i n  t h i s  position.) 
The r u l e  which foms t h e  pseudo-cleft sentence i s  a r u l e  which 
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extracts a major constituent of the  embedded sentence (e. g. 
S, NP, W, PP), and places t h i s  constituent in  the  position 
of the empty A, leaving behind an appropriate pro-form i n  the  
place of the extracted c s n s t i t ~ , m t .  
To take an wample, l e t  us consider the  derivation of 
2 the sentences of (16). First ,  on the level s f  S of (17), 
the reflexivization ru le  (or principle) operates t o  'reflex- 
ivize' the  second occurrence of the  NP -3 John thus giving f o r  
2 1 S John re& a book about himself. On the  S cycle two rules 
of relevance must apply, namely the Extraction Rule and then 
WH-Fronting, i n  that order. For (16a), the extraction ru le  
2 2 
applies t o  S by extracting NP , placing it i n  the position 
of the empty predicate A, and leaving i n  its place a pro-form 
what ( i .e .  WH + i t ) .  This leaves us with the  following 
-
intermediate structure: 
(18) f 6 it [that-John-do-m+it 31 be 
VP [read a book about h i m ~ e l f ] ~  
Again, the  WW-fronting ru le  applies on the  i n i t i a l  clause, 
forming (16b). 
It should be remarked that  we assume a theory of 
relat ivizat ion discussed by Emnds( 119701 and Bresnen [1970j. 
Within t h i s  theory, it is assumed that  the  introductory - tha t  
of re la t ive  clauses is the cq l emen t f ze r  that which intro- 
-
duces proposit f onaP complements of cer tain verbs (cf. Bresnan 
[ 19901 f o r  discussion) , Secondly, following bonds  [ 19701, 
it is  assumed tha t  re la t iwizat ion i s  carr ied out i n  stages-, 
i n  two possible ways. One poss ib i l i ty  i s  tha t  the  NP t o  be 
re la t ivized (which is marked by WH) i s  f i r s t  pronominalized. 
After it has been pronominalized, the  WH fronting r u l e  moves 
it t o  the  f ront  of the  sentence, replacing; the  coqlementizer 
that. The second poss ib i l i ty  is tha t  the  NP t o  be re la t ivized 
-
is simply deleted, resul t ing i n  r e l a t i v e  clauses introduced 
by - that .  A s  an example of a derivation of r e l a t i v e  clauses, 
consider the  following (from Emonds [1970]): 
(20) a. Deep Structure 
The fr iend [ t h a t - I  spoke t o  W-friend] drove away. 
b. Removal of NP by re la t iv iza t ion ,  with optional 
pronoun l e f t  behind 
A. The friend [ tha t  I spoke t~ WH-him] drove away. 
B. me fr iend [ t h a t  I spoke tc ] drove away. 
c. WH-fronting i n  - A of e i the r  NP o r  PP dominating 
pronominalized WP 
A. The friend [who I spoke to ]  drove away. 
B. The friend [ t o  whm I spoke] arove away. 
Note that the  operation of t h e S ~ x t r a c t i o n  Rule produces 
similar  resu l t s ,  as Rn~nds points out. That is ,  t h e  ru le  
removes an NP f r m  an embedded clause, leaving behind a pro- 
form, which we assume is  marked a s  [ +PRO, +WH]. The pro-form 
is then fronted, and replaces the  cornplementizer - that ;  
Furthermore, there  a r e  eases (which we discuss l a t e r )  where 
the  m t r a c t i o n  n l e  removes a constituent from the  embedded 
clause and leaves no pro-form behind, leaving a clause intro-  
duced by the cmplment fzer  - tha t .  
The Extraction Rule i t s e l f  must be stated as a schema, 
since it extracts  any major constituent of the  embedded 
sentence : 
(21) Extraction Rule : 
[ , [ X - A - Y I s  be [ A l l  =+ 
[ ,[ X - [+PRO,+WH] - Y IS  be [ A ] ] 
A must be a consti tuent;  I-iotSever, t h i s  condition need not be 
- 
s ta ted  on t h i s  par t icu lar  rule ,  s ince we r e s t r i c t  movement 
rules  i n  genera? t o  operating only on csnst i t~aents .  Hence, 
t h i s  general condition insures tha t  only consti tuents will 
be affected. 
3.2. The Deletion Theory. Another analysis of pseudo- 
$ 
cleft sentences which has been proposed recently is t ha t  of 
Bath and Peters [ 19681 and J, R. Ross' [ c l a s s  lectures] ,  which 
we re fe r  t o  as the  Deletion Theory. The essent ia l  feature  of 
t h i s  theory is tha t  the  predicate,positi.on is  f i l l e d  i n  deep 
s t ruc ture  with a f u l l  sentence, a portion of which must b,e' 
deleted t o  leave behind the  focus constituent.  For example, 
consider the  following deep s t ructure:  
4 2  
A be /* 
the  thing NP As3 A it  I 
John V 
 
I "P NP 
read smetking 
I 
John V A 
I -25=. 
read a book about 
himself 
In t h i s  analysis,  there  is an i n i t i a l  bound re l a t ive  (with 
th ing  as i t s  head), with an MP dominating a sentence i n  focus 
position, The ru le  which foms  the  pseudo-cleft is a deletion 
3 
rule,  which deletes a l l  elements of S which are  ident ical  
2 
with the  non-pro-dorm elements of S . &ch and Peters s t a t e  
the  rule thus [ 1968, p. $1 : 
the  thing tha t  X Y IS  A w  be it # lS X' NP Y ' ] ~  #
L J -EJw 
Ib 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 
where: 2 = 6 
3 = 8  
3 In the case of (22), the i t ens  John and - read of S a r e  deleted 
2 
under ident i ty  with these items i n  S . 
We w i l l  discuss the  r e l a t i v e  m e r i t s  of the  ~ x t r a c t i o n  
and Deletion theozies in section 6. The point t o  be made 
here is tha t  there  i s  good motivation f o r  a transformational 
theory of pseudo-cleft sentences which meets condition (7) 
(i. e. which incorporates in to  the  pseudo-cleft deep s t ruc ture  
the  phrase marker fo r  the  corresponding non-clefted sentence), 
and tha t  both t h e  Extraction and ~ e l e t f o n  theorkes meet t h i s  
condition. 
4. Pseudo-CPe£t Sentences a s  Base-Generated Structures 
We have attempted t o  show tha t  e theory ~f pseudo-cleft 
sentences must al lmi  fo r  a transformational derivation sf  
the  sorts discwsed i n  t h e  l a s t  section. W e  w i l l  point out 
here tha t  pseudo-cleft sentences have also  e second source 
within the  grammar, and that there  is no non-ad hoc way of 
\ 
preventing pseudo-cleft sentences frm deriving from t w o  
sources. We re fe r  here t(4 pseudo-cl&ft sentences a s  base- 
generated constructions. 
Among the  copula constructions i n  English, there  are, i n  
par t icular ,  c o n s t m t i o n s  such a s  the  following: 
(24) a. Clerk Kent is Superman. 
b. The man I know is the  man who robbed the  bank. 
c. My problem is my law income, 
The grammar must provide a source for such sentences, and 
. 
there  is no simpler source thaa the  basic s t ruc ture  
[ NP - be - MP 1. This syntactic s t ruc ture  is a l so  the  
source f o r  sentences such a s :  
(25) a .  H e  i s  a doctor, 
b. H e  is a fool,  
(The difference i n  interpretat ion between sentences such a s  
(24) and ( 2 5 )  i s  discussed i n  Chapter 3 , )  
I f  constructions su:',: as (24) e r e  basic structures,  then 
there  i s  no way t o  prevent pseudo-cleft sentences from being 
generated i n  the base; f o r  example, pseudo-cleft sentences 
such as: 
(26) What I cooked was the  spaghetti .  
Both underlined phrases e r e  dominated by the  node MP, and can 
appear i n  positions where any MP can. In  par t icular ,  f r e e  
t 
relatives such as the  i n i t i a l  clause of (26) appear i n  a l l  NP 
environments : 
(27) a. I threw away what John cooked, 
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b. What John cooked was believed t o  have be& 
eaten by B i l l .  
c. What he cooked was lumpy end cold. 
d. What I threw out was what John cooked. 
Therefore, i f  t he  base contains the expansion [ NP - be - NP 1, 
then pseudo-cleft sentences a r e  generated by the  base. 8 
This s i tua t ion  ra i ses  ce r t a in  questions as  t o  how 
deviant sentences a r e  t o  be blocked. Compere, f o r  example, 
the  following two sentences, both of which s ~ u l d  be syntacti-  
ca l ly  generated by the  base s t ruc ture  [ NP - be - NP 1: 
(28) a .  What I cooked yesterday was Hmingway's 
favor i te  I t a l i a n  dish. 
b. *What I cooked yesterday was Hemingway ' s suicide. 
We ask, then, how sentences such as (28b) ere t o  be blocked. 
Within a transfonnatisnal derivation, of course, sentences 
such a s  (28b) could not be generated, s ince (28b) would con- 
t a i n  i n  i ts  deep s t ructure  a phrase marker f o r  t h e  deviant 
sentence; 
(29) *I cooked ~emingway ' s suicide. 
Because of violat ions in  select ional  r e s t r i c t  ions, sentences 
$ 
such as  (29), and therefore (28b), a r e  blocked. Thus, the  
transfomationsP analysis r e l a t e s  the' ungramatical i ty  of 
(28b) with tha t  of (29). 
We must note, however, t h a t  this ekplanation won't do 
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for  other eases, where the  t r a n s f o ~ t i o n a l  analysis f a i l s  t o  
capture ce r t a in  para l le l s .  Specifically, t ha t  analysis f a i l s  
t o  capture the  s imi la r i ty  bwtween (28b) and t h e  following, 
(30) : 
(30) *The food was Herningwey's suicide. 
Sentences such as (30), obviously, do not undergo a c l e f t ing  
operation, but must be marked as deviant by the  grammar i n  
any event. Furthermore, what ever mechanism marks (30) as  
deviant w i l l  a l so  mark (28b) as  deviant. 
The deviance of (28b) and\ (30) has t o  d~ with the  f ac t  
tha t  the  semantic composition of the two NP's connected by 
the copula is  i n  confl ic t .  Consider, fo r  example: 
(31) *The man over there is  t h e  woman tha t  I. know, 
We understand t h i s  sentence t o  be odd i n  ce r t a in  ways, and 
we know tha t  it f a i l s  a s  a specif icat ional  ~ t a t e m e n t . ~  This 
is due t o  the  contradiction a r i s ing  i n  equating a noun phrase 
with the semantic information [Male) with a noun phrase with 
the semantic infomation [Morhle] . The noun phrases i n  a 
specif ica t ione l  statement m u s t  necessarily ' agree' i n  t h e i r  
semantic f eaturea. Specifically, the noun phrases i n  guest ion 
\ 
must be non-distinct with respect t o  a l l  those semantic 
features which play a ro le  i n  selections1 res t r ic t ions .  10 
To take t he  example sf (30), note that  the  NP - food has 
the s m a n t i c  marking fo r  concreteness,' while the  NP 
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Heminmay's suicide has the satant  i c  marking for  abstractness. 
The dis t inc t ion  conc~ate /abs t rac t  plays a rafe i n  select ional  
res t r ic t ions ,  and therefore the  two NPs i n  a s p e c i f i c s t i ~ n a l  
statement must agree with respect t o  t h i s  feature. Since 
they do not in  (30), the sentence is  m l e d  out. 
We should emphasize here that  features which play no 
ro le  m s s l e c t i o m l  r e s t r i c t ions  need not agree: 
(32) A man tha t  I saw yesterday is  the man who robbed 
the  bank. 
Even though one NP is  syntact ical ly  inde f in i t e  and the  other 
syntact ical ly  def ini te ,  t h i s  is  e semanticalfy well-formed 
sentence. Note, i n  addition, tha t  t h e  syntactic d is t inc t ion  
indef in i te ldef in i te  plays no ro le  in select ional  r e s t r i c t ions .  
Returning t o  sentence (28b), we now note tha t  it can be 
blocked i n  just  the  manner tha t  (30) is blocked. Let us 
assume tha t  the  deep representation of t h e  what-clause of 
(28b) is [ I - cooked - [+PRO,+WH] 1. Following Katz and 
Postal  [1964, pp. 81-84], we assume t h a t  t h e  reading of a 
pro-form i s  composed of whatever semantic infometion it may 
possess as  an independent lex ica l  i t e m ,  alone; with semantic 
information which it acquires £rans t h e  c ~ n t e x t  in which it 
is  found. That is, Katz and Postal '  propose tha t  by a general 
convention within t h e  theory of grammar, pro-forms acquire 
the  semantic information projected by t h e  select  ional  
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features of the  items with which they enter into select ional  
relat ions.  Thus, the  verb - cook, i n  (28b), projects  onto the  
pro-form (something) the  semantic features specified by the  
select ional  r e s t r i c t ions  f o r  possible objects of - cook. When 
the pro-form is fronted, it is  thus ,marked with t h e  semantic 
features common t o  a l l  possible objects of the  verb c o ~ k .  
This is  necessary for reasons completely independent of 
the  question of blocking pseudo-cleft sentences. For example, 
consider sentences such as  : 
(33) a. I a t e  what John cooked, 
b. *I a t e  what John said,  
As Joan Bresnan [I9701 points out, i n  f r e e  r e l a t ives  the 
element what must sa t i s fy  se lec t iona l  r e s t r i c t ions  within the  
r e l a t ive  i . t s e l f ,  as well as within the na t r ix  sentence. Thus, 
i n  (33b), what -is  marked with those semantic features colmon 
t o  a l l  possible objects of say; however, i n  the  matrix sen- 
tence these features v io la t e  t h e  ss lect ional  r e s t r i c t ions  of 
the verb - eat . I f  we assume Chat semantic features  a r e  
associated with whole phrases, as  well a s  s ing le  lex ica l  
categories (cf.  Jackendoff [ 19661, Chomsky [ 19671, McCawPey 
[1968]), then the  f ree  r e l a t i v e  es \a  whole takes on the  
semantic fea ture  composition of the  pro-form whet. - ahis  in  
turn derives i t s  semantic content from the  elements wcth 
which it enters in to  select ional  relat ions.  Thus, a phrase 
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such as what I cooked takes on, aa  a whole, the searantic 
features common t o  a l l  possible objects of the verb cook. 
En th i s  way, (28b) is completely para l le l  with (30) 
since the  NPs what I cooked end the  food share semantic 
- 
features common t o  a11 possible objects of the  verb cook. 
This w i l P  mean, then, tha t  what I cooked w i l P  be marked, as  
a whole, as shmnantically concrete, while the phrase 
Heminmay's suicide i s  marked as serrntantically abstract. 
Therefore, (28b) is marked as  deviant fo r  the same reason as  
5. Syntactic Motivaei~n for a Dual Source 
So f a r  we have seen that a t r a n s f o ~ t i o n a l  derivation 
of pseudo-cleft sentences is required, and further tha t  the 
base also  generates pseudo-cleft sentences. It should be 
noted that there is no non-ad hoc way t o  prevent t h i s  
si tuation. It would greatly cmplecate the  grannner t o  
attempt t o  reszr ic t  the  base i n  s*h a manner as  t o  prwent  
pseudo-clef t sentences f rm being generated, since (a s ~ b s e t  
cif) pseudo-cleft sentences a re  permissible expansions s f  the  
base ru le  [ NP - be - . .W 1. In t h i s  -section we note tha t  
1 there i s  some posi t ive  evidence fo r  a dual source f o r  pseudo- 
c l e f t  sentences, in  that such a dualism accounts f o r  ce r t a in  
syntactic fac ts .  The s e t  of f a c t s  w e  consider here involves 
the ru le  of There- Insert  ion. 
I f  w e  assume that  t h e  r u l e  sf There-Insertion (cf. 3. R. 
Ross [1967], Chmsky [1967], Em~nds [1970]) is  cyclic, then 
there i s  a c l a s s  of pseudo-cleft sentences which cannot be 
derived i n  the transformational theories outlined above (or 
any transformational theory which posi ts  a non-clefted sen- 
tence embedded i n  the deep s t ruc ture  of the  c le f ted  sentence). 
Consider i n  t h i s  regard t h e  following: 
t h e  jack you gave 
(34) What there  was i n  the  car  was 
my hat 
In  pre-copular posit ion the  clause contains ex i s t en t i a l  
there;  however, i n  post-copular position there  i s  a de f in i t e  
noun phrase. There i s  no corresponding non-clefted sentence 
fo r  (34), s ince There-Insertion is  r e s t r i c t ed  t o  operating on 
indef in i te  noun phrases: 
the  jeck you gave m e  7 
(35) *There was i n  the car.  
my hat  
Sentences such a s  (34) cannotbe derived i n  e i ther  the  
Extraction or Deletion theories,  f o r  d i f f e r ing  reasons. 
Consider f i r s t  the  Extraction Theory. The presumed 
source f o r  (34) would have t o  be the  following: 
i n  the  car  
I f  the  There-Insertion r u l e  is  cyclic,  it m y  operate on S 2 
2 i f  i t s  conditions a re  m e t .  However, note tha t  i n  S of (36), 
the  conditions f o r  There-Insertion are not met: __I there m y  not 
replace the  de f in i t e  noun phrase my hat .  The r u l e  Pa i l s  to 
1 
apply and on the  S cycle the  extraction r u l e  may apply. The 
only sentence which c ~ u l d  be derived would be: 
(37) What was i n  t h e  car  was my hat.  
which is the r e su l t  of extracting the  NP my hat.  However, 
the version of the  sentence with there, a s  i n  (343, could not 
be derived. 
Note, by t h e  way, tha t  there i s  good reason t o  suppose 
tha t  the There-Insertion r u l e  i s  i n  f ac t  cyclic. Consider 
examplea such as: 
(38) There was believed t o  have been an explosion, 
Such examples show t ha t  once - there  has been inserted it 
behaves j u s t  as  any other noun with respect t o  trans- 
fomatisns ,  such a s  Passive and Raising. Since Passive i s  a 
cyclic rule,  and s ince i t  may operate- en there, ,There- 
Insert ion must a l so  be cyclic.  (Fqr fur ther  discussion, see 
E$aonds [ 19701. ) 
Consider now the  Deletion Theory. It cannot derive 
sentences such as  ( 3 4 ) ,  s ince the  application of There- 
Insert ion i n  the Leftmost clause destroys t h e  conditions on 
ident i ty  required for  t h e  deletion ru le  t o  apply. The pre- 
aumed source f ~ r  (34) within t h i s  theory would be: 
n 
be 
something be it A 3  
i n  the  car   
my hat be 
i n  the  car  
Assuming that There-Insertion may apply i n  r e l a t i v e  clauses 
with f u l l  heads, 11 we would derive, after application of 
this rule,  the  following: 
- - 
there  was something A3 it S - ~ - 
i n  t h e  car & 
my hat  was 
i n  the ca r  
Note, however, t ha t  the  application of There-Insert ion has 
destroyed the  ident i ty  conditions f o r  t h e  Deletion R u P ~ .  In 
order t o  derive the noun phrase y - hat i n  post-eopular 
3 position, it i s  necessary t o  dellete was i n  the  car i n  S . . 
2 3 But there i s  no portion of S fd~nt iccal  t o  S with respect t o  
2 this: s ince i n  S ,we have was something i n  the  car. Further- 
2 
more, There-Insertion has added the  morpheme - there to S , 
3 
which i s  not found i n  S . Thus, There-Insertion, with its 
addition of t h e  morpheme - there along with the concomitant 
change i n  word order effected by t h e  rule,  creates  conditions 
such tha t  the  deletion r u l e  can no longer apply. Thus, sen- 
tences such as  (34) e r e  net derivable within e i ther  of the  
transf smat iona 1 theories. 
Sentences such a s  (34), however, a re  derivable i n  the  
base source f o r  pseudo-cleft sentences. Consider the  follow- 
ing deep source: 
P- - 




C (There was what i n  the  car)  
C
I b (What -there  was i n  t h e  car)  
2 In S of (411, the  pro-form repres;nted by - what i s  assigned 
semantic features projected by the  items with which it enters  
in to  select ional  re la t ions .  Thus, i n  a locat ive statement 
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(i .e.  was i n  the  car) the  pro-form.men8t be assigned features 
indicating that  it is srrnantically concrete ( i .e .  something 
capable of occupying space). If  the  post-copular NP is a l so  
marked with such features, t he  sentence is good. I f  t h e  
post-copular NP i s  not marked with such features, the  sentence 
m u s t  be marked as  deviant, jus t  a s  the following a r e  marked 
a8 deviant: 
(42) a ,  *The theory of gramnap was i n  t h e  car. 
b. *The i t a n  in the c a r  wars the theory of grammar. 
As before, as  long as the features which play e r o l e  i n  
se lec t  tonal r e s t r i c t  ions agree, sentences derived from 
structures such as (4.1) a r e  marked well-formed, and thus the  
base can derive sentences such as ( 3 4 ) .  mis case, then, 
provides posi t ive  evidence in favor s f  a second source fo r  
pseudo-cleft sentences. 12 
In  our discussion s f  the transformational derivation fo r  
pseudo-cleft sentences, w e  noted tha t  the  primary motivation 
for  such analyses involved ce r t a in  d is t r ibut iona l  fac ts ,  
namely, tha t  the  d is t r ibut ion  of pos t -cqu la r  items is, i n  
cer ta in  cases, a function of the dis t r ibut ion  of these items 
i n  non-clefted sentences. With reflexives, fo r  exaxnpze, w e  
noted that  the cmdi t i sns  for  the dis t r ibut ion  of ref lexive 
pronouns in  pseudo-cleft sentences were just  the conditions 
f o r  the dis t r ibut ion  of ref  Iexfves i n  -non-clefted sentences. 
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We wish t o  derive pseudo-clefts i n  such a way that  the  prin- 
c iples  which govern ref lexive coreferent ia l i ty  patterns i n  .- 
non-clefted sentences a l so  account f o r  the  d is t r ibut ion  of 
reflexives i n  pseudo-clefts. In t h i s  manner, a transfoxma- 
t ione l  analysis is motivated. On t he  other hand, the  case 
with There-Insertion i s  a case i n  which t h e  d is t r ibut ion  of 
post-copular items is n_ot a function of t h e  d is t r ibut ion  s f  
these items i n  nsn-clefted sentences, and i n  t h i s  sense the  
pre-copular and post wcopular it ems a r e  independent (providing, 
of course, tha t  the  semantic features agree). 
5.1. Consequences of the  Existence of a Source i n  the  
Base, We should make c lea r  here the  logical  consequences of 
-
t h i s  s i tuat ion.  That is, a ce r t a in  c r i t e r i o n  is used t o  
es tabl ish a transformational analysis of pseudo-cleft sen- 
t ences, namely, what we have t emed ' gratrmnat i c a l  connected- 
ness' .  I f ,  on the  other hand, it is claimed tha t  a ce r t a in  
c lass  of pseudo-cleft sentences can be generated onlv i n  the  
'. 
base, it should be the  case tha t  t h i s  par t icu lar  c lass  sf  
sentences does not manifest any propert ies of grammat bcal 
connetedness of the  s o r t  which motivates a transformational 
analysis. 
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The case under consideration hers  is one i n  which the  
i n i t i a l  clause of the  pseudo-cleft contains an ex i s t en t i a l  . 
there, while i n  focus posit ion there  is a syntact ical ly  
-
def in i te  NP. It is argued tka t  t h i s  cannot derive from 
e i ther  transformational source discussed above, but we note 
tha t  sentences of t h i s  specif ic  s o r t  a r e  generated by the  
base. Since it is  maintained tha t  sentences of t h i s  specif ic  
s o r t  a r e  generated only by t h e  base, then it should be the  
case tha t  such sentences do not display dependencies across 
the  copula which would argue f o r  a transformational analysis 
of the  s o r t  sketched out above, A specif ic  counterexample 
t o  t h i s  posit ion would be one i n  which a pseudo-cleft sen- 
tence contains there  i n  the  i n i t i a l  clause, a de f in i t e  NP i n  
focus position, and yet displays grambtfca l  dependencies 
across the  copula. 
J.R. Ross has suggested to m e  that  sentences with re- 
f lexive possessives appear t o  cons t i tu te  such counterexamples. 
For example, consider a sentence such as the  following (from 
J.R. Ross): 
(43) What there  was next t o  Bill was h i s  own pis to l .  
The focus phrase i n  t h i s  case, h i s  dm p i s to l ,  contains t h e  
so-called rdflexive possessive, - own. If it is  the case tha t  
ref lexive possessives a r e  governed by the same principles 
tka t  govern ref lexive pronouns -- b. e. ; i f  t he  antecedent s f  
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a reflexive possessive must be i n  t h e  same simplex sentence -- 
then examples such as (43) would argue against generating .. 
such pseudo-cleft sentences i n  the  base. The reason, jus t  a s  
with sentences such as (8), i s  tha t  generating such sentences 
i n  the  base would e m p l i c a t e  the  r u l e  o r  pr inciple  which 
determines the  antecedent of a ref  Zexive possessive. In  (43) 
the possessive is i n  the  higher sentence, while i t s  ante- 
cedent is i n  the  embedded sentence; i f ,  i n  general, t he  
antecedent of such a possessive m u s t  be i n  the  same s h p l e x  
S, than (43) would cons t i tu te  a specfal  case which would 
require some special  statement. Just  as  with the  sentences 
of (8), sentence (43) would argue f o r  a transformational 
derivation. This, then, i s  the  general form a counterexample 
would take. 
However, if we examine t h i s  par t icu lar  case, we note 
tha t  it 'does not, in fac t ,  cons t i tu te  a counterexample, s ince 
the antecedent of a ref lexive possessive need not be i n  the  
same simplex - S. For example, consider the  following: 
(44) a. John denied that  he ever saw a gun, but his 
own p i s t o l  was lying on the  table.  
b. Even though Mary looks hewn on people who 
haven't finished t h e i r  theses, her own t hes i s  
is  f a r  from complete. 
In both cases, the  antecedent ~f t he  ref lexive possessive i s  
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dominated by a different  2 node, and i n  (44b) t h e  antecedent 
i s  within a subordinate clause. Suck examples show tha t  the  
reflexive possessive is not governed by the  same principles 
which govern re f  lexiva pronouns and thus sentences such as 
(43) do not represent cases which require special  extension 
of the  principles which determine the  antecedents of reflex- 
ive possessives. 13 
S i m i l a r  examples can be constructed with other so r t s  of 
anaphoric acpressions. For example, sentences such as  the  
follawi.ng might be raised a s  putat tve counterexamples: 
(45) What there  was next t o  B i l l i  was [ :I
photograph of himselfi which was taken l a s t  srmrmer. 
In the  i n i t i a l  clause there  is  an occurrence of there, and 
the focus NP is definite.  Further, there  4.s an anaphsric 
item i n  the focus NP which i s  coreferent la l  with an i t e m  i n  
the i n i t i a l  clause. Given t ha t  the  coreferent ia l i ty  r e l a t ion  
I extends across the copula I ,  tk2.s might be construed as  the 
so r t  of grammatical connectedness whBch motivates a trans- 
formational analysis,  ghf s would be the  case only i f  it 
could be shown t ha t  (45) represents's special  case, i . e .  a 
deviance from otherwise general p-7inciples of coref erent ia l -  
i ty .  This would be a case analogous t o  tha t  represented by 
the sentences of (8), i n  which the  pat tern of coreferent ia l i ty  
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i n  the  pseudo-cleft is  completely p a r a l l e l  with t h e  pa t te rn  
found i n  non-clefted sentences, If (45) is  generated i n  the 
base, would it not then involve an ad hoc extension of other- 
w i s e  general principles f o r  assigning coref e ren t ia l i ty?  
Before answering th i s ,  it should be noted that  t h i s  
par t icu lar  so r t  of example is not r e s t r i c t e d  t o  cases which 
involve ex i s t en t i a l  there, as  w e  have been discussing. David 
Perlmutter has suggested t o  m e  tha t  such sentences cons t i tu t e  
putative cozanterexamples t o  t h e  general claim tha t  pseudo- 
c l e f t  sentences are generated i n  t%e base. For example, 
consider the  following (from Perlmutter) : 
(46) a. What B i l l i  read was a book about himselfi. 
b. *What B i l l i  read was a book about him i 
I f  sentence (45) is generated by the  base, as we claim, then 
the sentences of (46) would a l so  have t o  be generated by the  
base, s ince they a r e  of the  same general form, namely 
NP-be-NP. In (46a) w e  must account f o r  the  f ac t  tha t  the  
ref lexive pronoun is coreferent ia l  with an NP i n  the  i n i t i a l  
clause, while i n  (46b) the pronoun I him cannot be coreferent ia l  
with the  previous NP. This i s  a l so  the pat tern found i n  non- 
c lef ted sentences : '. 
(47) a .  B i l l  read a book about himselfi. i 
b. * B i l l i  read a book about h b . .  
1 
This would then appear t o  be a case analogous t o  tha t  
represented by the  sentences of (8), i. e. one which would 
argue for  a transformational derivation and against  a base,.  
derivation. 
Once again, hwever, sentences such a s  (45) (or (46)) 
do not, i n  fac t ,  f ~ m  counterexamples t o  the  claim that  
pseudo-cleft sentences derive from a base source. The reason 
again i s  simply tha t  a s  base-generated s t ructures  they do - not 
f o m  exceptions t o  otherwise general principles f o r  assigning 
coreferent iaf i ty .  Ti-L~S can be seen most eas i ly  by noting 
tha t  the  very same fac ts  hold i n  copula sentences which a r e  
simple equational statements ( i .  e. which would not involve a 
c le f t ing  transformation) : 
(48) a. John. ' s favor i te  possession is a book about 
1 
b. *Johnils favor i te  possession is a book about himi. 
(49)  
  oh nib biggest worry is  {z] photograph of 
himself which was taken l a s t  summer. 
The f s c t s  of (48) are completely pa ra l l e l  with the  f ac t s  sf  
(44) and (47) ,  but the sentences of (48) are only base- 
generated ( i .  e. do not undergo any c\Lefting rule) .  (49) i s  
a lso a simple basic equational statement, and there  too the 
focus phrase contains an anaphoric expression which i s  co- 
re ferent ia l  with some item i n  t h e  i n i t i a l  pre-copular phrase. 
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There a r e  a lso examples i n  which the  antecedent and t h e  
anaphoric expression a r e  dominated by d i f fe rent  2 nodes: 
(50) a. The greates t  source of embarrassment tha t  Johni 
has t o  endure is f"') photograph of h h i ~ e l f ~  
the  cj 
which was taken l a s t  summer. 
b. The most diff icult- . :project  of a l l ,  which Johni 
could hardly bring himself t o  complete, was 
the  a r t i c l e  about himselfi t ha t  he was supposed 
t o  wri te  f o r  h i s  publishers. 
Sentences such as those of (50) a r e  base-generated equative 
sentences, and yet they display the same s o r t  of cross-copula 
coreferent ia l i ty  pat terns  found i n  sentences such as (45) and 
(46) l4 Thus, i f  (45) and (46) a r e  base-generated, they 
would not represent speclal  cases f o r  which t h e  principles 
which determine coreferent ia l i ty  would have t o  be extended 
i n  some ad hoc fashion. Sentences such as  those of (48) ,  
( 4 9 ) ,  and (50) demonstrate that  principles which determine 
core£ e r e n t i a l i t y  re la t ions  w i l l  apply in copula sentences a s  
well as  non-copula sentences, and therefore  sentences such 
as those of (45) and (46), i f  base-kenereted, cause no 
additional campl ica t i~n  i n  the grammar. 
To sum up br ief ly ,  w e  have pointed out that  there  a r e  
cer ta in  empirical claims inherent i n  the  position tha t  pseudo- 
c l e f t  sentences have two dis t inc t  syntactkc sources. In 
claiming that  a cer tain subset of pseudo-cleft sentences a re  
generated only by the base (e.g. pseudo-clefts with I there 
within the i n i t i a l  clause and a deffnite MP i n  focus position), 
it should be the case that such sentences do not manifest the 
sor t  of grammatical connectedness which motivates a trans- 
fomationai derivation, We have examined a se t  of putative 
counterexamples, and w e  have fomd that  they do not, i n  fact,  
represent cases of grammatical connectedness, in  the  sense 
intended. This is due t o  the  fact  that  pseudo-cleft sen- 
tences of the form NP-be-NP behave l i ke  other copula 
sentences of that  general form, and require no special 
prirrciples t o  account for  coreferentiali ty relations which 
hold across the copula. 
If  we now reca l l  sentences such as those sf (8), we can 
ask why it is that  the coreferentiali ty patterns of those 
sentences i n  fact  - do consti tute evidence for  a transforma- 
t ional  source. The crucial  dis t inct ion between examples 
such as (8) and those such as  (45) and (46) is  that  the focal 
phrases in  (8) are  verb phrases while those i n  (45) and (46) 
are noun phrases. s 
Consider an example with the form of (8): 
(51) a, What John did was read a book about himself. 
b. *What John thought Mary did was read a book 
about h b s e k f .  
A sentence such as  (51a) cannot be generated by the  base 
expansion W-be-NP, s ince the  phrase read a book about himself 
is  a verb phrase, not an NP. Thus, t o  attempt to generate 
such cases i n  the base would cause serious compl&cations i n  
that  an otherwise unnecessary base expansion would be 
required ( i .  e. bJP-be-VP) ; and, i n  addition, otherwise general 
principles governing coreferent ia l i ty  would have t o  be 
extended i n  an ad hsc manner f o r  jus t  these cases, 
On the other hand, sentences such as  (45) and (46) have 
qui te  a dif ferent  s ta tus .  That is, generating them i n  the  
base does - not e n t a i l  constructing an otherwise unnecessary 
base expansion, f o r  the  expansion NP-be-M? is required anyway 
f o r  simple equative statements. Further, a s  we have seen, 
these par t icu lar  sentences do not require any special  gramma- 
t i c a l  principles beyond those independently required for 
copula sentences i n  general. It should be the  ease, i n  
general, that  pseudo-sleft sentences of the f o m  W-be-NP 
do not display grammatical dependencies across the  copula 
of the s c r t  which motivate a t ransfohat2onal  analysis.  15 
We have attempted t o  make c lea r  what s o r t  of evidence 
would argue against generating pseudo-cleft sentences i n  the  
base. A s  f a r  a s  I can determine, there  a r e  no examples which 
indicate that generating pseudo-cleft sentences i n  t h i s  manner 
resul ts  i n  loss of generality of the  grammar. Specifically. 
with regard t o  certain cases involving existent ial  there, 
we have attempted t o  show that these are  generated only i n  
the base. 16 
We have seen thet  a dual source for  pseudo-cleft sen- 
tences is not only unavoidable, but further, that  there is  
some positive syntactic evidence which indicates the need t o  
posit a source other than the transfonaational source. This 
i s  t o  account for  facts  relat ing trj, There-Insertion. (In 
the sections which foPfow, we w i l l  c ~ n s i d e r  more evidence fo r  
a dual source for  speudo-clefts.) We are  therefore l e f t  with 
a si tuation which can be described i n  the following sort of 
diagram : 
Pseudo-cleft sentences can derive from a source i n  the base, 
or can be transf ormationaf Py derived. Certain sentences, 
(A),  can be derived only in  the base (e. g. There- Insert ien) . 
Other pse~ds-c lef t  sentences, (B) , can only be transf oma- 
t ionally derived (e. g. examples with' reflexives). Finally, 
a sub$et a pseudo-cleft sentences can derive from ei ther  
source. (We w i l l  show i n  Chapter 3 thet  for  the subset of 
pseudo-clefts which derive from either'source, no systen~atic 
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senanti,c ambiguity can be associated with the  derivational 
ambiguity.) Having discussed why pseudo-cleft sentences ,. 
derive from both a transformational and a base source, we 
should now consider the reasons fo r  adopting the Extraction 
Theory for  pseudo-cleft sentences. 17 
6. Extraction or Deletion? 
In the course of t he i r  discussion on pseudo-cleft sen- 
tences, Bach and Peters [I9681 consider the  Extraction Theory 
proposed by Chamsky [1967], and attempt t o  show that  such a 
theory must be rejected, We w i l l  consider t he i r  cri t icisms 
here, and attempt t o  show tha t  they can be met. Further, we 
w i l l  show that the  Deletion Theory i t s e l f  has serious defects 
and that  the  Extraction Theory i s  i n  fact  preferable. 
The f i r s t  objection raised by Bach and Peters concerns 
the fact  that  on the Extraction Theory the  focus of the 
pseudo-cleft sentence cannot be determined a t  the deep 
structure level. The predicate is &ty a t  the deep level, 
and there is  no indication as  to which particular constituent 
of the embedded sentence w i l l  be extracted. The Extraction 
Rule is  stated as  a general schema i n  order t o  express the 
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generalization tha t  any major category can appear i n  focus 
position. It is  not u n t i l  o f t e r  the  ExtractbamRulehas . 
applied tha t  it is  possible t o  determine the  focus constituent 
( in  f ac t  t h i s  is not possible u n t i l  t he  level  of phonetically 
interpreted surface structure).  W e  re jec t ,  of course, 
notational t r i c k s  t o  achieve a marking of focus i n  deep 
structure.  
Notice, however, the t  i n  the  Deletion Theory i t s e l f ,  the  
focus posit ion of the  pseudo-cleft is occupied by a f u l l  sen- 
tence a t  the  deep s t ruc ture  level  (ef. (22)). The constituent 
which ends up a s  the  focus is tha t  constituent which remains 
a f t e r  the  deletion ru le  has applied. A t  the  deep s t ruc ture  
level,  before the  application of the  deletion rule,  t he  focus. 
is  not marked i n  any way. I f  one were t o  propose an in te r -  
pret ive r u l e  t o  determine the focus a t  the  deep s t ruc ture  
level ,  it would essent ia l ly  have t o  be a re s t a tmen t  of the  
deletion transformation. Such a r u l e  would have t o  examine 
2 3 both embedded sentences (e.g, S and S of (22 ) )  and would 
have t o  makk t he t  portion of the  rightmost sentence which is 
not ident ical  with any portion of the  leftmost sentence as  
-
the  focus. This would therefore dup\licate the  operation of 
the  deletion transfornation, and would needlessly complicate 
the gramar,  Thus, neither the  Extraction nor Deletion 
Theory provides a way t o  determine the. focus const2t uent a t  
the  deep s t ruc ture  level.  
6.1. Evidence from Distribution of Pro-Forms. The 
second objection t o  the  extraction theory which Bach and 
Peters advance involves cer ta in  problems concerning t h e  
d is t r ibut ion  of pro-forms i n  the  r e l a t i v e  clauses of t h e  
pseudo-cleft, They note tha t  w h a t  -is  not usually used a s  a 
pro-form f o r  animate nouns, as in:  
(53) *What I persuaded t o  leave was Mary. 
(54) *What is easy t o  please i s  John. 
(It should he noted tha t  t h e i r  discussion is re s t r i c t ed  t o  
pseudo-cleft sentences with i n i t i a l  what-clauses.) -- However, 
would not be s t r i c t l y  correct,  as  they point out, t o  
r e s t r i c t  pseudo-cleft sentences with whet -clauses such t ha t  
only inanimate nouns may appear in  focus position. Consider 
examples such as t h e  following: 
18 (55) What I saw was Mary. 
(56) *What I amazed was Mary.  
\ 
(57) What concerned John was Mary. 
(58) *What loves John is Mary. 
The correct  generalization, Bach and Peters maintain, i s  tha t  
the  pat tern of grarmnaticality of (55) - (58) i s  a function of 
57 
t he  d i s t r i bu t iona l  pa t t e rn  of t h e  pro-f o m  sanething: 
(59) a. I saw something. 
b. *I amzed something. 
c. Something concerned John. 
d. *Something loves John. 
The sentences (55) - (58) c o n s t i t u t e  a problem f o r  t h e  
Extraction Theory i n  t he  following way. when e const i tuent  
i s  operated on by the ext ract ion ru le ,  a representa t ive  pro- 
form is  l e f t  i n  i t s  place. For human nouns who i s  l e f t  
-
behind, f o r  inanimate nouns what is l e f t  behind, and so  
-
for th .  Noting t h a t  (55) and (57) a r e  grammatical, how is it 
t h a t  t h e  pro-form what -can be l e f t  i n  place of animate nouns? 
For example, (57) would derive from: 
Mary concerned John A 
The extract ion r u l e  would have t o  move the  constitu.ent Mary 
i n t o  predicate  posi t ion,  leaving 2 pro-form behind. The pro- 
form could be what (as well  as  who for. t h i s  pa r t i cu l a r  case),  
-
'. 
and t h i s  spec i f i c  cha rac t e r i s t i c  would be expressed i n  t h e  
s e l e c t i s n a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  of the verb concern. However, Bach 
and Peters  point  out (p. 6) : 
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(61) "Now t h i s  i s  a decisive f ac t  d i sc~nf i rming a l l  
Extracting Analyses i n  which the  select ion of t h e  
pseudo-clefted noun phrase i s  carr ied out by a 
transformation; f o r  it i s  impossible t o  t e l l  
a t  t he  t i q e  when t h i s  ru le  applies whether the  
noun phrase selected could be replaced by something 
s ince it can . . . have been removed a r b i t r a r i l y  f a r  
from the  element (s) with which it par t ic ipates  i n  
select ional  res t r ic t ions .  I' 
They go on t o  give examples such as  the following: 
(62) - John i s  thought t o  have been amused by the  joke. 
If t h i s  were the embedded sentence within the  pseudo-cleft 
deep structure,  there  would be no way t o  te l l ,  a t  the  time 
the extracting ru le  applied, whether or  not the  constituent 
John could be replaced by what ( i .e .  (WH) something) as  a 
- -
pro-form, s ince t h i s  consti tuent is  removed from the  elements 
with which it enters into select ional  res t r ic t ions .  There- 
fore, the  Extraction Theory f a i l s  t o  derive sentences such 
as (55) and (57).  
We w i l l  claim t ha t  such sentences a r e  indeed not derived 
$ 
by the  Extraction Rule, but ra ther  derive from the  base. 
Further, we w i l l  attempt t o  show t h a t  the  basic source m i l s t  
be the  source fo r  such sentences, and tha t  the  f ac t s  present- 
ed by Bach and Peters cause serious problems f o r  the  Deletion 
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Theory. 
In t h i s  regard, consider the  following s i tuat ion.  A .- 
verb such as  believe, es Bach and Peters note, can take both 
someone and something a s  i t s  object: 
(63) a .  I believe someone. 
b. I believe John. 
(64) a .  I believe something. 
b. I believe tha t  John i s  in te l l igent ,  
Notice that  while a pseudo-cleft such as (65a) i s  well-formed, 
(65b) i s  not : 
(65j a. What I believe i s  tha t  John i s  in te l l igent .  
b. *What I believe is John. 
However, what is  t o  b:l ock (65b) i n  t h e  Deletion Theory, when 
deep s t ructures  such as  the following a r e  generated: 
(66) [[ the  thing [ I believe something] ] be [ I believe 
John ] ] 
The f i r s t  embedded sentence, - I believe something, is w e l l -  
formed, and so  i s  the  second sentence, I believe John. What 
prevents the  deletion r u l e  from applying, giving (65b) ? 
Bach and Peters attempt t o  solve t h i s  problem by noting 
\ 
that  there  a r e  two d i s t inc t  senses of the  verb believe 
involved, and that f o r  t h i s  reason t h e  two occurrences of 
believe i n  (66) should be considered a s  non-identical verbs. 
To substant ia te  the  claim tha t  two verbs a r e  involved, they 
60 
note, among other  things , t h e  poss ibi - l i ty  of t h e  following 
sor t  of con t ras t :  
(67) 1 bel ieve  t h e  claim t h a t  John i s  a l i a r ,  but I 
bei ieve  him. 
The two senses of the  verb a r e  qu i t e  c l ea r ,  and it i s  perhaps 
reasonable t o  consider t he  verbs of (66) a s  non-identical  for 
t h i s  reason. 
This p a r t i c u l a r  s o r t  of explanat ion, however, f a i l s  f o r  
other cases which a r e  analogous. Consider, f o r  example: 
(68) a. *\?hat he kicked was Mary. 
b. *What he found i n  t h e  garden was Mary. 
(69) e,  What he kicked was the tree, 
b. What he found i n  t he  garden was t h e  shovel. 
The Deletion Theory pred ic t s  t h a t  sentences such as (68) a r e  
well  formed, s ince  such sentences would der ive  from the  
following s o r t  of s t ruc tu re  ( fo r  (68a)) : 
\ he kicked Mary 
2 3 The verbs _I_ kick i n  S and S i n  (70) cannot be considered a s  
non-identical (i. e, t he  sense of t he  verb i s  completely in- 
dependent of t he  marking f ~ r  animacy o f - t h e  object of the  
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verb). Nothing prevents the  occurrence of he kicked i n  S 3 
from being deleted. Completely analogous considerat ions ,. 
hold for (68b). 
The deviance of sentences such as  (68a-b) resides i n  the  
fac t  tha t  the  semantic feature cmtent of the  NPs connected 
by the  copula is i n  conf l ic t  (compare these with the  analogous 
(28b)). It i s  n ~ t  possible t o  equate an inanimate noun phrase 
(what he kicked, what he found) with an animate noun phrase 
(Mary). Such sentences a r e  marked as  deviant on the same 
basis as  sentences such a s  (28b) and (30). (Therefore, they 
could not be generated i n  the  base, s ince t h e i r  semantic 
features do not agree i n  the relevant sense. They could not 
be generated by the  Extraction Transformation ei ther ,  s ince 
only the  pro-form who - is  left behind f o r  human NPs extracted. ) 
However, the  Deletion Theory generates sentences such as (68) 
from structures  such as  (70). 
Thf s observation uncovers a serious semantic problem 
w i t h  the  deep s t ructures  posited by t h e  Deletion Theory, It 
i s  reasonable t o  assume t ha t  sentences such as (28b), (30), 
and those of (68) a r e  t o  b e  marked a s  deviant on the  basis of 
a semantic pr inciple  of feature i n c d p a t i b i l i t y  (as discussed). 
But they cannot be ruled out (or mark.ed a s  deviant) on tha t  
basis  within the Deletion Theory, s ince the  Deletion Theory 
a s  s ta ted  by Bash and Peters necessarily involves violat ion 
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of such f ea tu re  agreement. Observe, once again, example (22). 
The i n i t i a l  c lause  i s  a r e l a t i v e  c lause  with t h e  head noun ,. 
thing. In  t h i s  case  t h e  head n,oun i s  marked a s  semantically 
concrete. However, t he  noun phrase i n  focus pos i t ion  i s  an 
NP which dominates a sentence, and is  marked a s  semantically 
abs t ract .  Thus, a concrete MP i s  equated with an abs t rac t  
NP, and (22) should be a s  deviant a s  sentences such as :  
(71) a.  *The c a r  is John bought t h e  car .  
be *That cha i r  is  t ru th .  
In order f o r  t h e  Deletion Theory t o  work, then, it is  necessary 
t o  abandon a p r inc ip le  of semantic f ea tu re  agreement, and t o  
f ind an a l t e r n a t i v e  explanation f o r  t h e  deviance of (28b), 
(301, and (68). 
The problems we have been discussing a r e  avoided e n t i r e l y  
i f  the Deletion Theory is  abandoned i n  favor of t h e  Extract ion 
Theory. That is ,  t he  Extract ion Theory will not generate 
sentences such a s  (68a) and (68b), because an animate NP has 
been c l e f t ed  i n  these  cases and the Extract ion Theory could 
leave only t h e  anhmate pro-fom i n  place  of t h e  c l e f t ed  NB 
(i, e. who -but not - what). The question now a r i s e s  a s  t o  how 
sentences such a s  (55) and (57) a r e  generated. These, notice,  
could not be derived i n  t h e  Extract ion Theory s ince  t h e  5n- 
animate pro-form what is  found i n  clauses i n  which animate 
NPs would have been extracted.  Our cla'irrr is  t h a t  t he re  i s  no 
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problem connected with th i s ,  s ince sentences such a s  (55) and 
(5 7) w i l l  be generated by the  base i n  any event, given the  ,. 
expansion NP-be-NP. 
Consider a s  an example sentence (57), I f  t h i s  is gen- 
erated i n  the base then we have a s p e c i f i c a t i ~ n a l  statement 
i n  which the NP what concerned John i s  equated with the  NP 
Mary. The reason why t h i s  i s  not ruled out is the following: 
the par t icular  semantic properties of the  verb concern (and 
verbs of t h i s  c lass ) ,  whatever these may be i n  de ta i l ,  a r e  
such that  inanimate pro-form subjects of such verbs ( i .  e. 
what something, e tc . )  can be taken as  referr ing t o  animates. 
-9 
For example, any theory must have a way t o  account f o r  the  
following difference between verbs: 
(72) a.  Something concerns John, namely, Mary, 
b. "Something kicked John, namely, Mary. 
On t h e  basis of examples such a s  (72) we conclude tha t  it is  
a par t icular  property of a given class of verbs whether o r  
not inanimate pro-form subjects (or objects) of such verbs 
can be specified as animates. I f  t h i s  is  true,, then i n  a 
phrase such as what concerns John, t h e  pro-form what -w i l l  
receive t h i s  specif ic  semantic infordat ion projected by t h e  
verb concern. T ~ u s ,  t o  equate what concerns John with Mary 
involves no semantic violat ions i n  (57), jus t  as  there  a r e  no 
violations i n  (72a). 
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On the  other hand, i n  sentences such as (58) and (72b), 
there is  indeed a semantic violation. The par t icu lar  verbs ,. 
love and kick do not allow inanimate subjects, and thus could 
-
not be generated. Furthermore, sentences such a s  (68a) and 
(68b) could not be generated, since the  phrases what he kicked 
and what he found i n  the  garden can only r e f e r  t o  inanimates, 
and thus cannot be equated with animates, such as Mary. The 
part icular  verbal expressions i n  these cases do not allow an 
inanimate pro-form object t o  r e f e r  t o  an a n h a t e  ent i ty .  
Thus, t h e  base generates the  correct  s e t  of cases, and ex- 
cludes t h e  deviant set, on the basis of seaantic feature  
agreement. 
Once again, we have a case a7alogous t o  t h e  case invol- 
ving ex i s t en t i a l  there. That is, a ce r t a in  c lass  of pseudo- 
c l e f t  sentences -- i . e . ,  those with the  pro-form what -i n  the  
i n i t i a l  clause, but with animate NPs i n  focus posit ion -- 
cannot be generated i n  e i the r  t ransfomational  theory dis- 
cussed. Once again, the  claim is  tha t  t h i s  s e t  of pseudo- 
c l e f t  sentences can be generated only i n  the  base. I f  such 
sentences can be generated only i n  t h e  base, then it should 
be t r u e  tha t  factors  which motivate 2 transformational 
analysis should not be found with such cases. Such sentences 
should not manifest the  s o r t  of grammatical connectedness 
which motivates a transformational anaXysis. A spec i f ic  
counterexample t o  the  posit ion we have arrived a t  would be 
one i n  which the  form - what appears i n  the  i n i t i a l  clause, 
,. 
where an animate NP is  %n focus position, yet  where there  i s  
gramat  i c a l  connectedness across the  copula which would 
motivate a transformational analysis.  This would be a case 
which, i f  base generated, would cause otherwise unnecessary 
complication i n  the  grarmnar, 0.15. would cons t i tu te  an exception 
t o  otherwise general principles.  
As far as  P can determine, there  a r e  no such counter- 
examples. It should be borne i n  mind tha t  sentences such as 
the following: 
(73) 'hart concerns John i s  himself. 
do not cons t i tu te  counterexamples. Even though it appears ss 
i f  ref lexivizat ion operates "across the  copula" i n  such cases, 
it is  not t rue  tha t  the  coreferent ia l i ty  pat terns  of sentences 
such a s  (73) a r e  pa ra l l e l  with patterns found i n  non-clefted 
sentences (see note 3). Thus, consider, f o r  example: 
( 7 4 )  
What John wants cz] t o  be concerned about 
i s  himself, 
In such sentences, the  ref lexive prodom may be coreferent ia l  
e i ther  with - John o r  B i l l .  In  the  no-clsfted sentence, 
-
however, there  is only one poss ib i l i ty :  
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(75) John wants t o  be concerned about h i m e l f .  
Hence, generating sentences auch as  (73) and (74) i n  t h e  base 
does not c rea te  otherwise unnecessary complication i n  the  
grammar, s ince any theory must formulate rules  f o r  csref erence 
i n  cases where the  ref lexive pronoun forms the focus of the  
sentence ( i .  e. bears the  intonation center) .  Aside £ran such 
cases as  (731, there  do not appear t o  be counterexamples of 
the  s o r t  specified i n  the  previous paragraph. 
6.2. Arpuments from the  Defivation of Cleft  Sentences. 
We have argued i n  the  previous section tha t  che Deletion 
Theory of pseudo-cleft sentences involves ce r t a in  smant  i c  
problems, i .e.  it must be the  case tha t  semantically concrete 
, NPs can be equated with semantically abstract  NPs. Further- 
more, given t h i s  feature  of the  Deletion Theory, there  i s  no 
non-ad hoc means of excluding sentences such as (68a) and 
(68b), since these can derive from structures  such as  (70). 
$ 
So fax, then, w e  have presented only negative evidence. A t  
this  point, however, w e  w i l l  consider - independent posi t ive  
evidence i n  favor of the  Extraction Theory, 
It i s  argued i n  Chapter 2 tha t  c l e £ t  sentences derive 
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from pseudo-cleft sentences by a syntactic t r a n s f o m t  ion 
which extraposes the  i n i t i a l  clause of the  pseudo-cleft to t he  
end of the  sentence, leaving t h e  form - it i n  subject position. 
(For de ta i l s  of t h i s  derivation see Chapter 2).  The Extrac- 
t ion Theory, but ,- not the Deletion Theory, allows us t o  derive 
cer ta in  c l e f t  sentences which otherwise present serious 
problems f o r  any analysis.  W e  r e f e r  t o  c l e f t  sentences whish 
have prepositional phrases in  focus position. Consider, f o r  
example : 
(76) a. It was John who I gave the  book to. 
b. It was John t o  w k m  I gave the  book. 
c. It was t o  John tha t  I gave the  book. 
If we search f o r  pseudo-cleft sources for these sentences, w e  
see that  the f i r s t  two sentences are  not problematic, but the  
l a s t ,  (76c), presents serious problems (pointed out i n  
Akmaj i a n  [ 19703). (76a) and (76bj can derive respectively 
from the following: 
(77) ( the one) who I gave the  book t o  was John. 
(78) ( the one) t o  whom I gave t he  book was John. 
However, what is  the  source fo r  (76c)? W e  see  tha t  there  is 
no well-formed pseudo-cleft source wgich gives us the  proper 
form t o  derive (76c) ( i .  e. with a PP i n  focus position) : 
( 7 9 )  a. *Who I gave the  book was t o  John. 
b. *Who I gave the  book t o  was t o  John. 
Given the  Extraction Theory, however, t h i s  problem has 
a natural  solution. To see t h i s ,  consider the  following ,. 
input s t ructure:  
(80) 
1- 
A2 be A Pred 
it ha t  /+\ NP A I
I A 
I: v I A A  
gave the book P NP 
I I 
t o  John 
Let us consider various poss ib i l i t i e s ,  given t h i s  input 
structure.  F i r s t  of a l l ,  the extraction r u l e  could extract  




it be /"\ NP  





I A A gave the book P NP 
I 4 
t o  who 
The WH-fronting r u l e  can reow move the  WH word who - t o  the  
front of the  sentence replacing -9 t ha t  thus deriving (77). 
By extraposition of t h i s  i n i t i a l  clause we derive (76a). 
Alternatively, the  WH-fronting r u l e  could transport the  
en t i r e  PP dominating the  W-word, replacing the  complementizer 
that  deriving (78) and u l t h a t e l y  (76b). Consider now the  
-' 
derivation of (76c). Given (80) a s  the  input structure,  
the extraction ru le  can operate t o  extract  the  PP and place 




t o  
I 
John 
The cruc ia l  f a c t  here is tha t  the  extraction ru le  leaves no 
pro-form behind for the  prepositional phrase. (This i s  
discussed fur ther  i n  the  next chspter, where it i s  pointed 
out tha t  there  a r e  no syntactic pro-forms available i n  
ErEglish f o r  PPs such as t o  John i n  (76c). ) Since no pro-form 
i s  l e f t  behind, there  is  no WH ward t o  f ront ,  and t h i s  re-  
s u l t s  i n  clauses headed by the complementizer - tha t  ( i .  e. - tha t  
'4 
i s  not l o s t  by replacement with a WH-word). Structures such 
as (82) then undergo extraposition to'  f o m  c l e f t  sentences. 
(82), then, provides the  source fo r  (76c). 
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Notice, furthermore, t h a t  the  extraction theory makes 
a c ruc ia l  prediction for ,  such cases: namely, tha t  when t h e  ,. 
c l e f t  has a PP such as  t o  John i n  focus position, the  follow- 
ing clauses - must be headed by the  complmentizer tha t .  Since 
no WH pro-form is  l e f t  behind for  FPs, only a - that i n i t i a l  
clause can resu l t .  This prediction is  borne out: 
(83) a. It w a s  t o  John - t ha t  I gave the  book. 
b, * I t  was t o  John who I gave the  book. 
c.  * I t  was t o  John t o  whm I gave the  book, 
I f  w e  now examine the Deletion Tb.eory with respect t o  
t h i s  data,  w e  see tha t  the  .&letion Theory provides no 
account f o r  sentences such a s  (76c). The closest  deep 
s t ructure  source f o r  (76c) would have t o  be: 
/ I 
t o  John 
The deletion ru le  could apply t o  derive sentences (77) and 
(78), and these present no problems. However, (76c) could 
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not be derived, F i r s t  of a l l ,  t he  preposition i n  s3 would 
always be deleted, since it is ident ica l  with the  preposition 
2 in S , and therefore w e  could not derive the  prepositional 
phrase i n  focus position. Furthermore, even i f  w e  grant 
that  by some means ve could derive the  PP i n  focus posit ion,  
we woilld s t i l l  -b'e l e f t  with the  problem of how t o  get r i d  of 
the preposition i n  the i n i t i a l  clause: 
(85) a. *The one who I gave the  book t o  was t o  John, 
b. *The one t o  whom I gave the  book was t o  John. 
The Deletion Theory, then, involves a t  l e a s t  two 
problems: (a) how t o  avoid deletion of the  preposition i n  
focus position, and (b) how t o  eliminate the  preposition i n  
the i n i t i a l  clause. Furthermore, i n  the  Deletion Theory 
there would appear t o  be no reason a t  a l l  why c l e f t  sentences 
with PPs such as  t o  John i n  focus posit ion must have - tha t  
clauses. 
7. The Embedded Question Alternative 
Before ending our discussion of the syntact ic  derivation 
of pseudo-clef t sentences, w e  should consider e modification 
of the  De!letion Theory which has been suggested recently 
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( in unpublished papers by E. Clif ton [1969], R. Faraci [1970], 
as well as  J.R. Ross [personal communication]). The suggestion 
advanced i s  t o  modify the Deletion Theory so that  the  i n i t i a l  
clause of the pseudo-cleft has the s t a tus  of an embedded 
question, ra ther  than the  s ta tus  of a r e l a t i v e  clause. Thus, 
for  a sentence such as (16a) (repeated here as (86a)) the  
underlying s t ruc ture  on t h i s  proposal would roughly be (86b): 
($6) a. What John read was e book about himself. 
b. s1 
-
A 2  
it v A  Q NP be I A3 A. it I 
John V NP A 
read WH+amething John 
A 
v 13"\ 
read a book 
about 
himself 
The Deletion Rule would apply t o  such a structure,  a s  
before, 19 
The proposed change saves the  Deletion Theory from the  
semantic problems mentioned ear l ie r .  That is, i f  t he  i n i t i a l  
clause i s  a question ra ther  than a ~ ~ l a t i v e  clause, as  i n  (229, 
then it w i l l  have t h e  s t a tus  of a acmantically abstract  clause, 
and the  NP dominating t h e  question w i l l  be semantically an 
abstract  NP. Thus, both the i n i t i a l  and final clauses of the  
pseudo-cleft deep s t ruc tu re  w i l l  always be abs t rac t ,  and 
therefore  t h e  problem of conf l i c t ing  f ea tu re  composition w i l l  
vanish, and t h e  objections ra i sed  i n  sec t ion  6 .1  no l ~ n g e r  
hold. However, w e  w i l l  show i n  t h i s  sec t ion  t h a t  t h i s  pro- 
posed modification i s  incorrect  f o r  severa l  reasons, and 
must be re jec ted.  Furthermore, while t h i s  approach solves 
ce r t a in  semantic problems, w e  w i l l  show t h a t  it leads t o  o ther  
equally ser ious  semantic problems. 20 
F i r s t  l e t  us note t h a t  t h e  p r o p ~ s e d  hypothesis (hence- 
f o r t h  the Question Theory) has some i n i t i a l  p l aus ib i l i t y .  
That is, t h e  f i r s t  clause of t h e  pseudo-cleft a c t s  a s  a 
question (and is of ten  an echo of a question which is  being 
answered) i n  that it contains a var iable ,  and t h e  focus of 
t h e  pseudo-cleft a c t s  a s  an answer t o  t h e  i n i t i a l  question i n  
t ha t  it provides a spec i f ica t ion  of t he  var iable .  This is  not 
reason enough t o  generate t h e  i n i t i a l  c lause  as a question, 
but does i nd i ca t e  t h a t  t h e  proposal r e f l e c t s  a c e r t a i n  
i n t u i t i o n  about t he  use of pseudo-cleft sentences. 21 
The most i n t e r e s t i ng  arguments fox t h i s  proposal a r e  
advanced by Faraci  [1970], t h e  cen t r a l  argument of which has 
% 
t o  do with t he  f a c t  that embedded questions, but not free 
22 
r e l a t i ves ,  may appear i n  c l e f t e d  form: Consider, f o r  
example: 
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(87) a. What it was tha t  John bought was not c lear .  
b. *I threw out what it was tha t  John bought. 
Noting t h i s  fact ,  Faraci goes on t o  point out tha t  (at l eas t  
i n  h i s  speech) the  i n i t i a l  clause of t h e  pseudo-cleft may be 
in  c lef ted form: 
(88) What it was tha t  John bought was a car. 
Thus, t he  argument is tha t  jus t  as  the  embedded question, (87a), 
can be i n  c le f ted  form, so can the  i n i t i a l  clause of the  
pseudo-cleft, (88). However, t he  f r e e  r e l a t i v e  i n  (87b) may 
not be i n  c le f ted  fom. ( I t  should be noted here, however, 
that  fo r  my own speech sentences such as (88) a r e  more o r  l e s s  
margina 1. ) 
~ e r a c i  goes on t o  point out additional,  but weaker, 
evidence i n  favor of the  question hypothesis. For example, 
he maintains tha t  the  d is t r ibut ion  of cer ta in  adverbs is  
ident ical  i n  embedded questions and pseudo-clefts, but 
dif ferent  i n  f r e e  re la t ives .  Thus, compare the following : 
(89) a.  What, exactly, John bought is  not c lear .  
b., *I threw out what, exactly, John bought. 
c. m a t ,  exactly, John bought was a car. 
(Again w e  give these sentences i n  t e h s  of Fareci 's  judge- 
ments. ) The argument here i s  tha t  the  adverb exactly can 
appear i n  the  embedded question (89a) as  well as  the  pseudo- 
c l e f t  (89c), but not i n  the f r e e  re la t ive .  Therefore, the 
i n i t i a l  clause of the  pseudo-cleft is not a f r e e  re la t ive ,  
but an embedded question, (Once again, however, f o r  my m .- 
speech (89c )  is ungrammatical. ) We musk now show, however, 
that  even though there  is some i n i t i a l  p l aus ib i l i ty  fo r  the  
hypothesis, there  is qu i t e  a b i t  of evidence against the  
proposal. 23 
The f i r s t  s e t  of arguments which we present indicates 
that  the  i n i t i a l  clause of the  pseudo-cleft cannot be an 
embedded question, since we do not f ind ce r t a in  morphemes or  
formal propertf es which w e  expect t o  f ind i n  embedded ques- 
tions. For example, i f  t he  i n i t i a l  clause were an embedded 
question, we would expect t o  f ind - e l s e  and -9 ever but we do 
not. Consider: 
(90) a ,  What e l se  he bought is not c lear .  
b. What he ever worked on i s  sixnply not k n m .  
(91) a. *What else he bought was e car. 
b. *What he ever worked on was h i s  thesis .  
W e  see that t he  embedded- questions of (90) a h i t  - e l se  and 
ever* however, t h e  clauses of the  pseudo-cleft i n  (91) do 
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not. Pursuing t h i s  l i n e  further,  w e  note tha t  i f  the  clause 
of the  pseudo-cleft were a question we( would expect t o  f ind 
whether-clauses , which-clauses, and clauses wit la  double 
occurrences of WH words. Compare the embedded questions of 
(92) with the  pseudo-cleft sentences of '(93) : 
(92) a.  Whether he w i l l  go is  not known a t  t h i s  time. 
b. Which book he read is  hard t o  determine. 
c. Who kissed whom i s  not c lear .  
(93) a. "Whether he w i l l  go is yes. 24 
b. "Which book he read was War and Peace. 
c .  *Who kissed whom was John kissed Mary. 
Comparison of (92) and (93) reveals tha t  the  i n i t i a l  clause 
of the  pseudo-cleft i n  f a c t  does not behave l i k e  an embedded 
quest ion. Further counter-evidence is found i n  t h e  df s t r ibu-  
tion of any i n  embedded questions. Since any is found i n  
embedded questions w e  should a l so  get it i n  pseudo-clefts 
in  the  i n i t i a l  clause, but we do not: 
(94) a. I don't know what makes any sense. 
b. *What makes any sense i s  not ~ o h n ' s  theory. 
Faraci attempts t o  counter t h i s  by claiming tha t  i n i t i a l  
embedded questions with a_ny a r e  ungrammatical i n  general. 
However, examples such as  the  following show tha t  t h i s  i s  
not t rue :  
(95) What anyone can do about the  war now i s  unclear. 
As a f i n a l  argument of t h i s  sor t ,  note tha t  i n  embedded 
questions it is  possible t o  have a prhosed  prepositional 
phrase; however, i n  the  clause of the  .pseudo-cleft t h i s  is 
impossible : 
(96) a. To whom one should give the  applicetion form 
is not clear. 
b. *To whom one should give the  application form 
is the registrar.  
Thus, the Question !I'heory makes fa l se  predictions as t o  the 
possible form of pseudo-clef t sentences. 
However, there a re  more serious defects. If the Question 
Theory i s  correct, then pseudo-clef t sentences with headless 
i n i t i a l  clauses a re  completely unrelated t o  pseudo-clefts 
with i n i t i a l  relatfve clauses, such as: 
(97)  The thing that  John wants is  a car. 
In (97) the i n i t i a l  clause is a genuine relative,  a fact  which 
can be tested by noting that it is  impossible fo r  the clause 
t o  occur in  c l e f t  form: 
(98) *The thing that  it is that  John wants i s  a car. 
Since the clause of (97) i s  a re la t ive  clause, it should bear 
no relation. t o  the sentence: 
(99) What John wants is a car. 
since the i n i t i a l  clause here i s  supposedly ia question. 
Xn order t o  preserve the relat ion between sentences such 
as  (99) and (97), Faraci proposes t o  herive sentences such as  
(97) from sentences such as  (99), i n  the manner of the 
derivation of ~ u e s t i o n s  proposed by Baker [1968]. 
Baker proposes t o  derive sentences such 'es (100a) from (100b) : 
(100) a. I f ina l ly  found out the  brand she uses. 
b. I f ina l ly  found out which brand she uses. 
In a similar manner, Faraci wishes t o  derive the  t h i ~  that  
John wants from what John wants, thus claiming that  the  former 
clause is  rea l ly  a question. Masever, i f  t h i s  were the case 
we would expect sentences such as  (981, since questions may 
occur i n  clefted fom. 25 Therefore, the  Embedded Quest ion 
Theory forces us t o  t r ea t  (97) and (99) as unrelated. Qne 
would expect some difference i f  i n  fac t  the  clause of one were 
a question and that  of the  other a relat tve,  but (97) and (99) 
are synonymous i n  t h i s  case. 
W e  present now evidence that  the  Question Theory must 
face serious semantic problems connected with the referential-  
i t y  of noun phrases. Consider an example such as: 
(101) What John a t e  was the  steak. 
The nominal phrases underlined i n  (101) are  b ~ t h  understood 
. t o  be referential ,  i. e. t o  have a specific referent i n  the  
universe of dfscourse. Now i f  t h i s  is  the  case, then the 
phrase whet J o b  a t e  cannot be an embedded question, since 
embedded questions cannot be used t o  refer  t o  objects in the  
\ 
world, and do not have specific referents in  the sense that  
re la t ive  nominals do. 
We can i n  fact  t e s t  the  claim tha t  phrases such as 
what John a t e  a re  referent ial  NPs i n  seGeral ways. Consider 
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first the fact  t'nat in a s g ~ i f l c a t f o a ~ l  ste tmect ,  the past- 
copular NP and the  pre-copuler lP9P must both be re ferent i s l .  , 
This is s h m  by comparing sectences such as the  following: 
(102) a. The thing tha t  John a t e  was the  steak. 
b. "Some thing tha t  John a t e  was the  steak. 
Thus, a phrase such as  same thing T h a t  John ate,  which i s  
understood t o  be nm-referent ia l ,  i . e ,  t o  have ms specif ic  
referent  i n  t h e  un%verse of discourse, cannot occur in a 
specif icat ional  statement where the post-copuler W is  
referent ia l .  (This, we should note, is completely pa ra l l e l  
with the  property mentioned e a r l i e r  tha t  i n  sgecLficetiona1 
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statements relevant semantic features must agree. Return- 
ing now t o  (101) w e  note tha t  s ince the pos t -cqu le r  NP is  
re ferent ia l ,  t he  i n i t i a l  nominal must a l so  be re ferent ia l ,  
Hence, it cannot be an embedded question, 
Another simple t e s t  f o r  the claim tha t  the i n i t i a l  
clause of the  pseudo-cleft must be r e fe ren t i a l  has t o  do with 
the f ac t  that appositive r e l a t i v e  clauses can be adjoined t o  
such phrases. Appositive clauses can be adjoined only t o  
Ws which have specif ic  referents,  as  w e  see  from the  f s l l m -  
', ing examples : 
(103) a. The man, who was very t a l l ,  addressed us. 
b. *Some man, who was very t e l l ,  addressed us. 
Given t h i s  fac t ,  w e  now note tha t  such appositives can be 
adjoined t o  the i n i t i a l  clauses of pseudo-cleft sentences, 
but not t o  embedded questions: 
(104) What John got £ran h i s  father yesterday, which 
was vergr expensive, was that  Jagwr XKE. 27 
(105) a. *No one knows what John got from h is  father 
yesterday, which was qu i t s  expensive. 
b. *What John got from his father  yesterday, which 
was qui te  expensive, is a mystery. 28 
The embedded questions of (105) cannot take appositive 
relatives, since such clauses are not ref erentfal .  
Returning fo r  a moment t o  sentences such as  (87) end (881, 
we shcild note tha t  ~ a r a c i ' s  evidence from clef t ing possibil- 
ities is weaked a great deal by the fac t  that  certain re la t ive  
clauses can in  fac t  occur i n  clefted form. These are, i n  
part i c d a r ,  s e l a t  ive clauses with what ever : 
(106) a. Whetever it was that  John bought cost him 
a l o t  of money. 
b. She threw away whatever it was that  John bought. 
The phrases with whatever a re  clearly not questions. There- 
fore, even i f  s a t cnces  such as  (88) exist ,  they do not show 
\ 
that  the  clause of the pseudo-cleft must be an embedded 
question, since we see  here that certain re la t ive  clauses can 
occur i n  clefted fonn. 
What seems t o  be the relevant generalization here is  that  
non-referential clauses may occur i n  cledted £om. This 
generalization covers: embedded questions, which we have seen 
a re  not re ferent ia l ,  and a l s o  clauses with whatever, s ince . " 
these, too, a r e  nm-referent ia l ,  This can be seen simply in  
the f a c t  tha t  such clauses cannot occur i n  pseudo-claft sen- 
tences, nor can appositive re la t ives  be adjoined t o  them: 
(107) a. "Whatever ( i t  was tha t )  John bsught was a car. 
b. "Whatever John bought, which cost  e l o t ,  was 
broken two days l a t e r .  
Therefore, we claim tha t  non-ref e ren t i a l  clauses occur i n  
c lef ted form. (If  t h i s  is the  case, it shows why, f o r  the  
speech of ce r t a in  speakers, including myself, sentences such 
a s  (88) ere judged as deviant. That is, it is not possible 
fo r  the i n i t i a l  clause t o  be non-referential i f  the  f i n a l  
clause is  re ferent ia l .  ) 
The objective ~f t h i s  chapter has been t o  es tabl ish the  
s 
basic hypothesis tha t  pseudo-cleft sentences can derive f ram 
two syntactic sources within the grammar. This is  t h e  case 
since f o r  one c l a s s  of pseudo-cleft sentences, a 
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transformational analysis is necessary, end f o r  another c lass  
a base source is  necessary. Furthermore, there  i s  no non- 
ad hoc way t o  prevent the  base from generating pseudo-clef< 
sentences i n  any event. While given classes of pseudo-cleft 
sentences derive e i t h e r  from one source or  the  other, there 
is p a r t i a l  overlap, and f o r  a subset of pseudo-cleft 
sentences, e i the r  source i s  possible. We have attempted t o  
show that  of t h e  current transformational theories of pseudo- 
c l e f t  sentences, t h e  Extraction Theory must be chosen, given 
tha t  the  Deletion Theory (and its variant,  the  Question 
Theory) gives r i s e  t o  various semantic and syntact ic  problems 
which are not found with the Extraction Theory. 
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER2 
1. Many speakers find sentences suck as  (2a) unaccepteabPe 
(or less  acceptable than sentences (2b) - (2f)) but judge 
as acceptable sentences (2b) - (2s). For th i s  part icular  
dialect we can assume that  sentences such as (2a) obliga- 
t o r i l y  become c l e f t  sentences (e.g.  "1t was Agnew who 
Nixon chose"). Note tha t  correlated with the fact  that  
(2a) i s  unacceptable i s  the fact  that  i n  c l e f t  sentences 
the  only WH clauses which can appear in  extraposed 
position are  - who clauses (cf. + " ~ t  was a car what I I 
bought"). For further discussion, see Chapter 2. 
2. W e  assume, of course, that  the sentences of (3) have the 
same foci  a s  the sentences of (1) +nd (2). For example, 
sentence (3) is a paraphrase of sentences (la) and (2a) i f  
the intonation center of (3) comes om the constituent 
Agnew : 
(2) ('cont'd.) 
I ( i )  a. The one Nfxon chose was Agnew, 
b. Who Nixon chose was A&. 
P 
c. Nixon chose Agnew. 
The sentences of (i) a l l  have ident ical  f o c i  and pre- 
suppositions ( i .  e. focus on Agnew, with the  presupposition 
that  Nixon chose sameone). T ~ u s ,  c le f ted  and non-clefted 
sentences a r e  paraphrases provided the focus consti tuents 
a re  ident ical .  
It should be noted tha t  Bach and Peters use ce r t a in  
examples involving reflexives which do not, i n  fac t ,  
motivate a transformational analysis.  An example of t h i s  
sor t  given by them is: 
(i) What the miss i le  damaged was i t s e l f .  
Notice tha t  t h i s  is a case i n  which the ref lexive pronoun 
i s  the s o l e  i t a n  in focus position, and bears the  intona; 
t ion  center of the sentence. In cases such a s  t h i s  one, 
in  which the  ref lexive is t h e  focus, t h e  r e s t r i c t ions  
governing coref e r a t  f a l i t y  of ref lexive pronouns a r e  
relaxed, i. e. pseuds-cleft sentences of t h i s  form a r e  not 
\ 
para l l e l  with non-cleft ed sentences, Consider: 
(bi) a .  me one John wants Mary t o  describe 
I s  himlaelf. 
(3) (csnt ' d. ) 
b. The one John claimed had been cheated 
was himself. 
Note tha t  there  a r e  no non-slefted sentences pa ra l l e l  with 
these: 
( i i i )  a. *John wants Mary to describe hhscr?.f. 
b. *John claimed tha t  himself had been 
cheated. 
Thus, pseudo-cleft sentences with reflexives a s  the  so le  
focus do not provide motivation f o r  deep s t ructures  i n  
which the  phrase marker f ~r the  corresponding non-clef ted 
sentence appears. (For fur ther  discussion of t h i s  
phenomenon, see  Chapter 4, note 1.) 
In contrast ,  not ice  the sentences of (8). In these 
cases the ref lexive pronoun i s  pa r t  of a larger  phrase, 
and, i n  par t icu lar  does not bear the  intonation center. 
In such cases where the  ref lexive pronoun i s  within the  
focus phrase but does not cons t i tu te  the  so le  focus, the  
coreferent ia l i ty  pat terns  i n  c l e f t ed  and non-clefted 
sentences a r e  then para l le l .  It i s  t h i s  parallel ism 
which motivates a transformationa& analysis.  It is  in te r -  
est ing t o  note, m c e  again, tha t  even i n  sentences such 
as (81, if t h e  ref lexive is  given the  highest stress, then 
the core£ ermt i a l i t y  pa t t  e m s  change.: 
(3) (cont'd.) 
( iv)  What John wants Mary t o  do is wash H I M E L F .  
(cf. (8b)) . Thus, when using coreferent ia l i ty  patterns. 
as examp?.es of grammatical connectedness i n  pseudo-cleft 
sentences, one must be careful  t o  choose examples i n  
which the  anaphoric expression within the  focus phrase 
does - not bear the  highest str .... 2, exslrer optionally o r  
obligatori ly.  
4. For example, i f  pseudo-cleft sentences were t o  be gener- 
ated only i n  t h e  base, i n  essent ia l ly  t h e i r  surface form, 
then there  would be complication i n  generating derived 
phrases such as easy t o  please and eager t o  please, for 
reasons which have now become w e l l  knuwn. See Chomsky 
[1965]. 
5.  It should be added tha t  there  a r e  fur ther  arguments f r m ,  
grammat ice1 connectedness which have been discussed. For 
example, J.R. Ross [ c l a s s  lectures] has pointed out ghe 
parallelism s f  c le f ted  and non-clefted sentences with 
respect te t he  d is t r ibut ion  of some/=. Consider, for  
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example : 
(i) a. I doubt that czle) needs t h i s  money. 
(5) (cont'd.) 
b. I don't doubt that [zz]n~ds t h i s  m ~ m y .
( i i )  a. What I doubt i s  tha t  needs 
t h i s  money. 
b. What I don't doubt is tha t  [i:~: ] needs 
t h i s  money. 
Qnce again, the  f a c t s  manifested i n  the  pseudo-cleft 
sentence a r e  pa ra l l e l  with those manifested i n  the  ncn- 
c lef ted  sentence. Pairs such a s  ( i )  and ( i i )  provide 
addit ional  support f o r  deriving pseudo-clef t sentences 
from deep s t ruc ture  sources which incorporate the  phrase 
markers fo r  t h e  corresponding non-clefted sentences. 
6. We modify Chmsky' e theory somewhat, however, by st ipu- 
l a t ing  that the  extraction r u l e  leaves behind a pro-form 
with the marking [+W], and we drop Chmsky's r u l e  which 
converts Pt+that t o  what. -
\ 
7. The semantic i ~ t e r p r e t a t i o n  of such deep s t ructures  a s  
(17) is  discussed i n  Chapter 3, section 4 . l , ,  where it is  
pointed out t ha t  the  empty predicate Pa such s t ructures  
causes no semantic cmplicat ions .  
8. We should note tha t  it i s  just  t h i s  base expansion tha t  is 
required by the  deletion theory t o  form the  deep s t ruc ture  
of the  pseudo-cleft (cf. (22)).  Further, t h i s  expansion 
i s  required by the  &tract ion Theory whenever the  focus of 
the  pseudo-cleft i s  an NP. Recall t ha t  the  t e r n  - PRED is  
used as  a cover term for  the  nodes which can appear a f t e r  
the  copula. Thus, (17) is  more accurately represented as: 
s1 
Y g ,  
it be /- t@ 
about himself 
This t ree ,  we note, requires the base expansion 
[ WP - be - MP 1. 
9. For c l a r i f i ca t ion  of the t a m  ' specif icat ional  statement' 
see Chapter 39 section 2,1. 
10. Note that it would be too strong t o  s t a t e  tha t  the  Ws 
being eqamfed must be &dentical with respect t o  the 
(10) (cont ' d. ) 
features which play a r o l e  i n  select ional  res t r ic t ions .  
Consider, f o r  example: 
( i )  That person over there  i s  the  - man I know. 
Thus, t he  NP person i s  neutral  with regard t o  the  marking 
f o r  the  semantic feature  (Male), but ( i )  is s t i l l  well- 
formed. The cruc ia l  d i s t inc t ion  between ( i )  and (31) is 
tha t  i n  (i) the  two NPs connected by the  copula do not 
have d i s t inc t  markings f o r  the  feature  (I.  e. ( 9 )  vs. (+)I. 
In what follows we w i l l  speak sf feature  'agreement'; 
however, the  term 'agreement' w i l l  be used t o  mean 
"identi ty o r  non-distinctness". 
11. It i s  not c l ea r  tha t  the  ruf e can i n  f ac t  apply i n  such an 
environment, given the  oddity of sentences such as:  
( i )  ?The thing tha t  there  was i n  the  car was my hat.  
( i i )  ?I threw away the  thing tha t  there  was i n  the  caz  
This seems t o  be re la ted t o  the  f a c t  tha t  r e l a t i v e  clauses 
cannot occur i n  c le f ted  form: 
(f i i )  "The thtng tha t  it was that  was i n  the  ca r  
was my hat .  \ 
(Such sentences a r e  discussed fur ther  in section 7.) That 
is, it is impossible t o  r e l a t i v i z e  en itan frm post- 
copular posit ion i n  bound re la t ives .  Note, however, t ha t  
(11) (cmt'd.) 
t h i s  is possible i n  f ree  relatives:  
(iv) I threw out what there was i n  the car. 
It should be kept i n  mind that sentences such a s  .the 
following : 
(i) Whet there was i n  the car  was - a hat. 
could derive from either the  transformational o r  the base 
source. Since There- Insert ion operates on indefini te  
NPs, a sentence such as ( i )  could be derived from a 
structure such as (361, It cotfld, of course, a l so  be 
generated i n  the  base, with the expansion NP-be-NP. 
13. Incidentally, note further that  fo r  (43) there i s  no 
corresponding non-clef t eel sentence, with or without 
existent ial  I there. In particular,  the following a re  not 
p o ~ s i b l e :  1 
( i )  *His own pis to l  was next t o  B i l l .  
( i i )  *There was his  own pis to l  next t o  B i l l .  
In neither case is  the  reflexive possess%ve coreferential  
with the NP B i l l .  Yet, if it were argued that  (43) were 
\ 
derived transfonnatisnally, such a derivation woalld indeed 
require ( i i )  . Sfnce neither ( i )  nor (ii) i s  possible, 
th i s  provides further support fo r  the view that  sentences 
such a s  (43) a r e  generated only i n  t h e  base. 
14.  Note, i n  pzrt icufar,  tha t  sentences such as  (58)  a r e  not 
pseudo-cleft sentences, nor could they undergo a clegting 
transformation. They would not be labeled a s  pseudo- 
c l e f t  sentences s ince the heads of t h e  i n i t i a l  phrases 
of the  sentences of (50) a r e  not semantic variables, i n  
the  sense discussed i n  regard t o  t h e  sentences of (1) and 
(2).  Further, these cannot underga a c l e f t ing  trans£ or- 
mation fo r  t h e  reason that there  is no place within the  
pre-copular phrase from which the  post-copular phrase 
could originate. For example, the basic equation of 
(50b) i s :  
( i )  The most d i f f i c u l t  protect  of all was 
the a r t i c l e  about himself tha t  he was supposed 
t o  wr i te  fo r  his publishers. 
The re~ason why (i) e m l d  not undergo any so r t  of c l s f t i n g  
transformation i s  tha t  there  iz simply no place i n  t h e  
i n i t i a l  phrase from which the  post-copular phrase could 
be extracted, Rather, ( i )  (and q e  sentences of (48) ,  
(491, and (50)) a r e  simple basic equations, Such examples 
can be multiplied indef ini te ly ,  Consider: 
(ii) a. The only mystery Johni can1 t solve i s  
a r t i c l e  about himself which appeared 
i n  Playboy. 
b. The cross that Johni has t o  bear is the 
a r t i c l e  about himself which exposes e l l  those 
embarrassing detai ls .  
Again, these a re  basic equational statements, i n  which 
there is no way for  the pos t -c~pular  phrase t o  originate 
within the  i n i t i a l  phrase. 
15, In other words, it turns out that  pseudo-cleft sentences 
which display a syntactic form other than the form 
NP-be-NP a r e  those sentences which provide motivation for  
a transf ormat ional analysis. For example, these would 
I 
include pseudo->cleft sentences with Ws and Adj ective 
Phrases i n  focus position (cf. "Whet she did was wash 
herself vigorously", "What John i s  is easy to  please"). 
Further, as  w e  discuss in  section 6.2. and i n  Chapter 2, 
pseudo-cleft sentences with PPs i n  focus position a l s ~  
'. 
mot fvate a transf onnational analysis (in particular, these 
form the basis fo r  - c l e f t  sentences; cf. "It was t o  John 
that I gave the  book"). Our claim is that  sentences of 
t he  form NP-be-NP do not provide support f o r  a transfor-  
mational analysis. (Needless t o  say, t h i s  claim i s  
obviously based on t h e  assumption t h a t  phrases such as 
wash herself ,  easy t o  please, and t o  John a r e  not noun 
phrases, ) 
16. The argument that  sentences such a s  ( 3 4 )  can only derive 
from the base source depends crucial ly  on the existence 
of a r e s t r i c t i o n  prohibit ing There-Insertion from operat- 
ing on def in i te  NPs. Kenneth Hale has suggested t o  m e  a 
way i n  which t h i s  argument might be answered. That is, 
Hale points out tha t  one might claim that There-Insertion 
is  not res t r ic ted  ~ n l y  t o  indef in i te  bRs, end tha t  sen- 
tences such as (35) s h ~ u l d  be generated as  well-formed 
but subject t o  a special  semantic i n t e r p r e t a t l m  (not 
I 
associated with cases which have indef h i k e  NPs) . 
Specifically, it has often been noted tha t  ex i s t en t i a l  
there  can cs-occur with syntact ical ly  de f in i t e  NPs when- 
-
ever there  is a sense of "l ist ing" involved. For example: 
( i )  What did you f ind i n  the  car? '. 
( i i )  Well, there  was the  picnic basket, t he  blanket, 
t he  inner tube, the  broom you got f o r  Christmas, 
and a photo of Spire Agnm. 
Hale thus suggests that  one might argue that sentences 
such as:  
the  jack you gave m e  
( i i i )  There was 1 i n  the car. my hat  
should be generated as well-famed, and subject t o  the  
specfal interpretat fon sf "listing", a s  with (if). If 
( i i i )  were allowed i n  thfs manners then in a s t ruc ture  
2 
such as  (36) There-Insertion cmfd apply i n  S , thereby 
deriving sentences such a s  (34) from the  t sans fo rmt io~~bi l  
(extraction) source. (Notice, incidentally, t ha t  t h i s  
would be possible only with the Extraction Theory -- t he  
arguments against  the Deletion Theory would s t i l l  hold 
i n  any event, That is, whether o r  not There-Insertion 
were formulated t o  apply on de f in i t e  MPs, t h e  point is  
that the  r u l e  of There-Pnsertion would s t i l l  destroy the 
ident i ty  conditions required by the  Deletion Tkresry. ) 
It seems t o  m e  that  such an approach would be mis- 
taken, me's is, a s  for my own judgements, sentences such 
as (iii.) a r e  not acceptable, even with some special  in ter-  
pretat ion of " l i ~ t i n g ' ~ .  I would not Judge sentence (iii) 
'. 
as an appropriate answer t o  (f) : the; sense sf "l ist ing" 
a r i ses  only when there  is  i n  f a c t  a l is t  of more than one 
item given, and the  longer t h e  list the more acceptable 
(16) (cont ' d. ) 
the  sentence (obvimsfy, within reasonable l imits) .  
Thus, consider: 
(iv) What d i d  you f ind i n  the car? 
(v) a. *There was the jack you gave me i n  the car. 
b. ?There was t h e  jack you gave m e  and t h e  
lug wrench i n  the car. 
c ,  m e r e  was the  jack you gave me, the  Bug 
wrench, the  radio, and t h e  picnic basket 
in the car. 
Furthermore, a t  l e a s t  f o r  my own speech, sentences such a s  
(34) do not carry a sense af "listing", but a r e  in te r -  
preted jus t  as  sentences wfth indef in i te  NPs are. 
Compare, f o r  example: 
(vi) a. What there  was i n  the  car was my hat. 
b. What there  was i n  the  car  was a hat. I 
These a r e  both interpreted i n  the  same way -- t he  ease 
with the  de f in i t e  NP has no special  interpretat ion.  
The claim t ha t  TheteaInsertion m y  operate wfth 
de f in i t e  NPs has certain consequences which are more 
serious, however. Once the  restri,+orns on There- 
Insert ion a r e  relaxed i n  this manner, we a r e  then left 
with no explanation f a r  the  following facts: 
(16) (cont'd.) 
(vfi) a. If you're looking for your coat, there's 
one in the bedrom. 
b. *If you're looktng for your coat, there's 
it in the bedroom, 
Sentences such as (vif-b) are direct counterexamphes to 
the claim that There-Insertion may operate with definite: 
noun phrases. (As far as I know, there are no speakers 
who accept such sentences.) 
Similar examples have been discussed in a recent 
squib by Joan Bresnan [1970]. In discussing pronominali- 
zation, Bresnen argues that (vif i-a) cannot derive from 
(viit-b) : 
(vtii) a. Some students think that they are xvnning 
the show. 
b. S w e  studentsi think that some studentsi are 
runnhg the show. 
If (viii-b) were the underlying f o m  for (viii-a), it 
should be possible for There-Insertion to apply on the 
embedded sentence, produe ing : 
(ix) Sane studentsi think that there are some 
studentsi running the show. 
It should then be possible for pronominalization to apply 
on the upper cycle, producing: 
(16) (cont ' d. ) 97 
(x) *Some studentsi think that there are  they 
running the  show. 
Bresnan argues, however, that  sentences such as (x) 
cannot be generated i f  the pronoun they appears in  the 
underlying form ( i .  e. (vii i-a) wculd form the underlying 
form, as such). There-Insertfon cannot apply when there 
i s  a def in i te  pronoun present, and hence (viit-a) could 
not became (x) . If the res t r ic t ions  on There-Insertion 
a re  relaxed so that  the  rule may apply with def in i te  .NPs, 
then there I s  no way t o  block sentence (x) above. If the 
rule  is  restr icted t o  applytng with indefinites, then 
there is  an explanation fo r  sentences such as  ( x )  . 
A s  for  sentences such as  (v-c), these a r e  permissible 
only under special circumstances, and it 'is not c lear  tam 
these are generated. Note further that, a t  least in my 
own speech, such sentences occur i n  res t r ic ted  environ- 
ments. Ia: particular, they cannot be questioned or 
negated : 
(x i )  a. *Was there the  jack, the lug wrench, and the 
picnic basket i n  the car? 
% 
b. cf :  Was there a jack, a .  lug wrench, and a 
picnic basket i n  the  car2 
(16) (cont'd.) 
(x i i )  a,  *There wasn't the jack, t h e  Pug wrench, and 
the  picnic basket i n  the  car. 
b. c f :  Therewasn't  a jack, a lug wrench, and 
a picnic basket i n  the  car. 
In any event, however sentences such as  (Y-C) a r e  t o  be 
generated, it would be wrong ts a s s m e  tha t  sentences 
such a s  (v-a) could be generated i n  the same way, f o r  
reasons given above. 
1 7 ,  The arguments fo r  a transfornational  source f o r  pseudo- 
e l e f t s  which have been presented so f a r  a r e  independent 
of any par t icu lar  transformational theory of pseudo- 
c l e f t s .  Thus, the  lexfstence af a dual source f o r  
pseudo-clefts is  an issue which i s  independent of the  
issue sf  the  choice of a par t icu lar  transformational , 
t h e ~ r y  of pseudo-clefts. 
18. I d~ not f ind sentences such as  (55) as  acceptable as  
sentences such as  (57). The season has t o  do with the 
f ac t  tha t  the  pro-form what most rqaturally f u n c t i ~ n s  t o  
r e fe r  t o  human nouns with verbs which take a s  subjects 
(or objects) both abstract  nouns - and human nouns. For 
example: 
(18) (cont'd. j 
( i )  a. The Pack of jus t i ce  concerned John. 
b. Mary's s i tua t ion  concerned John. 
c. Mary concerned John. 
In a cer ta in  sense the NP Mary i n  (i-c) i s  abstract  i n  
tha t  par t icu lar  context. Thus, the  pro-form w k a t  -i s  
appropriate. (I am gra tefu l  t o  Morris Halle fo r  pointing 
out these facts . )  
19* Since t h i s  modification of the  Deletian 'HPreory s t i l l  
re ta ins  the  basic deletion process, it is a l so  subject t o  
the  cr i t ic isms advanced i n  the previous section (i. e. 
there  is s t i l l  no natural  way t o  derive prepositional 
phrases i n  focus posi t  ion). 
20, One of the  problms faced by t h i s  theory is tha t  while the  
pseudo-cleft necessarily derives frm a deep s t ruc ture  
which has the  '.ntespretation of an equation of two abstract  
NPs, the  surface s t ructures  which derive f r m  these may 
not have the  same in terpretat ion,  Consider: 
(i) e.  What he cooked was that  steak. 
', 
b. [ [ Q-he-cooked-what ] B e  
[ he-cooked-that-steak ] ] 
A sentence sue& as (i-a) derives from a s t ruc ture  such a s  
1 Q O  
(20) (cont'd.) 
( i - )  . (i-b) i s  an equation of two abstract  NPs, but (i-A) 
does not have t h i s  interpretat ion s ince t h e  NP tha t  steak 
i s  semantically concrete. Theref ore, t he  semantic reading 
of the  deep s t ruc ture  (i-b) is  not preserved by the  
Deletion Rule. 
21. J, W. Ross [personal comunication] has suggested tha t  the  
deep s t ruc ture  of the  pseudo-cleft, on t h e  Ehbedded 
Quest ion Theory, should ac tua l ly  be (roughly) rhe 
following : 
( i )  [ [ The answer t o  the  question (of) 
[ John-read-a book about himself ] ] 
However, it seems t o  me tha t  it would be d i f f i c u l t  t o  
motivate t h e  presence of the lexical. items answer and , 
question, and it is  hard t o  see what syntactic function 
these items would f u l f i l l .  A t  any ra te ,  t h i s  suggestion 
(as well as Faracf 's) is subjest  t o  the  c r i t ic i sms  we 
advance i n  t h i s  section. 
5 
22. For a discussion of the  differences .between f r e e  re la t ives  
and embedded questions, see  Bakes [1970], 
101 
23. Further, it is  necessary t o  point out tha t  the pa ra l l e l s  
between pseudo-clef t sentences and quest ion-answer pa i rs  
can be accounted f o r  i n  other ways. In  Chapter 3 we 
present a system of semantic notation which can be used i n  
simple ways t o  capture the  s imi la r i t i e s  between questions, 
answers, and pseudo-cleft sentences. 
24. (93a) is par t icular ly  damaging t o  Ross' suggestion, s ince 
the folfowing is well-formed: 
( i )  The answer t o  the  question of whether he w i l l  
go is yes. 
From t h i s  well-formed deep structure,  however, no w e l l -  
formed pseudo-cleft can be derived. (Some of these 
counterexamples, by the  way, a r e  a l so  noted by Faraci.) 
25. Faraci i n  f ac t  maintains tha t  sentences such a s  (98) a r e  
well-formed f o r  him, and these cons t i tu te  evidence f o r  him 
tha t  the  clauses sf s-uch sentences a r e  i n  f ac t  questions. 
Such sentences a r e  ungrammatical f o r  myself and others I 
have checked, however, 
% 
26. Thus f a r  we have s ta ted  t h i s  agreement phenomenon i n  terms 
of agreement of semantic features which play a r o l e  i n  
. . 
select ional  res t r ic t ions .  It is nat c l e a r  t o  me-whether, 
the  property of r e fe ren t i a l i ty  is a l so  a semantic feature  
i n  t h i s  sense. In any event, t h i s  property must be e 
property of both NPs of a specif icat ional  statement, 
27. Sentences such a s  (104) provide addit ional  evidence against 
the  specif ic  proposal mentioned i n  note 21. That is, t h e  
following i s  impossible: 
( i )  *The answer t o  the  question of what John got 
from h i s  father,  which was very expensive, 
was a Jaguar XKE. 
28. The examples i n  (105) do not depend cruc ia l ly  on the  
presence of negation (cf. (IOSa), For example, consider! 
(i) +We a l l  r ea l i ze  what John got from h i s  father\, 
which was very expensive. 
Notice, furthermore, that  various so r t s  sf parenthetical  
clauses can occur with t h e  i n i t i a l  clauses of pseudo-cleft 
sentences, but not with embedded questi.ons. Consider : 
( i i )  a ,  What he cooked f o r  us w- t h e  t a s t i e s t  dish 
I ' ve  had t h i s  we& -- w8s an English mutton 
pie. 
(28) (csnt'd.) 
b. What he saw in  the box -- a sight which 
terrified him -- was a dismembered hand. 
Compare these with the following: 
( i i i )  a .  *What he cooked for us -- the tast iest  dish 
E've had this  week -- was obvious t o  all of us. 
b. *We do not know what he saw in the box -- a 
sight that terrified him. 
Tl~ese facts indicate, again, that mbedded questions and 
the WH clauses of pseudo-clefts do not behave aiike.  
CHAPTER 2 
THE SYNTACTIC DERIVATION OF CLEFT SENTEXES 
1. Deriving Cle f t  Sentences from Pseudo-Cleft Sentences 
There i s  a g rea t  deal of s imi l a r i t y  between pseudo-cleft 
sentences and t h e i r  corresponding c l e f t  sentences. If we ex- 
amine a s  an example a pa i r  of sentences such a s :  
(1) a .  (The one) who Nixon chose was Agnew 
b. It was Agnew who Nixon chose 
w e  note t h a t  t he  pseudo-cleft and i t s  corresponding c l e f t  sen- 
tence express t he  same grammaticpal re la t ions ,  share  t he  same 
\ 
presuppositions, have the  same focus, i n  shor t ,  they a r e  
synonymous and a r e  used interchangeably. Since the semantic 
representat ion of pseudo-cleft and corresponding c l e f t  sen- 
tences i s  iden t ica l ,  we w i l l  d iscuss the  semantic representa- 
t i on  of borh syn tac t ic  forms i n  Chapter '3.  The object ive  of 
t h i s  chapter, however, i s  t o  provide a' general account of the 
syntact ic  der ivat ion of c l e f t  sentences, and i n  pa r t i cu l a r ,  
t o  show tha t  c l e f t  sentences derive syrltactice l l y  from pseudo- 
105 
c l e f t  sentences. 
W e  w i l l  propose specif ical ly  tha t  c l e f t  sentences a r e  de- 
rived from pseudo-cleft sentences by a transformation which 
extraposes the i n i t i a l  clause of the  pseudo-cleft t o  t h e  end 
of the sentence. W e  r e fe r  t o  t h i s  r u l e  as  the  Cleft  Extra- 
position rule,  and i ts  operation can be i l l u s t r a t e d  by the  
following pa i r  of phrase markers: 
who Nixon chose Agnew 
Note here that  the  i n i t i a l  clause of the pseudo-cleft i s  a 
free re la t ive,  not a bound relati_ve, and w e  show i n  a l a t e r  
section tha t  the  c l e f t  source (2a )  must ultimately derive from 
a deep s t rus ture  with an empty predicate such as tha t  posited 
i n  the =traction Theory. For the bulk of the discussion, 
\ 
however, it does not matter whether the  i n i t i a l  clause is 
thouglnt of a s  a f r e e  or  bound re la t ive ,  since both kinds of 
r e l a t ive  clause share cer ta in  propert ies which a r e  cruciul  f o r  
the der ivat ion of c l e f t  sentences. 1 
2. On Motivating Transformational Rules 
Whenever a new t r a n s f o - m t i o n a l  r u l e  i s  proposed, it i s  
of course necessary t o  provide ample j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t he  
par t i cu la r  transformational der ivat ion advanced. The question 
a r i ses ,  however, a s  t o  what s o r t  of j u s t i f i c a t i o n  -- i . e .  what 
kind of evidence -- i s  required t o  e s t ab l i sh  a given analys is .  
In par t i cu la r ,  we r e f e r  here  t o  t he  tendency i n  recent  work t o  
j u s t i fy  transformational analyses on the  bas is  of semantic con- 
siderat ions.  We have noted, f o r  example, t h a t  pseudo-cleft 
sentences and t h e i r  corresponding c l e f t  sentences a r e  synony- 
mous, and it i s  easy t o  see that semantic v io la t ions  (e.g. se-  
lectiona: v iola t ions)  i n  one would a l s o  be matched i n  the  
other. However, arguments from s imi l a r i t y  of se lec t iona l  re-  
s t r i c t i o n s  and grammatical r e l a t i ons  should be secondary i n  
attempting t o  j u s t i f y  a transformational analys is .  
It i s  imperative t o  provide independent syn tac t ic  evi- 
dence f o r  proposed analyses, where by the  term ' syn tac t ic '  w e  
mean t he  s t r i c t l y  formal p roper t i es  of given coz~struct ions.  
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What we wish t o  bring out here is  t h a t  t h e  analys is  proposed 
here f o r  c l e f t  sentences is  not j u s t i f i e d  on the  bas i s  of 
semantic considerations, but ra ther ,  t he  arguments which w i l l  
be given a r e  a11 arguments from syntac t ic  form of the c l e f t  
construction. The ana lys i s  i s  j u s t i f i e d  primari ly on t h e  
bas i s  of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  one can predic t  complicated syn tac t ic  
agreement pa t te rns  by deriving c l e f t  sentences from pseudo- 
c l e f t  sentences. Further, we would claim t h a t  any tramsfor- 
mational ana lys i s  proposed must be j u s t i f i e d  by formal evi- 
dence of t h i s  s o r t .  With t h i s  i n  mind, we tu rn  now t o  t h e  
spec i f ic  evidence f o r  t h e  proposal. 
3. Evidence f o r  the Proposal 
\ 
3.1. Evidence from Verb Agreement Pat terns.  One of t he  
most i n t e r e s t i ng  syn tac t ic  proper t ies  of c l e f t  sentences i s  
the  verbal agreement pat tern .  I w i l l  be concerned primari ly 
with my own d ia l ec t ,  which I l abe l  Dialect I, however, I w i l l  
discuss two other  d i a l ec t s  a s  well .  In Dialect I, (which i s  
the d ia l ec t  of most speakers I have interviewed) t h e  follow- 
ing i s  t h e  typ ica l  pa t te rn :  
(3) a .  It 's m e  who - is responsible. 
b. I t ' s  you who - i s  responsible.  
c.  It I s  him who responsible. 
John and m e  
who - a r e  responsible.  
e. It 's you who - a r e  responsible. 
f. I t ' s  f thm , who responsible.  
those two 
Pronouns i n  focus pos i t ion  a r e  always i n  t h e  object ive  case, 
and the  verb i n  t h e  c lause  i s  systematical ly t h i r d  person. 2 
The verb does not agree i n  person with t h e  focus noun (or  pro- 
noun), but does agree i n  number with the  focus noun. Thus: 
(41 
a .  I t ' s  you who { 1 t h i s  job. (Singular) 
(But : You do t h i s  j ob. ) 
b. I t ' s  you who - do t h i s  job. (Plural)  
does 
c 1.'. me who I Z  ] t h i s  job. 
(But: I - do t h i s  job.) 
d. I t %  us who - do t h i s  job. 
e. It 's me t h a t  always (i::~'] t h e  tough breaks. 
(But: I always get the  tough breaks.) 
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f .  I t 's  us t ha t  always pt- t h e  tough breaks. 
Mow can we account f o r  t h i s  complicated pa t t e rn  of agreements? 
Why is  the re  number agreement but no person agreement? We 
answer both these  questions by deriving t h e  c l e f t  from t h e  
pseudo-cleft sentence, s ince  t h e  pseudo-cleft sentence exhi- 
b i t s  precise ly  t he  proper t ies  we want. For example, compare 
the  following with t h e  above sets: 
(5) a .  The one who - i s  responsible i s  me.  
b. The one who - i s  responsible i s  you. 
c. The one who - i s  responsible i s  him. 
John and m e  
d. The - ones who - a r e  responsible are  
e. The - ones who, - a r e  responsible a r e  you. 
f .  The - ones who - a r e  responsible a r e  
g. I am the  one who } t h i s  job. 
h. I a m  t he  one t h a t  always g e t s  the tough breaks. 
The r e l a t i v e  c lause  of t h e  pseudo-cleft s en t eme  has a t h i r d  
person head noun, one; i n  (d) - ( f )  we have the p l u r a l  head noun 
3 ones and thus t he  p lu ra l  verb i n  t he  Vela t ive  clause. Hence, 
J 
systematic t h i r d  person marking, but agrement  i n  p l u r a l  mark- 
ing. We account f o r  t h e  paradigm of Dialect I i n  a completely 
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natura l  manner. The complicated agreement pa t t e rn  i s  given t o  
us by regular  ru l e s  of agreement -- no new ru l e s  e r e  needed.,. 
There a r e  two other  d i a l ec t s  I w i l l  discuss here, both 
o f  which a r e  more complicated, and thus more in te res t ing ,  than 
Dialect I. The f i r s t  of these, Dialect 11, has t h e  following 
4 
s o r t  of pa t t e rn  : 
(6) a. I'c is & who - i s  s ick .  
b. It i s  who(m) John i s  a f t e r .  
c .  It i s  1 who & being chased by Mary. 
d. It i s  - m e  who Mary i s  being chased by. 
Verbal agreements i n  Dialect I1 a r e  exactly those of Dialect 
I: consis tent ly  t h i r d  person, with number agreement. Thus, 
jus t  a s  with Dialect I, t he  proposed theory co r r ec t ly  p red ic t s  
the  agreement pat terns .  Dialect I1 d i f f e r s  f r ~ m  Dialect I with 
regard t o  case marking only. A t  f i r s t  s igh t  i t  seems t o  be 
the  case t h a t  the  focus pronoun agrees with t h e  r e l a t i v e  pro- 
noun i n  case marking (assuming, of course, t h a t  r e l a t i v e  pro- 
nouns a r e  marked f o r  case) .  However, t h i s  can ' t  be r i gh t ,  
s ince i n  Dialect T I  w e  have sentences such a s  : 
(7 )  I t  i s  me who John says i s  sick.  
where the  r e l a t i v e  pronoun would be ma+ked nominative, being 
the  subject  of -- is  s ick ,  yet  where t h e  focus pronoun i s  accusa- 
t i ve .  Steve Anderson has suggested t o  m e  t h a t  t h e  relevant  
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general izat ion with regard t o  case marking i s  t h i s :  when t h e r e  
i s  a surface  subject  i n  t h e  c lause  of t h e  c l e f t  sentence, t h e  
focus pronoun i s  marked accusat ive;  when the re  is no surface  
subject,  t he  focus pronoun i s  marked f o r  nominative. Thus, 
the  clauses of (6b), (6d), and (7) a l l  have subjects  (John  
Ma=, and John, respect ively) ,  hence t h e  focus pronoun is  
- 
marked a s  accusative. (6a)  and (66) have clauses i n  which 
there  i s  no su.rface subject  intervening between t h e  focus pro- 
noun and t h e  verb of t h e  clause,  hence i n  these  cases t he  fo- 
cus pronoun i s  marked a s  accusative. I w i l l  assume t h a t  
speakers of Dialect I1 d i f f e r  from those of Dialect I i n  tha t  
they ass ign case t o  focus pronouns according t o  t h e  surface  
general iza t ion ju s t  s ta ted .  
We noted e a r l i e r  t h a t  i n  Dialect I, focus pronouns a r e  
consis tent ly  marked f o r  accusative. This suggests t h a t  
speakers of Dialect I ass ign accusat ive case  t o  focus pronouns 
on the  bas is  of t h e  f a c t  t ha t  focus pronouns a r e  i n  immediate 
post-verbal posi t ion (accusative case i s  used q u i t e  general ly 
f o r  items i n  post-verbal, o r  non-subject, pos i t ions) .  As 
G. L. Brook [1964, 1521 points  out: 
One of t h e  most frequently discussed problems i s  
whether t o  say It i s  I o r  It i s  me. The l a t t e r  ex- 
pression gained ground ?= so quickly t h a t  i t  i s  now t h e  
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usual idiom, especia l ly  i n  col loquia l  speech. . . A s  
ea r ly  a s  t h e  s ix teenth  century w e  f ind  instances of 
t h e  replacement of L by me,  which probably a rose  be- 
cause t h e  pronoun here  follows the  verb, and t h e  ob- 
j ec t i ve  case  general ly follows t h e  verb. . . Jesperson 
sums up what i s  happening t o  English pronouns: "On 
t h e  whole, t h e  na tura l  tendency i n  English has been 
towards a s t a t e  i n  which t h e  nominative of pronouns 
i s  used only where it i s  c l e a r l y  t h e  subject ,  and 
where t h i s  i s  shown by c lo se  proximity t o  (generally 
pos i t ion  inmediately before) a verb, while t h e  objec- 
t i v e  i s  used everywhere else". . . The opposition of- 
fered by p rescr ip t ive  grammarians t o  t h e  idiom - I t ' s  
m e  has had t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  many speakers have gained 
-




Brook points  out fu r the r  t ha t  many speakers say: 
(8) I sent  f o r  t h e  man who -had done it. 
where t h e  use of who - i s  co r r ec t ;  on the  other  hand they say: 
(9)  I sen t  f o r  t h e  man whom I knew had done it. 
These f a c t s  seem t o  c o r r e l a t e  with the$ f a c t s  of Dialect 11; 
where a noun subject  intervenes between ' t h e  r e l a t i v e  pronoun 
and the  verb phrase (had done i t ) ,  t h e  r e l a t i v e  pronoun i s  
113 
marked f o r  accusative. The speakers of Dialect I1 follow t h i s  
r u l e  with respect  to focus pronouns. 
What  i s  c r u c i a l  i s  t h a t  t h e  proposed theory pred ic t s  cor- 
r ec t ly  t h e  f a c t s  of agreement f o r  both Dialect I and Dialect  
11. I assume t h a t  t h e  two d i a l e c t s  d i f f e r  with respect  t o  t h e  
ru le (s )  assigning case, where Dialect 1 assigns accusat ive 
case t o  post-verbal elements i n  general, and Dialect 11 has a 
more complicated r u l e  based on a surface  general iza t ion con- 
cerning surface  subjects  i n  the  clause. 
Final ly,  let  us exanine Dialect 111, which i s  more com- 
pl ica ted than e i t h e r  of t he  previous two. Our data comes 
from Ross's gaper on performative verbs [1968], where he 
points  out the  following sentences : 
(10) a .  It i s  I who 1 responsible.  
b. It i s  me who ::' 1 responsible.  
Apparently, i n  t h i s  d i a l ec t ,  the  case  marking of t he  focus 
pronoun can be e i t h e r  nominative o r  accusative. The i n t e r e s t -  
ing f ea tu re  of t h i s  d i a l ec t  i s  tha t  i f  t he  focus pronoun i s  
nominative, then the  verb of t he  clause, agrees i n  person with 
it. Otherwise, j u s t  a s  with Dialects  I and 11, t h e  verb i s  
th i rd  person. 
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Since ( lob)  exhibi ts  a pa t t e rn  i den t i ca l  t o  t h a t  of ' 
Dialects I and 11, our theory accomts  f o r  a t  l e a s t  pa r t  of 
Dialect I11 with no changes made. The problem is how t o  ac- 
count f o r  (10a). Note t ha t  i f  t he  c l e f t  sentence derives from 
the  pseudo-cleft sentence, then (10a) derives from a sentence 
such a s  "the one who - is  responsible i s  me , "  not ,  " the one who 
a m  responsible i s  me." The problem i s  how t o  account f o r  t he  
-
agreement i n  person between t h e  verb of t h e  c lause  and the  fo- 
cus pronoun. 
1 suggest t h a t  i f  t h e  pronoun happens t o  be marked a s  
nominative, then the re  i s  a low l eve l  r u l e  i n  Dialect  111 
which changes t h e  marking on t h e  verb of t h e  c lause  so tha t  it 
agrees with t h e  focus pronoun, Why should Dialect  111 have 
such a ru le?  I would suggest t h a t  speakers of Dialect  I11 
produce sentences such a s  (1Oa) by analogy t o  t h e  pa t t e rn  as- 
sociated with apposi t ive  clauses.  When an apposi t ive  clause ' 
i s  associated with a pronoun marked f o r  nominati.ve case, 
the re  i s  person agreement between t h e  verb of t h e  c lause  and 
the  pronoun; however, when an apposi t ive  c lause  i s  associated 
with a pronoun marked f o r  accusat ive case, t he re  i s  no agree- 
ment, but r a t h e r  t h e  verb of t h e  clause, is cons i s ten t ly  t h i r d  
5 person. For example: 
(11.1 a .  I, rho  { 1; 1 t a l l ,  was force. t o  squeeze i n t o  
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tha t  VW. 
(11) b. Be had t h e  nerve t o  say tha t  t o  me, who 
*have 
made him what he i s  today. 
know 
. 1, who { 1 him, have come t o  ha te  him. 
*knows 
d. I wish she had said tha t  t o  me, who { sen- 
s i t i v e  enough t o  understand these things. 
These sentences a r e  not par t icu lar ly  flawing, but the  f a c t s  
a r e  in tu i t ive ly  qu i t e  c lear .  Furthermore, the  above pat tern 
is one which is found i n  a l l  d ia lects ,  not jus t  Dialect 111. 6 
-
It i s  easy t o  see how the appositive paradigm could in- 
fluence the  c l e f t  sentence pat tern i n  Dialect 111. Note tha t  
i n  surface s t ruc ture  the clause of t h e  c l e f t  sentence i m e d i -  
a te ly  follows the focus pronoun, and t h i s  i s  exactly the  - sur-  ' 
face configuration of t h e  appositive c lause case (with t h e  ex- 
-
ception tha t  the  apposit ive clause i s  separated from the  pro- 
noun by a phonological pause) : 
(12) a*  It is I who am responsible. 
b. I, who am responsible, covld never agree t o  tha t .  
(12b), a construction shared by a l l  speakers, provides a 
reasonable model f o r  the  pattern of (12a), as  both construc- 
t ions a r e  v i r t u a l l y  i den t i ca l  i n  surface s t ruc ture .  There- 
fore,  i t  i s  suggested t h a t  Dialect 111 i s  derived bas ica l ly  
just  a s  Dialects  I and I1 are ,  wi th  (lob) being t h e  basic 
form. The case  marking r u l e  apparently can ass ign  nominative 
case optionally t o  focus pronouns, and i f  t h i s  happens then 
speakers of Dialect  I11 "correct" t h e  verbal agreement i n  t h e  
clause on analogy with t he  apposi t ive  pat tern .  Hence, t he  d i f -  
ference between t h e  d i a l ec t s  l ies i n  d i f f e r ing  conditions on 
case-marking, with Dialect 111 containing a low l eve l  agree- 
ment rule.  
We should note t ha t  it i s  not pa r t i cu l a r ly  surpr is ing 
tha t  such low l eve l  "correction" ru l e s  ex i s t .  While postu- 
l a t i ng  such ad-hos ru les  i s  t o  be avoided, w e  must take  note 
of the  f a c t  t h a t  w e  deal here  with a p a r t i c u l a r l y  troublesome 
area of English grammar, one which i s  often tampered with by 
grammar teachers i n  the  schools. It i s  i n t e r e s t i ng  t o  note 
t ha t  some speakers w e  have interviewed express complete con- 
fusion on t h e  matter of proper pronominal and verbal  forms i n  
c l e f t  sentences. It is  i n  j u s t  t h i s  s o r t  of s i t ua t ion  tha t  
we would expect t o  f ind low leve l ,  ad-hoc correct ions  on the  
par t  of speakers, often i n  am attempt i;o speak "correct" 
English. 
It has been suggested t o  m e  [by  David Perlmutter, 
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personal canit~mication] t ha t  the  verbal  agreemen, pa t t e rns  i n  
c l e f t  sentences might be accounted f o r  i n  a completely d i f f e r -  
ent manner, namely, by claiming t h a t  t he re  i s  a universa l  
p r inc ip le  t ha t  only nominative case  can cause agreement of t he  
verb, and a l l  other  case  forms cause t h e  verb t o  remain i n  
t h i r d  person ( i .  e. umarked) fom.  Such a universal  p r inc i -  
p l e  would account f o r  t h e  appearance of t h i r d  person verb 
forms i n  c l e f t  sentences, and therefore ,  pa r t  ~f t he  evidence 
f o r  our proposal would be neutral ized.  However, t h i s  proposal 
f a i l s  t o  explain c e r t a i n  c ruc i a l  f a c t s ,  namely, a s  w e  pointed 
out f o r  the  sentences of (3) and ( 4 ) ,  the re  i s  i n  f a c t  ~ ~ m b e r  
agreement between the  focus pronoun and the  verb of t h e  clause,  
even though there  i s  no person agreement. Hence, accusat ive 
case pronouns a r e  i n  f a c t  causing c e r t a i n  agreements t o  occur. 
The derivat ion from pseudo-cleft sentences shows why t h i s  pat-  
tern of p a r t i a l  agreement occurs. 
3., 2. Evidence f r m  Reflexive Agreements i n  t h e  Clause. 
A t  t h i s  point I w i l l  consider another rgnge of data,  which 
confirms the  view I have presented. This evidence concerns 
t h e  agreement pa t te rns  which occur between t h e  focus i t e m  and 
reflexive pronouns i n  the  clause. We find, i n  fac t ,  tha t  
thi rd  person reflexive forms occur qui te  regularly. For ex- 
-
ample, the  following a r e  typical:  
(13) a. I t ' s  not me tha t  shaves himself with a s t r a igh t  
razor. 
b. Was it you tha t  saw himself i n  the  c rys ta l  ba l l ?  
c. I t ' s  m e  tha t  cut himself so badly. 
d. I t ' s  you and me who nearly drowned themselves 
out i n  the  lake. 
Sentences such as  these once again indicate tha t  the clause 
has a th i rd  person subject.  As w e  would expect, the  pseudo- 
c l e f t  sentences exhibit jus t  t h i s  pattern:  
(14) a .  The one who shaves himself with a s t r a igh t  razar  
i s  not me. 
b. Was the one who saw himself i n  the c rys ta l  b a l l  
you? \ 
c. The one who cut himself so badly was me, 
d,  The ones who nearly drowned themselves out i n  
the  lake a r e  you and me. 
Since we propose t o  derive the  sentences of (13) from the  sen- 
tences of (141, w e  a r e  ab le  t o  account ,for t h i s  pat tern of re- 
f lexive forms i n  the  c l e f t  sentence. There is  no other way 
that  I see, which i s  not ad hoc, t o  account f o r  the  f ac t  tha t  
himself could co-occur with a f i r s t  person focus pronoun. / 
1 have f i r s t  presented the  cases where the ref lexive pro- 
noun i n  the  clause does not agree with the  focus element, but 
is  systematically th i rd  person. This, I claim, i s  t h e  basic 
pattern. We must now consider cases where the  ref lexive p r ~ -  
noun does, i n  f ac t ,  agree with the  focus pronoun, and w e  must 
try t o  account fo r  t h i s  agreement. 
Let us begin with sentences i n  which reflexives occur i n  
the clause: 
(15) a. I t ' s  me tha t  cut  myself. 
b. I t ' s  you tha t  cut  yourself. 
c. It % us who cut ourselves. 
d, It ' s  m e  who has always kept {::I:: 1 mt 
trouble. 
e. I t ' s  me who has t o  protect  
Such sentences a r e  problematic f o r  our view, s ince i n  the  
pseudo-cleft t he  i n i t i a l  r e l a t i v e  clause has a th i rd  person 
head, and non-third person reflexives cannot be generated: 
(16) a. *The one tha t  cut  myself i s  me. 
b. *The one t h a t  cut  yourself i s  you. 
c.  *The ones tha t  cut ourselves a r e  us. 
d. *The one who has always kept myself out of trouble 
i s  me.  
(16) e. *The one who has t o  protect  myself i s  me. 
HOW, then, can w e  account f o r  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  r e f l ex ive  pro- 
nouns agree with t h e  focus i n  (15), i f  c l e f t  sentences der ive  
from pseudo-cleft sentences? 
I would suggest t h a t  the  problematic re f lex ive  forms i n  
(15) a r e  spurious, and a r e  not  produced by t h e  r u l e  of re-  
f lexivizat ion.  To see t h i s ,  no t i ce  t h a t  f o r  one thing, i n  
(15d) and (15e) w e  have a syn tac t ic  paradox. That is, while 
the re f lex ive  pronoun agrees with t he  f i r s t  person focus, t he  
f i n i t e  verb is  marked f o r  t h i r d  person. W e  do not have sen- 
tences such as:  
(17) * I t ' s  me who have t o  p ro tec t  myself. 
Somehow, we must account f o r  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a f i r s t  persort re- 
f l ex ive  co-occurs with a t h i r d  person verb form. 
Note fu r the r  t h a t  t h e  same pa t t e rn  occurs i n  sentences 
such a s  t he  following: 
(18) a .  I am t h e  one who cu t  myself. 
b e  I am t h e  one who - has t o  p ro tec t  myself. 
These sentences a r e  e s sen t i a l l y  inverted pseudo-cleft sen- 
tences: t he  focus element has been brought t o  t h e  f ron t  of t h e  
sentence, and t h e  c lause  i s  sentence f$nal. As with c l e f t  
sentences, a f i r s t  person re f lex ive  c a n .  occur, but with -. t h i r d  
person verb forms. Thus, w e  have the  following s i t ua t ion :  
himself 
(19) a .  The one who has t o  protect  
himself 
b. I a m  t he  one who has t o  protect  
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c. It is m e  who has t o  protect  {:::[ 
On the  basis  of (19) we see tha t  i t  is  when the  c lause  - foh- 
lows the  focus item i n  surface s t ruc tu re  t h a t  the  f i r s t  per- 
-
son re f lex ive  i s  possible.  We must account f o r  t he  appear- 
ance of t h i s  f o m  with a t h i r d  person verb form. 
I suggest t ha t  t h e  re f lex ive  forms i n  (15) and (18) a r i s e  
under c e r t a i n  surface s t r u c t u r e  conditions. To see  t h i s ,  
not ice  t ha t  i n  (15e), t h e  version with myself answers a d i f -  
8 ferent  question than the version with himself. The version 
w i t h  myself answers t h e  following question: 
(20) a.  Who has t o  protect  you? x 
b. I t 's  me t h a t  has t o  protect  myself. 
I am t h e  one who has t o  protect  myself. 
Whereas t h e  version with himself answers the question: 
(21) a. Who has t o  protect  himself? 
b. It 's me t h a t  has t o  protec,t himself. 
I am the  one who has t o  protect  himself. 
L e t  us examine fu r the r  t he  answers t o  questions such a s  (20a). 
A very in t e r e s t i ng  pa t t e rn  emerges: 
(22) who cu t  you? 
( i )  It was him who cu t  me. 
( i i )  It was you who cu t  me. 
( i i i )  * I t  was m e  who cut  m e  -, It was me who cut  
myself. 
1. H e  is  t h e  one who cu t  me. 
2. Ycu a r e  the  one who cut  me. 
3. *I am t h e  one who cut  me + I a m  the  one who 
cu t  myself. 
In  answering t h i s  question, then, we would be forced i n t o  
I t  ut te r ing  the  sentence, It was m e  who cut  m e ; "  hence, the  
more acceptable form, "It was me who cut  myself," or,  "I am 
the  one who cut  myself." 
It i s  in t e r e s t i ng  t o  note t h a t  the re  i s  no obvious syn- 
tactic reason why sentences (22.3) and ( 2 2 i i i )  above should 
be bad. The two pronouns a r e  dominated by d i f f e r en t  S nodes ' 
i n  deep s t ruc ture ,  and t h i s  should be j u s t  as  acceptable a s  
John i s  the  one who cut  m e  o r  It is  John who s u t  me. We cer-  
t a in ly  would not expect re f lex iv iza t ion  t o  apply here. It 
seems reasonable t o  suppose tha t  t he  r epe t i t i on  of ghono- 
log ica l ly  i den t i ca l  person pronouns i s  ,somehow unacceptable 
i n  surface s t ruc ture .  In  f ac t ,  as w e  see, a succession of 
iden t ica l  person pronouns is unacceptable even when the pro- 
nouns a r e  a t  d i f f e r en t  l eve l s  of embedding: 
(23) a. Who was it t h a t  John believed h i t  you? 
b. * I t  was m e  t h a t  John believed h i t  me. 
*I am t h e  one tha t  John believed h i t  me. 
(C f .  It was me t h a t  John believed h i t  B i l l . )  
While (23b) i s  q u i t e  unacceptable, i t  i s  somewhat more acceg- 
t ab l e  t o  have: 
(24) ? I t  was me t h a t  John believed h i t  myself. 
Thus, it seems t o  be t h e  case  t h a t  under c e r t a i n  conditions 
(which I do not understand) a rightmost occurrence of a pro- 
noun i s  changed t o  a re f lex ive  pronoun under i den t i t y  with a 
pronoun on the  l e f t .  This seems t o  r e l a t e  t o  t he  f a c t  t h a t  
the re  i s  a succession of phonologically i den t i ca l  personal 
pronouns, and I suggest t h a t  t he  appearance of such re f lex ives  
has t he  same s t a t u s  a s  t he  agreement r u l e  w e  spoke o f ;  t h a t  
is ,  a "correction" of so r t s .  The derivat ion,  then, i s  a s  
f o l l w s  : 
(25) a. The one who - has t~ protect  m e  is  me. -+ (Cleft  
Extraposition).  
b. It i s  m e  who has t o  protect me. -, (Reflexive 
Correction).  
c. It i s  m e  who has t o  protecF myself. 
a ' .  I a m  t he  one who has t o  protect  me.  -* (Reflexive 
Correction). 
b'.  I am t h e  one who has t o  p ro tec t  myself. 
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Once again, we note t h a t  such solut ions -- i.e. low 
level  correct ion ru les  -- a r e  not, i n  general,  a t t r a c t i v e .  
Yet, a s  before, I think we ought t o  note t ha t  i n  t h i s  par t icu-  
l a r  area of grammar it  is not surpr i s ing  t o  a r r i v e  a t  such 
solutions. Again w e  a r e  dealing with an area subject  t o  wide 
d i a l ec t a l  f luctuat ion,  and an area,  a s  we have noted, which 
some speakers avoid completely. It seems t o  m e  t ha t  t h e  
c ruc ia l  f a c t  i n  t h i s  case is  t h e  appearance of t h e  f i r s t  per- 
son re f lex ive  with the  t h i r d  person verb form. The t h i r d  per- 
son verb form indicates  t h a t  t h e  c lause  has a t h i r d  person sub- 
j ec t ,  and the  f i r s t  person r e f l ex ive  would ind ica te  t h a t  t he  
clause has a f i r s t  person subject .  This paradox can be 
avoided by posi t ing a f i r s t  person non-reflexive pronaun 
(which does not imply a f i r s t  person subject  f o r  the  c lause) ,  
which a t  a l a t e  s tage  i n  t he  grammar is  corrected by a t r i v i a l  
ru le .  This a l t e r n a t i v e  el iminates t he  paradox while account- ' 
ing f o r  the  syn tac t ic  gap created by the  non-existence of 
sentences such a s  (25b) and (25a ' ) . 9 
3.3. Reflexives i n  Focus Position. W e  have seen examples 
i n  which the  c lause  contains re f lex ive  pronouns which agree 
i n  person with t he  focus pronoun. There a-re a l s o  cases i n  
which a reflexive pronoun appears i n  focus position, and 
agrees i n  person with a pronoun i n  the  clause, jus t  t h e  re- 
verse of the  case we just  discussed: 
(26) a. It was myself tha t  I shaved. 
b. It was y ~ u r s e l f  tha t  you cheated. 
These, however, do not present problems fo r  our view, s ince 
these patterns a r e  found i n  the  pseudo-cleft sentence: 
(27) a. The one tha t  I shaved was myself. 
b. The one tha t  you cheated was yourself. 
The Cleft  Extraposition Rule w i l l  convert the  sentences sf  
(27) t o  the  c l e f t  sentences of (26). 
It i s  interest ing t o  note tha t  pseudo-cleft and c l e f t  
sentences a re  pa ra l l e l  in  yet another way, i n  tha t  both con- 
t a in  instances of 'anomalous' ref lexive forms i n  focus posi- 
tion. For example, consider the  following sentences: 
(28) a. It was himself tha t  John claimed had been 
cheated . 
b. It was himself tha t  John wanted B i l l  t o  describe. 
(29) a. The one who John claimed had been cheated was 
himself. 
b. The one who John wants 1 t o  describe is  
himself. 
In the (a) sentences himself is corefezential  with - John, and 
i n  the  (b) sentences himself can be corefarent ia l  with e i the r  
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John or B i l l .  Note, though, tha t  there  a r e  no non-clefted 
- -
sentences corresponding t o  these: 
(30) a. *John claimed tha t  himself had been cheated. 
b. *John wants [ 1 t o  describe himself. 
(30a) i s  t o t a l l y  ungrammatical, and (30b) is  s tarred s ince 
it has only one reading (where himself = Bil l ) ,  and thus has 
los t  the ambiguity i n  (28b) and (29b). We should note fur- 
ther that non-reflexive pronouns i n  focus posit ion can only 
be interpreted i n  a non-coref e ren t i a l  way: 
(31) a. *It was him tha t  J ~ h n  claimed had been cheated. 
b. *The one John klaimed had been cheated was him. 
(32) a. * I t  was him tha t  John wanted B i l l  t o  describe. 
b. *The one tha t  John wanted B i l l  t o  describe was 
him. 
2%e focus pronouns i n  these cases can only be interpreted as . 
having outside reference. Thus a coreferent ia l  in terpretat ion 
' i n  these cases requires a ref lexive pronoun. 
We might possibly derive cases such a s  (28) and (29) by 
positing a pseudo-cleft source with emphatic ref  lexbves, 
since these have the  readings of (28) a ~ d  (29) : 
(33) a. The one John claimed had been cheated was John 
hinself .  
( 3 3 )  b. The one John wants B i l l  t o  describe i3 c: 1 
himself. 
A source such a s  (33) has t h e  ambiguities i n  question, and 
accounts f o r  t h e  appearance of t he  re f lex ive  pronoun. Fur- 
ther,  app l ica t ion  of Cle f t  Extraposition t o  t h e  sentences sf 
(33) w i l l  der ive  t he  c l e f t  sentences i n  question. 10 
3 . 4 .  Evidence from Idiomatic Reflexive Constructions. 
The next area which I w i l l  examine cons t i t u t e s  t he  f i n a l  se t  
of cases involving syn tac t ic  agreements. I r e f e r  t o  what w e  
can c a l l  r e f lex ive  construct ions;  i.e., construct ians which 
require  i den t i t y  between the  subject and some possessive pro- 
noun, and these  include c e r t a i n  idioms, re f lex ive  possessives, 
. 
and c e r t a i n  verbs of perception. Regarding idioms, no te  t h a t  
the re  i s  a required i d e n t i t y  i n  t he  following: 
( 3 4 )  a .  - I held UIJ breath f o r  f i v e  minutes. 
b. - I found mra way home. 
c. - I made up r n j  mind. 
1 It i s  impossible t o  have any other pronominal forms -- t he  
i den t i t y  i s  obligatory. However, a s  w e  would expect, i n  
c l e f t  sentences the  pronouns a r e  i n  t h i r d  person form: 
(35) a. Was it you tha t  held - h i s  breath f o r  f ive  minutes? 
b. It was only m e  who could find &is way home i n  
t h e  storm. 
c .  It was me that  made up - h i s  mind before anyone 
else.  
3: do not know the  f a c t s  for  other dia lects ,  but bn my own, 
agreement cannot occur, Sentences such as, "was it  you that  
held your breath f o r  f i v e  rninutes? 'bre anmalous since they 
imply contrasts  such as  *"Or was it John tha t  held your 
breath fo r  f i v e  minutes?" These f a c t s  show, once again, that  
the clause has a th i rd  person subject. The pseudo-cleft sen- 
tence gives us jus t  the  r ight  paradigm: 
(36) a. Was the  one who held h i s  breath f o r  f i v e  minutes 
you? 
b. The only one who could find his  way home i n  the  
storm was me. P 
c. The one who made up h i s  mind before anyone else 
was me. 
(Cf. *The one who made up my mind before anyone 
e l s e  was me.) 
The same f a c t s  hold for ref lexive possessives. There is 
\ 
an obligatory ident i ty:  
(37) I h i t  %:"jather. 
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Yet, i n  the  c l e f t  sentence (and i n  the  pseudo-cleft) w e  have 
no agreement, but systematic th i rd  person: 
(38) a. It 's  me tha t  h i t  {::: 1 OWTI father.  
b. The one who h i t  own fa ther  i s  me. 
Finally, with cer ta in  verbs of perception we have s imilar  
obligatory iden t i t i e s  : 
(39) I f e l t  a spider crawl up (:is I-. 
But once again w e  get th i rd  person forms i n  t h e  c l e f t  sen- 
tence: 
(48) a. It wasn't m e  who f e l t  a spider crawl up his leg. 
b. The m e  who f e l t  a spider crawl up h i s  leg was me. 
Agreement does not occur in  c l e f t  or  pseudo-cleft sentences, 
a t  l eas t  i n  Dialect I, and t h i s  i s  especially c l ea r  i f  w e  add ' 
a negative element: 
(41) a. *It wasn't m e  who f e l t  a spider crawl up leg. 
b. *The one who f e l t  a spider crawl up my leg 
wasn't me. 
To sum up, we have presented evidepce from three general 
areas, namely, verbal agreement pa t te rns , ,  ref lexive agreement 
patterns,  and agreement patterns i n  ref lexive construstton. 
The evidence presented indicates tha t  the  clause of t h e  c l e f t  
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sentence has a t h i r d  person head, and agreements within the 
clause, with few a c e p t i o n s  (such as (15)), a r e  f o r  th i rd  per- 
son. We show t ha t  these patterns a r e  just  those found i n  the 
i n i t i a l  re la t ives  of the  pseudo-cleft, and therefore w e  can 
predict the  rense of agreement patterns fo r  t h e  c l e f t  sentence 
on the basis of such patterns i n  the  pseudo-cleft sentence. 
Having presented t h i s  evidence, we w i l l  turn now t o  a more 
detailed look a t  the  specif ic  derivation proposed. 
4. The Beep Structure Source f o r  Cleft  Sentences 
In our discussion so  far we have used pseudo-cleft sen- 
tences with bound re la t ives  a s  examples i n  t h e  derivation of 
cleft sentences. However, w e  have s ta ted  tha t  c l e f t  sentences ' 
do not derive from these, but ra ther  from pseudo-cleft sen- 
' tences which have free re la t ives ,  i n  par t icular ,  those formed 
by the  extraction rule. Thus, instead of derivation (42),  
derivation (43) i s  the  proper derivation fo r  c l e f t  sentences: 
(42) a. rThe one who N i x o n  chose wgs Agnew. 
b. It was Agnew who Mixon chose 
(43) a. [[ it [Nixon chose Agnew] be A ] 
b. r[ it [Nixon chose who] be Agnew ] 
" C [ i t  [who Nixon chose] be Agnew ] 
d. [ it  is  Agnew [who Nixon chose] ] 
Our claim i s  tha t  c l e f t  sentences derive ultimately from struc- 
tures such as  (43a). 
An immediate and obvious advantage of derivation (43) i s  
that  i t  provides a natural  source f o r  t h e  dummy ]Lt of the  
c l e f t  sentence, s ince f r e e  re la t ives  (including those formed 
by the extraction rule)  a r i s e  from NPs which dominate [ i t -S] .  
When the 2 node i s  extraposed, - it i s  l e f t  behind, and i f  
extraposition does not apply, - it is deleted, a s  it is i n  
general. With a derivation such a s  (421, however, it i s  not 
c lear  tha t  the  dummy - it has any natural  source, and we face 
further the problem of eliminating the  lex ica l  head of the 
re la t ive  when t he  clause i s  extraposed. Hence, (42) is  more ' 
complicated. 
Secondly, there  a r e  semantic problems associated with 
postulating pseudo-clef ts  with bound re la t ives  as  the  source 
for clefi: sentences. For example, compare the  following sen- 
tences : 
% 
(44) a. The place where I found John was i n  the  garden. 
b, Where I found John was i n  the  garden. 
c. It was i n  the  garden tha t  I found John. 
(44b) and (44c) a r e  synonymous, but they a r e  not i n  turn 
synonymous with (44a). ( 4 4 a )  t e l l s  us where a cer ta in  place 
i s  located, while (44b) and ( 4 4 c )  t e l l  us where - John was lo- 
cated. This can be seen even more c lear ly  i n  sentences such 
a s :  
(45) a. The place where John was was i n  the  garden. 
b. Where John was was i n  the  garden. 
where, again, the  f i r s t  t e l l s  us of the  location of a ce r t a in  
place, while the second t e l l s  us of the  location of John. 11 
-
Thus, the  lex ica l  head of the  bound re l a t ive  makes an addi- 
t ional  independent semantic contribution t o  the t o t a l  meaning 
of the sentence, which i s  not found i n  sentences with f r e e  
re la t ives .  
To consider another example, note tha t  i n  cer ta in  cases 
it i s  impossible t o  have a lexical  head fo r  the  re la t ive .  In 
sane instances, the  presence of the  lexical  head causes an \ 
ill-formed copula statement. For example: 
(46) a. *The place where John went was t o  Boston. 
b. Where John went was t o  Boston. 
c. It was to Boston tha t  John went, 
( 4 6 a )  is  ill-formed s ince the  basic e q ~ t i o n  i s  anomalous, 
i. e. [ t h e  place was t o  Boston]. In  other words, w e  can not 
specify the  place i n  question by equating it with a preposi- 
t iona l  phrase, In  other instances, the  r e l a t i v e  clause can 
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apparently have no lex ica l  head a t  a l l .  Compare the  'follow- 
ing examples: 
(47) a. *The way young men a r e  registered i s  i n  t h i s  
atmosphere. 
b. ?How young men a r e  registered i s  i n  t h i s  atmo- 
sphere. 
c. It i s  i n  t h i s  atmosphere tha t  young men a r e  
registered. 
(47a)  i s  completely ungrammatical, and there  is  apparently no 
other lexical  head possible fo r  t h i s  case. (47b) i s  more 
acceptable, but a t  best awkward. (47c) is  completely accep- 
table. This ease, i n  fact, leads us t o  the  strongest evi- 
dence f o r  derivation ( 4 3 ) ,  namely, cases i n  which preposition- 
a l  phrases a r e  the foc i  of c l e f t  sentences. A s  w e  sha l l  see, 
only derivation (43) can generate such cases. 
\ 
5. Evidence from the  Derivation of Prepositional Phrases 
The most problematic cases fo r  any analysis of c l e f t  sen- 
< 
tences a r e  those suck a s  the  following: 
(48) a. It i s  i n  t h i s  atmosphere tha t  young men a r e  
registered. 
(48) b. It was t o  John tha t  I gave the  book. 
c. It was by the  police tha t  John was beaten. 
d. It was out of s p i t e  that  he kissed her. 
e. It was with Howard Johnson that  w e  met f i r s t .  
We have already seen tha t  there a r e  no pseudo-cleft sources 
for most of these sentences. 1 2  In  attempting t o  account fo r  
such sentences we a r e  therefore faced with the  problem of 
finding a source which allows us t o  generate prepositional 
phrases i n  focus positton, which fur ther  accounts fo r  the  
lack of prepositions i n  the clause. In addition w e  must ex- 
plain why only - tha t  clauses, and not WH-clauses, a r e  permis- 
s i b l e  with these cases. We should a l so  note tha t  ce r t a in  of 
these clauses would be ungrammatical i n  i so la t ion  (for  example 
the clause tha t  we met f i r s t  i n  ( 4 8 e ) ) ,  and we must explain 
this .  A l l  of these factors  a r e  explained by deriving such 
sentences according t o  derivation (43). Consider, then, the  . 
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(49a) const i tutes  the  deep s t ruc ture  input t o  the  Extraction 
Rule, which extracts  the  PP i n  t h i s  atmosphere and places i t  
i n  predicate position, forming the derived s t ruc ture  (49b). 
Note t ha t  - no pro-form is  l e f t  behind f o r  the  prepositional 
. 
phrase. This i s  a c ruc ia l  fac t ,  since i t  means tha t  when such 
PPs a r e  extracted, one should be l e f t  with - that-clauses, since 
the complementizer - t ha t  (e.g. i n  s2 of (49b)) w i l l  not be re- 
placed by a WH pro-form. 
The cruc ia l  f a c t  here  is  tha t  there  are no syntactic 
\ 
pro-forms f o r  prepositions1 phrases such as those i n  (48). 
To see th is ,  note tha t  noun phrases can .be pronominalized i n  
various ways (and thus have representative pro- f oms) ,  however, 
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many prepositional phrases cannot be pronominalized. This can 
be seen i n  the fac t  tha t  there  a r e  no pro-forms i n  English 
which could occupy the following kinds of s l o t s :  
(50) a. I gave the  book t o  J o h ,  and Bill gave t h e  car  
b. J ~ h n  was arres ted by the  police, and B i l l  was 
beaten 
That is, there  i s  no pro-form which could stand f o r  the  
phrase t o  John, or by the police, and the  only pronminaliza- 
t ion poss ib i l i ty  i s  t o  pronminalize the  NPs within the  pre- 
positional phrases (e.g. t o  him, by them). Along with the  
fact  tha t  such prepositional phrases c a m s t  be pronominalized 
goes the f ac t  tha t  they cannot be questioned. One way t o  
i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  i s  t o  note tha t  the  prepositional phrases, 
(b), cannot answer the questions, (a): 
(51) a. #ow a r e  young men registered? 
b. *In t h i s  atmosphere. 
(52) a. Haw was John beaten? 
b. *By the  police. 
In other words, our claim i s  tha t  English grammar contains a 
gap i n  i t s  system of syntactic pro-fsmg. A s  a consequence 
of th i s ,  i n  s t ructures  such as  (49b), no .pro-form i s  l e f t  be- 
hind i n  place of the extracted prepositional phrase, resul t ing 
automatically i n  clauses headed by the  complement i ze r  that .  
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The Cleft Extraposit ion Rule maps (49b) onto (49~1,  and thus 
the probPematdc c l e f t  sentences such as those of (48) can be 
derived. 
We shouldmte here t h a t  we have s ta ted  tha t  many pre- 
posit ional  phrases do not have syntactic pro-forms. This 
equivocation is  due t o  ce r t a in  considerations involving 
locative and temporal phrases which seem t o  indicate  that 
some prepositional phrases might indeed have syntactic pro- 
f oms. We r e f e r  here t o  t h e  locative where and - there  along 
with the  temporal when ihd then. F i r s t  of a l l ,  note tha t  
. - 
prepositional phrases can Apparently be pronminalized by 
there and then: 
_I U
(53) a. 1 went t o  Boston and John went - there  too. 
b. I l e f t  a t  5 o'clock and B i l l  l e f t  - then too. 
Furthermore, where and when i n  questions seem t o  stand f o r  
prepositional phrases, and we can see t h i s  by noting the  
poss ib i l i ty  of answering suck questions with prepositional 
phrases : 
(54) a.  Where did John go? 
b. To Bostan. 
(55) a. When did John leave? % 
b. A t  5 o'clock. 
Given these considerations, it appears t o  be the  case tha t  
such prepositional phrases have pro-forms. If t h i s  is t he  
case, then the  extraction ru le  could indeed leave behind pro- 
forms f o r  ce r t a in  prepositional phrases. 13 
I f  the considerations of the  above paragraph a r e  valid, 
then derivations such a s  the following should be possible: 
(56) a. [ [ i t  [ tha t -  John went t o  Boston] ] be A ] 
b. [ [it [ that-  John went - where] ] be t o  I%ostm] 
c. [ [ i t  [where John went j ] be t o  Boston] 
Since the prepositional phrase t o  Boston i s  one of those 
which apparently can be replaced by a pro-form, (56b) can be 
fomed from (56a). Note, however, t ha t  i f  such derivations 
are possible, we must prevent sentences such as (56c) from 
undergoing Cleft  Extraposition s ince w e  do not get  c l e f t  sen- 
tences of the  form: 
(57) *It was t o  Boston where John went. 
In order t o  derive the  appropriate c l e f t  sentences, we 
must impose t h e  following r e s t r i c t  ions : 
(58) a. Structures with i n i t i a l  WH-clauses may not 
undergo Cleft  Fxtrapssition. 14 
b. Structures with i n i t i a l  - that-clauses must under- 
go Cleft  Extraposition. 
Furthemore, we m t i s t  then s t i p u l a t e  tha,t t he  extraction ru le  
optionally leaves behind a pro-form fo r  phrases it  extracts.  
If the extraction ru le  happens t o  leave behhd a pro-form, 
then pseudo-clefts with i n i t i a l  WH-clauses a r e  fomed. If  
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the extraction ru le  does not leave behind a pro-form (as, f o r  
example, when there  i s  none t o  leave behind), then it w i l l  
r esu l t  i n  structures with i n i t i a l  - that-clauses, which must 
obligatori ly undergo Clef t  Extraposition. Note tha t  it would 
be necessary i n  event t o  s t ipu la te  tha t  pro-fonns a r e  l e f t  
behind optionally, s ince  even when NPs a r e  extracted, it i s  
possible t o  have - that-clauses: 
(59) It was John t h a t  I saw. 
Since w e  argue tha t  - that-clauses a r i s e  from simple delet ion 
of some item (i. e. with no pro-form l e f t ) ,  t h i s  means tha t  no 
pro-form has been l e f t  behind fo r  sentences such a s  (59). 
To sum up the  poss ib i l i t i e s  i n  the  derivation of cleft 
sentences, consider the  following examples : 
(68) a. [ [it [ tha t -  I saw Jshn] ] be A ] 
b. [ [ i t  [that- I saw ] ] be John] 
c. [ it be John [ tha t  I saw] ] 
(61) a'. [ [ i t  [ tha t -  I saw J ~ h n ]  ] be A ] 
b. [ [it [ tha t -  I saw who] - ] be John] 
c. [ [who I saw] be John] 
(62) a. [ [it [ tha t -  John went t o  Boston] ] be A ] 
b. [ [ i t  [ tha t -  John went wheye] ] be t o  Boston] 
c. [ [where Jshn went] be t o  Bo.ston] 
(63) a .  [ [it [ that-  John went t o  Boston] ] be A 1 
be [ [ i t  [ tha t -  John went ] ] be t o  Boston] 
(63) c. [ it be t o  Boston [ t h a t  John went] 3 
(64) a. [ [ i t  [ that-  we m e t  with HQJo] 1 be A 1 
b. [ [it [ tha t -  w e  met 3 ] be with HoJo] , ' 
c. [ it be with HoJo [ t h a t  we met] ] 
(61) and (62) represent derivations i n  which a pro-f o m  has 
been l e f t  behind fo r  t h e  i t e m  extracted, and these ultimately 
end up as  pseudo-cleft sentences with i n i t i a l  WH-clauses, 
(60) and (63) represent derivations i n  which no pro-form has 
been l e f t  behind, and these cases obl igator i ly  become c l e f t  
sentences. (64) represents a derivation i n  which there  i s  
no pro-form which can be l e f t  behind, thus it can only become 
-
a c l e f t  sentence. 15 
To sum up t h i s  section, w e  have attempted t o  shm that  
the derivation of c l e f t  sentences with prepositional phrases 
i n  focus posit ion represents evidence i n  favor of deriving 
c l e f t  sentences ultimately from deep s t ructures  posited i n  the \  
Extraction Theory. We have shown that ,  given the  E x t r a c t i ~ n  
Theory, there  i s  a straightforward means of deriving preposi- 
t ional  phrases i n  focus position. Further, we can explain 
why no preposition appears i n  the  clauses, and why, i n  fae t ,  
the clause i t s e l f  contains a gap (cf. ( 6 4 ~ ) ) .  Finally, we 
3 
note that  santemces such as (48) can have only that-clauses, 
and no WH-clauses, for  the reason that  no pro-forms can be 
l e f t  behing when the  extraction ru le  operates. Hence, there  
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could be no poss ib i l i ty  of forming WH-clauses. (This would 
leave unexplained, however, potent ia l ly  exceptional cases 
l i s t e d  i n  note 13, as w e l l  a s  (56)). These considerations, . 
then, provide support f o r  deriving c l e f t  sentences from 
pseudo-cleft sentences (i. e. ultimately from structures  under- 
lying pseudo-cleft sentences). 16 
6. Restrictions on Items which can Appear i n  Focus Position 
In discussing the  syntax of c l e f t  sentences, w e  should 
note tha t  there are r e s t r i c t ions  on the s o r t  Q£ items which 
can appear i n  focus positf  on. For most speakers interviewed, 
the items which can appear i n  focus posit ion a r e  noun phrases 
(including verbal complements which have heads) and preposi- . 
t ional  phrases : 
(65) a. It was John tha t  1 saw. 
- 
i n  the  garden 
a t  5 o'clock 
tha t  John kissed 
by g iming her d m  
because he loved her 
Mary. 
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(65) c. I t ' s  the  fac t  that Mary hates m e  tha t  I can ' t  
bear. 
d. It 's John's driving tha t  bothers me. 
e. I t ' s  Sirhan's assassfnation of Kennedy tha t  
astounds me. 
It i s  not possible, however, t o  have verb phrases i n  focus 
position, or verbal complements without heads: 
(66) a. * I t  was go tha t  John did. 
b. * I t  was fo r  John t o  go tha t  I wanted. 
c. * I t ' s  t ha t  t h e  world i s  round tha t  1 believe. 
A t  f i r s t  glance these f a c t s  appear t o  be unsystematic; however, 
J. Etnonds has provided a principled explanation f o r  t h e  f a c t s  
of (65) and (66) within what he terns the  Structure Preserving 
Framework. 1 7  
Recall t ha t  the  extraction theory pos i t s  a deep s t ruc-  
ture  source f o r  pseudo-clefts which has an empty predicate. 
The node -9 Pred however, i s  an a b b r e v i a t i ~ n  f o r  the  nodes 
' which can possibly appear a f t e r  the  copula, In fac t ,  i n  deep 
structure,  the  syntactic source f o r  pseudo-cleft sentences 
contains i n  predicate posit ion major category nodes such as 
NP, PP, W, and so on, which dominate the  dummy symbol [ A ] .  
'. 
Further, within the Structure Preserving,Framework, t h e  deep 
s t ructure  which ultimately becomes a c l e f t  sentence must a l s o  
contain an - S node a t  the  end of the  VP. Thus, f o r  a sentence 





3 In (67), the  MP dominated by the  verb phrase, NP , dominates 
the dummy symbol [ A ] ,  and t h i s  NP can be replaced by an ex- 
t racted NP (hence "f i l l ing" the  empty predicate).  No other 
kind of consti tuent can replace t h i s  NP, sinse, on the Struc- 
ture  Preserving hypothesis, movement rules  can move some i t e m  
x in to  a position where the  phrase s t ruc ture  ru les  generate 
the node X. In other words, movement rules  can move an NP 
only where the  phrase s t ruc ture  rules  of English generate t h e  
\ 
NP node. Thus, a f t e r  extraction w e  would have: 
(68) yS< 
/Np\ 2 
it t ha t  /7\ NP W V Ah NP s3
I I I be I John e \ A I v 
I 
saw 
A t  t h i s  point t h e  Clef t  Extraposition ru le  must apply. Once 
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again, movement rule* can move the - S* node only t o  where the  
phrase s t ruc ture  rules  generate 5 nodes. In t h i s  case, S 2 
can be moved t o  t h e  posit ion where the phrase s t ruc ture  rules  
3 have generated S . This r e su l t s  in: 
In short,  both the Extraction Rule and the  Cleft  Extraposition 
Rule, being movement rules,  can only move consti tuents of 
type X where the  phrase s t ruc ture  rules provide nodes of type 
x. 
With this brief  background ( for  detai led discussion, see 
bonds [1970]), w e  can now appreciate how the Structure Pre- 
serving Hypothesis predicts  tha t  sentences such a s  those of 
. 
(66) a r e  not possible. That i s ,  f o r  such sentences t o  be 
possible, the  deep s t ruc ture  would have t o  contain VPs sf the 
following so r t :  
\ 
Thus, (66a) would require a s t ruc ture  such a s  (70b), since it 
has the form (it) becawthat John did,  in other words, - it 
V+VP+S. Sentences such a s  (66b, c) wsukd require s t ructures  
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such as  (70a), s ince these a r e  of t h e  form be+S+S. The cru- 
c i a l  fac t ,  however, is  tha t  the  English phrase s t ruc ture  ru les  
provide no VP expansions such as  those of (70) (as argued in'  
de ta i l  by Emonds). There a r e  expansions such a s  tha t  of (68) 
(i. e. V+NP+S, cf .  f orce+John+ts leave), and expansions such a s  
V+PP+S (e. g. mention+ro John-~that S) , and thus we can have 
c l e f t  sentences with NPs and PPs i n  focus position. However, 
sentences such as  (66) a r e  blocked because the  phrase struc- 
ture  rules  of English do not provide the  proper VP expansions 
which would allow such sentences t o  be generated. 18 
7. Further Extensions 
The extraposition process we have posited here appears t o '  
be more general than w e  have s ta ted  it. That is, we have 
assumed tha t  it q3erates only on ce r t a in  output s t ructures  of 
the  Extraction Rule. However, there  appear t o  be base-genera- 
ted s t ructures  t o  which it a l so  applies. Consider sentences 
such as: s 
(71) a. My job is t o  keep order here. 
b. The task of syntax i s  t o  describe sentences. 
c. My feel ing is  tha t  John should stay. 
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men t he  items connected by t h e  copula a r e  reversed, t h e r e  i s  
a drop i n  accep tab i l i ty :  
(72) a. ?To keep order here  i s  my job. 
b. ?To describe sentences is  the  t ask  of syntax. 
c. ?That John should s t ay  is my feel ing.  
However, no t ice  t h a t  t he re  are  sentences such a s  those of 
(7'31, which a r e  synonymous with those of (71) : 
(73) a .  I t ' s  my job t o  keep order here, 
b. I t ' s  t h e  t ask  of syntax t o  describe sentences. 
c. I t ' s  my fee l ing  t h a t  John should s tay ,  
If we assume t h a t  t h e  sentences of (72) have the  following 
s t ructure :  
(74) a. [ [ i t  [ ( f o r  me) t o  keep order  h e r e l  i s  [my job]] 
b. [ [ i t  [ ( fo r  i t )  t o  describe sentences]] i s  [ t h e  
task of syntax] ] 
c.  [ [it [ t h a t  John should stay]] i s  [my fee l ing]  ] < 
then we can assume t h a t  Clef t  Extraposition operates on t h e  
embedded sentences leaving - it behind. These, then, a r e  
analogous t o  the c l e f t  sentences w e  have discussed i n  t h a t  
the  embedded clauses have no WH-pro-foms, but r a t h e r  have 
complementizers such as tha t  (and he r  fo r - to  a s  wel l ) .  Thus, 
-
the  r u l e  extraposes an i n i t i a l  c lause  i n  a copula construct ion 
(i, e. specif i c a t i ona l  statement) which has no WH pro-forms. 
Bn t h i s  way, it i s  not l imited t o  c l e f t  sentences. 
The objective of t h i s  chapter has been t o  provide an ac- 
count of the syntactic derivation sf c l e f t  sentences. We ar- 
gue that  the  c l e f t  sentence must derive from pseudo-cleft sen- 
tences (ultimately from the  deep s t ruc ture  provitied by the  
extraction theory). The evidence adduced i n  support of t h i s  
proposal i s  evidence from formal (i. e. syntactic)  considera- 
tions, not from semantic considerations. The f i r s t  general 
sort  sf  evidence presented deals with syntact ic  agreement pat- 
terns, and we show tha t  these can be predicted, given the  pro- 
posed derivation fo r  c l e f t  sentences. The second sor t  of evi-. 
dence has t o  do with the  derivation of prepositional phrases 
i n  focus p ~ s i t i o n  i n  c l e f t  sentences. This area provides sup- 
port for  the  extraction theory, and f o r  the  proposal t o  derive 
c l e f t  sentences i n  the  manner of (43). 
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2 
1. Even though the  discussion i n  t h i s  chapter centers on sen- 
tences such a s  (I), t he  analysis is, of course, intended 
t o  extend t o  all c l e f t  sentences, i n  par t icu lar  t o  pa i rs  
such a s  the  following: 
( i )  What John bought was a ca r  + It was a ca r  tha t  
John bought. 
( i i )  Where 1 saw John was In Boston -, It was i n  
Boston tha t  I saw John. \ 
(iii) When John l e f t  was a t  three o'clock -. It was a t  
three o'clock tha t  John l e f t ,  
(iv) Why John did tha t  was t o  i r r i t a t e  m e  -, It was t o  
i r r i t a t e  m e  t ha t  John did  tha t .  
(v) How John did tha t  was by gtanding on a laader-. 
It was by standing on a ladder tha t  John did 
that .  
For my rn speech, who -and - t ha t  a r e  completely in te r -  
changeable a s  r e l a t i v e  pronouns of t h e  clause i n  c l e f t  
sentences. There a r e  d ia lec ts  i n  which there  is  a d i f -  
ference i n  acceptabi l i ty  i n  many cases between the use of 
who -a s  opposed t o  t h a t ;  however, as f a r  as I know, ' t h i s  
should make no difference t o  t h e  analysis proposed here. 
3. The examples used i n  the  f i r s t  sect ion of t h i s  chapter 
have pseudo-cleft sentences with bound re la t ives ,  ra ther  
than f r e e  re la t ives ,  even though w e  claim tha t  c l e f t  sen- 
tences do not derive from these par t icu lar  f oms. The 
reason fo r  t h i s  i s  solely the  f a c t  tha t  some speakers do 
not f ind acceptable pseudo-cleft sentences with f r e e  re la-  
t ives, such a s  ( i i )  - (v) i n  footnote (1). Since it makes 
no difference i n  these sections which form is  used ( i .  e. 
both have the  propert ies needed), we naturally use the  - 
form acceptable t o  most spezkers. 
We should make clear ,  however, tha t  f r e e  re la t ives  do 
have the propert ies necessary t o  derive c l e f t  sentences. 





The Extraction Rule can apply t o  extract  the subject of 
the  embedded sentence, the  NP L. When t h i s  is placed in  
predicate position, the pro-form who - is  l e f t  behind, since 
w h o  i s  the pro-form f o r  human nouns. Th5s r e s u l t s  i n  the  
following : 
/s\ 
/Np\ 2 it be /"\ MP 
/s\ me I
I NP /w\ 
who V Adj 
8 
be I responsible 
Note that  t h e  pro-form -who is  syntact ical ly  th i rd  person, 
and when the  verb agreement r u l e  applies - be of s2 i s  in-  
f lected t o  agree with the subject,  who, - and ends up a s  the 
th i rd  person - is. Note fur ther  tha t  If a p lura l  subject 
had been extracted, the  pro-form would be marked a s  syn- 
t ac t i ca l ly  plural ,  and the  verb would end up as  the  th i rd  
(3) (cont'd.) 
person plural  _are. (Stnce most speakers f ind pseudo-cleft 
sentences with i n i t i a  1 - who clauses unacceptable (as men- 
tioned i n  Chapter I),, these must obl igator i ly  undergo 
Clef t  Extrapositian t o  become c l e f t  sentences. See note 
l a ) .  
4. I a m  grateful  t o  Steve Anderson and Morris Malle f o r  
pointing out the f a c t s  of Dialect 11. 
This f a c t  was pointed out t o  me by Peter Culicover, t o  
whom I am grateful  f o r  discussion on t h i s  section. It 
should be made c lea r  tha t  by s t a t ing  tha t  cer ta in  c l e f t  
sentences in  Dialect I11 a r e  produced "by analogy to'" 
apposit ive clauses, 'I. wish t o  express two fac ts ;  namely, 
(a) t ha t  the patterns found i n  both c o n s t r u c t i ~ n s  (with 
regard t o  case marking) a re  identical ,  and (b) tha t  the  
appositive clause construction is "primary" since it i s  
found i n  - all dialects ,  while the  c l e f t  sentence agreement 
pa t te rn  of Dialect I11 i s  found ~ n l y  in  t ha t  one d ia lec t .  
\ 
6 .  It is  not possible t o  discuss the  analysis of appositive 
clauses i n  t h i s  paper; however, it i s  interest ing t o  note 
one fur ther  fac t :  appositive clauses associated with 
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(6) (cont'd.) 
accusative pronouns can begin wfth head nouns such as the 
one the person, e tc . ,  however, t h i s  is not possible whew 
-3 
such clauses a r e  associated wfth nominative pronouns: 
(i) H e  had the nerve t o  say that t o  me, the one who 
has made him what he i s  today. 
( i i )  * I J  the  one who loves her, w i l l  always defend 
her. 
7. Note a l so  t h a t  these f ac t s  hold fo r  Dialect 11, a s  well. 
Steve Anderson points out in te res t ing  eases such a s  the 
following: 
It is  I who i n  s p i t e  of himself is  sick. 
8. This f ac t  was pointed out by Ray Jaekendoff, and is quoted 
i n  Ross [ 1968, footnote 521. 
9. The matter is not as  simple as  we have s ta ted  it ,  however. 
J.R. Ross has pointed out t o  m e  cases in which a successiom 
of ident ical  person pronouns is  unacceptable, but i n  which 
reflexive forms a r e  equally unacceptable: 
', 
( i )  I t ' s  me who thinks Mary loves 
Only the t h i r d  person non-reflexive pronoun i s  acceptable 
(9) (cont'd.) 
i n  t h i s  environment: 
( i i )  I t ' s  mei who thinks Mary loves himi. 
It seems t o  be the  case tha t  the occurrence of the  re- 
f lexive is  most acceptable when there  is  no subject NP 
within the clause i n  which the reflexive occurs (as in 
(25c) and (25b')). 
10. The matter of "anomalous" reflexives i s  discussed fur ther  
i n  Chapter 5, where it i s  shown tha t  such forms cannot be 
interpreted as n o m l  reflexives, since they form the  foc i  
of t h e i r  containing sentences. We show tha t  interpretat ion 
of pro-f oms changes s ignif icant ly  depending on whether 
the  pro-form i s  focal  o r  non-focal. 
The dis t inct ion between (44a) and (44b)  i s  manifested i n  
another difference as well, namely t h a t  the  tense of the  
copula need not agree with the tense of the  verb i n  the  
clause i n  (44a) : 
(1) The place where John was - i s  i n  the garden. 
(ii) *Where John was is i n  the p r d e n .  
As we paint out i n  Chapter 3, non-agreement i n  tense indi-  
cates  a non-sgecificatisnal use of the  copula. In the 
case of (i) above, we have a locat ive use ~f the  copula i n  
( l a )  (COII~ d. ) 
the statement [ the  place i s  i n  the  garden]. 
(48a) and (48b) have no sources f o r  reasons pointed out i n  
connection with (47a,b) and Chapter 1, (79). Tkere a r e  no 
corresponding pseudo-cleft sentences f o r  (48c)  and (48d); 
(48e) has a s  the  c losest  possible source t h e  sentence: 
( i )  ( the one) who we met with f i r s t  was Howard 
Johnson. 
where, jus t  a s  with (79) of Chapter 1, there  is  a problem 
i n  generating the PP i n  focus position, and eliminating 
the preposition of the clause. 
13. The matter of pro-forms fo r  prepositional phrases foms  a 
complicated area of English grammar. For example, on the 
basis s f  examples such a s  (54) and (55), one might a l so  
argue tha t  w& and RaJ also can represent prepositional 
phrases : 
( i )  Why did John go? 
For no reason. 
( i i )  How did John do that?  
\ 
By standing on a ladder. 
However, there  a r e  no analogues s f  there and - then (i.e. 
non-WH pro-forms) fo r  w h p  and a, as we see from the  
(13) (cont'd.) 
blanks i n  the following: 
( i i i )  a.  I did it f o r  tha t  reason and B i l l  did it 
b. John did  it by standing on a ladder, and Sam 
did it t 00. 
There is no pro-form which replaces the phrase f o r  tha t  
reason, and no pro-form which replaces the  phrase by stand- 
ing on a ladder (although it may be marginally acceptable 
t o  use the  pro-form - thus). There are ,  i n  other words, un- 
systematic gaps i n  the s e t  of pro-forms f o r  prepositional 
phrases, 
The s i tua t ion  i s  complicated even more by the  f a c t  
tha t  i n  ce r t a in  cases the  preposition can actual ly  appear 
with some of these forns. Thus, consider: 
(iv) a. Where did John go - to? 
'b .  Where did John come - from? (cf: *Where did 
John come?) 
(v) a. *I went t o  Boston and Sam went t o  there  also. 
b. I came from Boston and John came - from there  
too. \ 
Given sentences such a s  (ivb) and (vb) it is  questionable 
whether where (and there) a r e  pro-forms fo r  prepositional 
phrases, since the preposition i n  these cases must appear. 
It i s  not our purpose t o  embark on a study of such forms. 
The only point  is  t h a t  if i n  f a c t  t he re  a r e  pro-forms f o r  , " 
some preposi t ional  phrases, then such pro-forms could be 
-
l e f t  behind by t h e  ex t rac t ion  ru l e .  
14. There is  one exception t o  t h i s  p r inc ip le ,  namely, clauses 
which have who: -
( i )  a.  It was John who I gave the book to .  
b. It was John t o  whom I gave t h e  book. 
Thus, w e  must allow such clauses t o  extrapose. (See note  
16. ) 
15. It should be noted t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  s m e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on the  
kinds of preposi t ional  phrases which can be extracted and 
placed i n  focus posi t ion.  For example, note sentences - 
such as:  
(i) a. ? I t  is about Nixon t h a t  he  always talks, 
b. *It is  about Nixon t h a t  he always reads books. 
Note, however, t h a t  t h e  f a c t s  represented i n  (i) do not 
have t o  do spec i f i ca l l y  with t h e  der ivat ion of c l e f t  sen- 
$ 
tences, but a r e  r a the r  pa r t  of a  more general phenomenon, 
and the  r e s t r i c t i o n  i n  question can be r e l a t ed  t o  r e s t r i c -  
t ions  on movement ru l e s  i n  general.  Thus, compare t he  
(15) (cont ' d. ) 
sentences of ( i i )  with those of (i): 
( i i )  a. ?About Nixon he always ta lks .  
b. *About Nixon he always reads books. 
We see tha t  when such prepositional phrases a r e  moved by 
the ru le  of Topicalization, the  sentences a r e  jus t  a s  un- 
acceptable a s  the  c l e f t  sentences of ( i ) ,  Thus, whatever 
r e s t r i c t i o n  is involved here, it is  a r e s t r i c t i o n  on aove- 
ment rules  i n  general, and not a special  r e s t r i c t i o n  on 
the  extraction rule.  
16. The res t r ic t ions  l i s t e d  i n  (58) remain, a t  t h i s  writing, 
a s  specif ic  r e s t r i c t ions  on Cleft  Extraposition. It would 
be desirable, of course, i f  such re s t r i c t ions  were appli-  
cable i n  a wider range of cases, or i f  they followed from 
more general principles.  However, a t  the  present time it  - 
i s  not c lear  t o  me whether such re s t r i c t ions  generalize t o  
other areas of the grammar. 
Note that f o r  (58a), the  s i tua t ion  is  complicated by 
seemingly e r r a t i c  f a c t s  and d ia lec t  differences. For most 
speakers I have interviewed, it i s  the  case tha t  extraposed 
'. 
WH phrases a r e  unacceptable. The only, exception consis ts  
i n  extraposed who clauses; however, as we have mentioned, 
t h i s  correla tes  with the  f ac t  tha t  pseudo-cleft sentences 
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(16) (cont'd.) 
with i n i t i a l  w& phrases a r e  judged a s  unacceptable, or  a t  
l eas t  l e s s  acceptable than pseudo-clefts with other WM- . ' 
clauses. W e  can r e l a t e  these f ac t s  by assuming t ha t  in i -  
t i a l  - who-clauses obl igator i ly  undergo extrapos it ion, 
Other speakers I have interviewed accept not only 
who -clauses, but a l so  other WH-clauses i n  extraposed 
position. For  example, J.R. Ross has pointed out t o  me 
sentences such as: 
( i )  It was i n  the garden where I saw John. 
( i i )  It was on the. beach where I f i r s t  met her. 
Ross fur ther  points out, however, t ha t  i f  the  focus pre- 
posit ional  phrase i s  a di rect ional  phrase, then such ex- 
t rapos i t f sn  i s  unacceptable: 
( i i i )  *It was t a  Boston where he went. 
Thus, fo r  same speakers extraposition m y  apply t o  WH- - 
clauses besides who -clauses, with r e s t r i c t ions  of various 
sor ts .  It can be said, however, tha t  f o r  most speakers 
(58a) holds t rue  with the  s ingle  exception noted. 
17.  For a detai led exposition of the  Structure Preserving 
$ 
Framework see J. Fmonds [1970]. For the discussion of 
c l e f t  sentences i n  par t icular ,  see Bnonds [ 1970, sec t io r~  
3.2.11. 
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18. I leave as an open question whether adjectives can appear 
in focus position. While ( i )  seems unacceptabl.e, ( i i )  
seems t o  be better: 
( i )  It's t a l l  that John is. 
(ii) I t ' s  id io t i c  tha t  John always manages t o  be. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE SEMANTIC INTERPRETATION OF CLEFTED SENTENCES AND THE 
SEMANTIC REPRESENTATION OF FOCUS-PRESUPPOSITION RELATIONS 
1. Objectives 
In the  l a s t  two chapters w e  have discussed the  syntact ic  
derivation of c l e f t ed  sentences, and w e  have seen tha t  these 
can derive from two deep s t ruc ture  sources. In  t h i s  chapter 
w e  attempt t o  show how it is  possible tha t  a s ing le  surface 
s t ructure  deriving from two deep s t ruc tu re  sources can be as-  
signed only one semantic reading. We f i r s t  point out t h a t  
* 
the dual source f o r  c le f ted  sentences cannot be associated 
with semantic ambiguities, and tha t  ambiguities which a re  
found i n  c l e f t ed  sentences are i n  f a c t  par t  of more general 
phenomena. We then show t h a t  the  two deep s t ruc tu re  sources 
from which a s ing le  c le f ted  surface s t ruc tu re  can derive a r e  
semantically equivalent, and thus tha t  ho semantic difference 
r e s u l t s  from t h e  f ac t  tha t  the  deep s t ruc tures  a r e  formally 
d i s t inc t .  Finally,  w e  discuss focus-presupposition re la t ions ,  
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and show tha t  s ince  these  a r e  determined by fac tors  of sur face  
s t ruc tures ,  a s ing l e  c l e f t e d  surface  s t r u c t u r e  w i 1 . l  receive  
only one s e t  of such r e l a t i ons .  Thus, s ince  t h e  deep struc- 
tures  a r e  semantically equivalent,  and s ince  other  aspects  of 
in te rpre ta t ion  a r e  determined from the s ing le  surface. form, 
c l e f t e d  sentences deriving from two sources receive  only one 
reading. 
The discussion of focus i n  t h i s  chapter i s  pa r t i cu l a r ly  
cen t ra l .  F i r s t  of a l l ,  t h i s  i s  important given t h a t  t he  deep 
s t ruc tures  posi ted by t h e  Extraction Theory contain an empty 
[ A ] ,  end give no indicat ion as  t o  which const i tuent(9)  may be 
the  focus. Since t h i s  i s  t h e  case, we must show t h a t  t h i s  
deep S ~ ~ U C ~ U P P  source cau.ses no semantic problems, and t h a t  
f o r  independent reasons focus-presupposition r e l a t i ons  must be 
determined from fac to r s  of surface s t ruc ture ,  not deep s t ruc-  
ture. For t h i s  reason, w e  discuss focus i n  some d e t a i l ,  and 
i n  the  course of t h i s  discussion w e  propose a semantic nota- 
t i o n  f o r  focus-presupposition r e l a t i ons .  Therefore, t h i s  
chapter  has a broader purpose than t h a t  of discussing c l e f t e d  
sentences i n  pa r t i cu l a r ,  camely, t o  shot\? what a representa t ion 
of f ocus-presupposition. r e l a t i ons  would loqk lcice.. We j u s t i f y  
', 
t h i s  representat ion on the  bas is  of esguments from t h e  s t ruc -  
t u r e  of discourse, a s  well  a s  ' l og i ca l  scope'. Further,  i n  
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Chapter 4 we present  add i t iona l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  nota- 
t ion.  Thus, i n  discussing these  broader issues,  we w i l l  show 
tha t  t he re  i s  no need f o r  deep s t ruc tures  t o  include any indi- '  
cat ion of focus-presupposition r e l s~ t ions ,  and t h a t  a d i s t i nc -  
t ion  i n  deep s t r u c t u r e  source f o r  c l e f t e d  sentences need not 
lead t o  any semantic d i s t inc t ions .  
2. Basic Factors i n  t h e  In te rpre ta t ion  of Clefted Sentences 
2.1 .  Speci f ica t ional  vs. Predicational.  I n  t h e  course of 
our discussion of t he  i n t e rp re t a t i on  of c l e f t e d  sentences, we 
w i l l  have occasion t o  r e f e r  t o  two fundamental senses of t he  
copula, namely, t h e  spec i f ica t iona l  sense a s  opposed t o  t he  
predicat ional  sense. These two senses of t h e  copula a r e  il- - 
lus t ra ted  i n  simple examples such a s :  
The candidate f o r  the  t r i p  Mare 
Agnew . 
b. The f i r s t  candidate f o r  the  t r i p  t o  Mars i s  short  
and f a t .  
'7 
There i s  an i n t u i t i v e l y  c l e a r  d i s t i nc t ion  between these  two 
sentences, i n  tha t  the  f i r s t  sentence i d e n t i f i e s ,  o r  spec i f ies ,  
some en t i t y ,  while i n  t h e  second sentence given q u a l i t i e s  are 
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predicated of some individual.  An obvious di f ference  between 
these two i s  t h a t  t he  f i r s t  sentence tells us who - t h e  candi- 
date is, while t h e  second sentence does not. From t h e  second. ' 
sentence, we do not know y& the candidate is, w e  only know 
what he  is, t h a t  is, what q u a l i t i e s  he  has. Clefted sentences 
-
a r e  always spec i f ica t iona l :  t ha t  is ,  t h e  c lause  of t he  c l e f t ed  
sentence contains a semantic var iab le  (represented by t h e  WH 
word), and t h i s  var iab le  i s  speci f ied  by the  post-copular item. 
Hence, of the  following two sentences, (2a) i s  a c l e f t e d  sen- 
tence, while (2b) i s  a predicat ional  sentence: 
(2)  a .  ( the  one) who we chose t o  go t o  Mars was Spiro 
Agnew . 
b. ( the  one) who w e  chose t o  go t o  Mars was shor t  
and f a t .  
Once again, sentence (2a) t e l l s  us who -was chosen ( i .e .  t h e  
var iab le  has been given a value), however, from (2b) w e  do not - 
know who -has been chosen, we only know t ha t ,  whoever i t  was, 
he has ce r t a in  q u a l i t i e s  of being shor t  and f a t .  Thus, t h e  
var iab le  i s  not speci f ied  i n  (2b). This fundamental d i s t i nc -  
t i o n  i s  manifested i n  various syn tac t ic  and semantic d i f f e r -  
ences, which can i n  f a c t  be used a s  diagnostic t e s t s  f o r  t he  
'. 
t w ~  senses. F i r s t  of a l l ,  we note t h a t  i n  a  specj-f icat ional  
statement, t he  order s f  items connected by the  copula can be 
re-~ersed, while i n  a predicat ional  statement such reversa l  
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yields an ungrama t i c a l  sentence. Thus, compare the  sentences 
of (2) with those of (3), i n  which reversal  has taken place: 
(3) a. Spiro Agnar was the  one who w e  chose t o  go t o  , ' 
Mars. 
b. *Short and fat was the one who we chose t o  go t o  
Mars. 
The specif icat ional  sentence (2a) (and a l so  (Pa)) may be re- 
versed, a s  shown by (3a), however, t he  predicational (2b) 
may not. 
A second basic difference between the  two senses rests 
with the f ac t  tha t  predication is  a semantic re la t ion  which 
admits comparison and modification of degree, while specif i -  
cation is  a semantic r e l a t ion  which i n  some sense implies 
uniqueness, and there  can be no modification of degree. 
Thus, one can say that  someone is  very f a t ,  o r  somewhat t a l l ,  
or that  someone i s  t a l l e r  than someone else.  However, one - 
cannot say tha t  Jones is  somewhat the  man who robbed the bank, 
or tha t  he i s  more the man who robbed the  bank than he i s  the  
man who l ives  on the corner. Jones e i the r  i s  or  is  not the  
man who robbed the bank, and there  can be no sense of modifi- 
cation of degree. 
\ 
Fredicational and specif icat ional  senses a r e  a l so  d i s t in -  
guished i n  interest ing ways i n  pseudo-cleft sentences them- 
selves. Consider a pseudo-cleft sentence such as  : 
(4) What he  i s  i s  t a l l .  
This is a spec i f ica t iona l  statement (i .e.  t h e  item t a l l  is 
not predicated of t h e  subject  NP what John is, but r a t h e r  is  
a spec i f ica t ion  of t h e  var iab le  represented by what) - and t h i s  
can be seen f r m  t h e  f a c t  t ha t  (4) allows reversa l :  
(5) Ta l l  i s  what John is. 
Even though (4) is  i t s e l f  a spec i f ica t iona l  statement, t he  sen- 
tence f r m  which it i s  formed must be a predicat ional  s t a t e -  
ment. Thus, from (6a) w e  can form t h e  pseudo-cleft sentence 
(7a), however, from (6b) w e  cannot form (7b) : 
(6) a .  He i s  t a l l .  
b. He is the  man who robbed t h e  bank yesterday. 
(7) a .  What he i s  is  t a l l .  
b. *What he i s  i s  the  man who robbed the  bank yester-  
day. 
Thus, f o r  predicat ional  statements t he re  a r e  corresponding 
pseudo-cleft sentences which have t h e  form what X is,  however, 
f o r  spec i f ica t iona l  statements t h e r e  a r e  no such pseudo-cleft 
forms. This provides another d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  between the  two 
senses. 
2.2. Referent ia l  vs. Non-Referential. I n  order t o  explain 
the  f a c t s  manifested i n  (7), w e  must look a t  cases with predi- '  
c a t e  nominals. So f a r  w e  have discussed predicat ional  s t a t e -  
ments i n  terms of sentences which contain adject ives ,  however, 
predicate nmina l s ,  a s  well, appear i n  predicat  ional  s t a t e -  
ment s : 
(8) a. John i s  a fool .  
b. *A foo l  i s  John. 
c .  John i s  more a foo l  than he is  a pedant. 
d. What John i s  i s  a fool .  
According t o  t h e  tests we have established,  (8a) i s  c l e a r l y  
a predicat ional  statement. The dif ference between a predica- 
t i ona l  statement such a s  (8a) and a spec i f ica t iona l  statement 
such a s  (6b) r e s t s  with t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  post-copular NP of 
(6b) i s  r e f e ren t i a l ,  while t h e  post-copular NP of (8a) i s  - 
non-referential  (following t h e  terminology of Kuno [1969]). 
A s  Kuno points  out, noun phrases suck a s  a foo l  i n  (8a) a r e  
non-referential ,  i n  t h e  sense t h a t  they a r e  understood t o  
have no spec i f i c  r e f e r en t  i n  t h e  universe of discourse. Thus, 
the  speaker who uses t h e  phrase a foo l  i n  (8a) does not denote 
'. 
any individual  i n  t h e  world by using t h a t  phrase. On t h e  
other  hand, t h e  noun phrase t he  man who robbed the  bank 
yesterday i n  (6b) i s  i n  f a c t  understood a s  denoting a spec i f i c  
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individual,  i. e. an individual  can be picked out by the use  of 
that  phrase. 1 
The di f ference  i n  r e f  e r e n t i a l i t y ,  however, is  a l s o  mani-. " 
fes ted  i n  c e r t a i n  syn tac t ic  differences.  The primary d i f f e r -  
ence, a s  Kuno points  out, is  with respect  t o  p rsnmina l iza -  
t ion :  non-referential  NPs may be pronm.inalized by which, even 
when they a r e  marked as  animate. However, r e f e r e n t i a l  NPs 
may not:  
(9) a .  H e  i s  a  gentleman, which you a r e  not.  
b. *Jones i s  t h e  man who robbed the  bank yesterday, 
which Smith i s  not.  
Similarly, i n  pseudo-cleft sentences, non-referential  NPs may 
be replaced by what -9 however, r e f e r e n t i a l  NPs may not :  
(10) a .  What he i s  i s  a gentleman. 
b. *What he i s  i s  t h e  man who robbed the  bank yes- 
t erday . - 
Conversely, r e f e r e n t i a l  NPs may be replaced by who -9 while non- 
r e f e r e n t i a l  NPs may not : 
(11) a .  he claims t o  be i s  a gentleman. 
b. Who he claims t o  be i s  t h e  man who robbed the 
bank yesterday. 
% 
Thus, t he  d i f ference  between r e f e r e n t i a l  and non-ref e r e n t i a l  
NPs shows up i n  t he  di f ference  between poss ible  syn tac t ic  
pro-forms which may replace  such NPs (when t h e  NBs i n  question 
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a r e  animate). Referent ia l  NPs may be represented pronominally 
by who, and non-referent ia l  NPs may be represented by which -
2 
o r  -what. Kuno provides an example, i n  f ac t ,  where both - what " 
and which appear: 
(12) What you need i s  a good wife, which you don't  have. 
For  such reasons, then, w e  see  why (7b) i s  not possible:  t he  
pro-form what, i n  t h e  i n i t i a l  clause, has incor rec t ly  replaced 
a r e f e r e n t i a l  NP. 3 
2 . 3 .  kr r the r  Distinguishing Features. Another d i s t inc-  
t ion  between specif  i c a t i ona l  and predieat ional  senses w e  can 
c i t e  i s  the  f a c t  t ha t  c e r t a i n  tense  agreement phenomena in- 
fluence the  i n t e rp re t a t i on  of t he  copula with respect  t~ these  
two senses. That is, it has been noted of ten  t h a t  i n  pseudo- - 
c l e f t  sentences t h e  t ense  of t he  copula must agree with t h e  
tense of t he  verb i n  t h e  clause. Thus, consider: 
(13) a. What you a r e  holding i n  your hands - i s  a small 
b r m  bu t t e r f ly  w i t t i  spots  on i t s  wings, 
b. What you a r e  holding i n  your hands was -a small 
'. 
brown b u t t e r f l y  with spots  on i t s  wings (once). 
c. Whap you a r e  holding i n  your hands w i l l  be a 
small  brown bu t t e r f ly  with spots  on i t s  wings. 
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A s  we see, only (13a) informs us a s  t o  p rec i se ly  what i s  being 
held; (13b) does not specify what i s  being held, b u t  merely 
indicates t h a t  t h e  object  i n  question once had c e r t a i n  pro- 
pe r t i e s ;  (13c) a s  wel l  does not specify t h e  object i n  ques- 
t ion,  but s t a t e s  c e r t a i n  proper t ies  which t h e  object w i l l  
come t o  possess. It i.s in t e r e s t i ng  t o  no te  t h a t  only (13a) 
allows reversa l ,  while reversa l  i n  (13b) and (13e) causes un- 
grarnmaticality : 
(14) a. A small brown bu t t e r f ly  with spots  on i t s  wings 
i s  what you a r e  holding i n  your hand. 
b. *A small brown bu t t e r f ly  with spots  on i t s  wings 
was what you a r e  holding i n  your hand. 
c .  A small brown bu t t e r f ly  with spots  on i t s  wings 
w i l l  be what you a r e  holding i n  your hand. 
This suggests t h a t  (13b,c) a r e  predicat ional ,  while (13a) i s  
spec i f ica t iona l .  Because t h e  foca l  items i n  (13b) and ( 1 3 ~ )  - 
do not i n  f a c t  specify t he  var iab le  i n  t he  clause,  these  a r e  
therefore  not considered as ' c l e f t ed '  sentences, i n  t h e  sense 
i n  which we have discussed tha t  term. 
It should be noted t h a t  while t he  phenomenon i l l u s t r a t e d  
by the  sentences of (13) has been viewed i n  t e rns  of tense  
$ 
agreement, i t  i s  i n  f a c t  pa r t  of a deeper phenomenon. Con- 
s ider ,  £or example, sentences such a s :  
(15) a.  H i s  old job was building radars a t  Lincoln Labs. 
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b. *His old job i s  building radars a t  Lincoln Labs. 
The use of t he  ad jec t ive  - o ld  i n  h i s  old job denotes a  former 
s t a t e  of a f f a i r s ,  now no longer extant.  Given t h i s  i n t e r -  
pretat ion,  it i s  not poss ible  t o  speak of a  former s t a t e  of 
a f f a i r s  as  i f  it s t i l l  exis ted;  however, t h i s  i s  ju s t  what i s  
implied i n  sentence (15b), where t he  present tense  of t h e  co- 
pula is used. Such examples, which do not involve agreement 
of verb tenses a s  such, i nd i ca t e  t h a t  spec i f ice t iona l  s t a t e -  
ments imply a temporal congruence of t h e  e n t i t i e s  re fe r red  t o  
by t he  NPs i n  such statements. It i s  c l ea r ,  then, t ha t  agree- 
ment i n  tenses  i n  (13) i s  a supe r f i c i a l  r e f l ex  of a  deeper 
phenomencn. 
A s  a  f i n a l  example of t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between predica- 
t i ona l  and spec i f ica t iona l  senses, w e  note t h a t  t h i s  d i s t i nc -  
t i on  forms t h e  bas i s  f o r  ambiguous sentences such a s  t h e  f o l -  
lowing : - 
(16) What he wants h i s  next wife t o  be i s  fascinat ing.  
In t he  predicat ional  sense,, t he  ad jec t ive  f a s c i n a t a  i s  taken 
as modifying the e n t i r e  complex subject ,  what he wtints h i s  
next wife t o  be. In  t h i s  sense, t he  var iab le  of t he  c lause  i s  
not specif ied,  and thus w e  do not know what -it i s  he wants 
', 
h i s  next wife t o  be, we only know t h a t  i t  s t r i k e s  t h e  speaker 
a s  fascinat ing.  0-n the  other  hand, i n  t he  spec i f ica t iona l  
sense, (16) can be paraphrased a s  follows : 
(17) He wants his next wife to be fascinating. 
Furthermore, under reversal, (16) has only a specificational 
sense: 
(18) Fascinating is what he wants his next wife to be. 
The two senses are distinguished in an interesting way in the 
following, where on the specificational reading (19) repre- 
sents a contradiction, however, on the predicational sense 
(19) is consistent: 
(19) What John wants his next wife to be is fascinating -- 
believe it or not, he wants her tD be dull and 
boring. 
Within the framework we have developed so far, there is 
a straightforward aeans 'of distinguishing these senses. We 
can account for the ambiguity in sentences such as (16), in 
that such sentences can derive either from a predicational 
source in the base, or from a transformational source: 




What he wants his next wife to be 
e / w s  h i s  next wife t o  be f a a g  
The predicational sense of (16) has a representation such as 
that  shown i n  (20), the source i n  the  base, and thus i t  has 
a representation of the  same form as  simple predicational 
statements (e .  g. "The idea i s  fascinating"). Such a repre- 
sentation correctl-y shows the  'scope' of the  adjective - fas- 
cinating; t o  be the en t i r e  complex subject NP. The represen- 
ta t ion  fo r  the specif icat ional  sense i s  (21), which ultimate- 
ly  undergoes t h e  Extraction Rule. This representation cor- 
rec t ly  indicates tha t  the  scope of t h e  adjective f a s c i n a t i n ~  
2 is not the  e n t i r e  cmplex NP which dominates S , but ra ther  
is  the NP h i s  next wife within the  embedded sentence. 4 
The unitary surface s t ruc ture  (16) is  thus different ia ted 
a t  the level  of deep structure.  On the  assumption tha t  gram- 
matical re la t ions  a r e  determined i n  deep structure,  (20) w i l l  
be interpreted a s  a predicationaf statement ( i .  e. t he  gram- 
matical re la t ion  holding between subject  and predicate i s  that  
\ 
of predication, since the s t ruc ture  is of the  form NP-be-Adj). 
The deep s t ruc ture  predicate of (Zl), on the  other hand, i s  
semantically empty. (As we discuss i n  section 4.1, the  
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element [ A ]  c a r r i e s  no semantic in te rpre ta t ion) .  Thus, a t  
the  deep s t r u c t u r e  l eve l  (21) does not receive a spec i f ica -  
t iona l  in te rpre ta t ion .  Rather, t he  spec i f ica t iona l  in terpre-  .. 
t a t i on  associated wi th  the  pseudo-cleft which derives from 
(21) ( i n  t h i s  case, (16))  i s  assigned t o  it a s  p a r t  of i t s  
focus-presupposition re la t ions .  (This i s  discussed through- 
out sect ion 6 .  See i n  pa r t i cu l a r  note 18.) Thus, t h e  ambi- 
guity of (16) i s  accounted f o r  i n  t he  following way: it  can 
be generated a s  a  bas ic  predicat ional  statement ( i . e .  ( 2 0 ) ) ;  
o r ,  as  a spec i f ica t iona l  statement, i t  i s  generated a s  (21) 
and receives i t s  spec i f ica t iona l  i n t e rp re t a t i on  as  pa r t  of 
i t s  focus presupposition re la t ions ,  i n  a manner discussed i n  
sect ion 6. 
The d i s t i nc t ion  between predicat ional  and specificati .ona1 
senses i s  a fundamental aspect of t h e  i n t e rp re t a t i on  of copula 
sentences, and there fore  one of t h e  c ruc i a l  aspects  i n  d is-  
t inguishing c l e f t  ed sentences from other  copula sentences. In 
discussing semantic representat ions i n  l a t e r  sect ions ,  w e  w i l l  
need t o  use c e r t a i n  notat ion t o  represent  various meanings, 
and we w i l l  use t h e  symbol [=I t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  semantic re la -  
t i on  of speci f ica t ion,  and we s h a l l  simply use t h e  ortha- 
', 
graphic spe l l ing  [ i s ]  a s  a  technical  symbol f o r  t he  r e l a t i o n  
of predicat ion.  ' Thus, a s  a  f i r s t  rough approximation, we 
can represent t h e  senses of (16) as :  
(22) a. What he wants h i s  next wife t o  be is  fascinating. 
b. What he wants h i s  next wife t o  be = fascinating, 
We w i l l  develop such rough representations fur ther  as  we go 
along. 
3. Semantic Ambiguity i n  Clefted Sentences 
Before discussing semantic representations, w e  should 
discuss fur ther  ce r t a in  aspects of the  semantic interpreta-  
t ion  of c l e f t ed  sentences, namely, the  existence of cer ta in  
ambiguities. It i s  c l ea r ly  important t o  invest igate  the  ques- 
t ion  of ambiguities thoroughly, since we wish t o  determine 
whether a semantic notation must provide formal expression 
for  ambiguity, i f  any i s  present. Furthermore, given the  con- 
clusions we have reached a s  t o  the  syntax of c lef ted sentences, 
the matter of ambiguity becomes s ignif icant :  it i s  important 
t o  determine whether any semantic ambiguity can be syst  m a t i -  
cally associated wlth the syntact ic  derivational  ambiguity of 
c le f ted  sentences. W e  w i l l  show tha t  while various ambiguities 
5 
can be found i n  c le f ted  sentences, the  ambiguities i n  question 
cannot be associated with the  specific derivation of c le f ted  
sentences a s  such. Rather, the  ambiguities i n  c lef ted 
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sentences a r e  re f lexes  of much more general phenomena, and 
thus can not i n  f a c t  be associated with a dual syn tac t ic  
source f o r  c l e f t e d  sentences. 
We have already discussed c e r t a i n  ambiguities i n  sentences 
with predicate  adject ives ,  and w e  w i l l  now consider ambiguities 
i n  sentences with nominals i n  post-copular posi t ion.  For 
example: 
(23) What he  threw away was a valuable piece of equip- 
ment. 
This sentence i s  ambiguous i n  a way analogous t o  sentences 
such a s  (16). It has a specificationait  sense, i n  which the  
phrase a valuable piece of equipment i s  taken t o  have a spe- 
c i f i c  referent  i n  t h e  universe of discourse. In  t h i s  sense 
w e  know exactly - what it was t h a t  was thrown away, and t h i s  
sense allows reversa l :  
(24) A valuable piece of equipment was what John threw 
away. 
(3n t he  other  hand, (23) can have a predicat ional  sense, i n  
which the NP -- a velrlable piece of equipment is  - not  urderstood 
t o  have any spec i f i c  referent .  In t h i s  sense w e  do not know 
what -was thrown away; w e  only know t h a t ,  whatever it was, it 
'. 
has c e r t a i n  q u a l i t i e s ,  as  described i n  t he  predicate  phrase. 
Note t ha t  i n  t h i s  sense, t he  t ense  of the  copula need not 
agree with t h e  tense  of t he  verb i n  the clause: 
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(25) What he threw away - i s  a valuable piece of equipment. 
A t  f i r s t  glance, it would appear a s  i f  t h e  ambiguity of 
(23) should be accounted f o r  i n  a manner analogous t o  (16), 
namely, by d i f f e r en t i a t i ng  the  two senses on t h e  bas i s  of t h e  
two sources f o r  pseudo-cleft sentences, a s  follows: 
1 
NP - -VP 
it / \ 2  be 
I 
a valuable piece 
of equipment 
Thus, (26) would represent  t he  predicat ional  sense, while 
(27) would represent t h e  spec i f ica t iona l  sense, a s  before. 
However, t h i s  approach would be mistaken i n  severa l  ways. 
Consider, f o r  example, a sentence such a s :  
'. 
(28) What John threw away was t h e  valuable p iece  of 
equipment, 
This sentence is understood unambiguously a s  spec i f ica t iona l ,  
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i . e .  the  underlined NP i n  (28) i s  unambiguously r e f e ren t i a l .  
The c ruc i a l  point here i s  simply t h i s :  sentence (28) could 
2 
a r i s e  from e i t h e r  (26) (as NP ), or  from (27) ( i n  t he  posi- 
2 t ion of t h e  underlined NP embedded i n  S ). The phrase s t ruc-  
t u r e  ru les  allow NPs t o  be generated a f t e r  t h e  copula (as i n  
( 2 6 ) ) ,  as  w e l l  a s  i n  posi t ions  such a s  t h a t  of t he  NP i n  S 2 
of (27). Such NP posi t ions  can be expanded e i t h e r  a s  inde- 
f j -n i te  NPs o r  d e f i n i t e  NPs, and therefore,  (28) could a r i s e  
from e i t h e r  (26) or  (27). The di f ference  between (26) and (27) 
can not be used t o  explain t he  spec i f i ca t io~a l /p red ica t iona l  
ambiguity of (23), s ince  - each source i n  t u rn  can generate 
sentences which a r e  e i t h e r  predicat ional  o r  spec i f ica t iona l .  
The ambiguity i n  (23) i s  not spec i f i ca l l y  associated with 
the  der ivat ion of pseudo-cleft sentences, a s  such, but i s  a 
function of t he  semantic nature  of t h e  noun phrase a v a l u a b g  
piece of equipment. The d i s t i n c t i o n  between the  predicat ional  
and specif i c a t i ona l  senses i s  a function of t he  ref  e r e n t i a l i t y  
of t h i s  pa r t i cu l a r  NP, r a the r  than any property of t he  der i -  
vationof c l e f t e d  sentences. 
The view t h a t  t h e  ambiguity i n  question i s  not associated 
spec i f ica l ly  with t h e  der ivat ion of c l e f t e d  sentences i s  
', 
great ly  strengthened by noting t h a t  t he  same ambiguity shows 
up i n  non-clefted sentences a s  w e l l .  Consider, then: 
(29) H e  threw away a valuable piece of equipment. 
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This sentence is  ambiguous i n  just t he  way sentence (23) i s ,  
and t he  two senses can be resolved by addi t ion of appropriate 
contexts : 
(30) a ,  Jones i s  an i d i o t  -- he  threw away a valuable 
piece of equipment, which I ce r t a in ly  could use 
r i gh t  now. 
3 ,  We don' t  know what t h e  secre t  agent threw away -- 
we only know t h a t  he threw away a valuable piece 
of equipmexlt . 6 
The ambiguity of (291, l i k e  t h a t  of (23), is  a function of 
t he  r e f e r e n t i a l i t y  of t he  NP a v a l u a b i e  piece of equipment: 
when the  NP i s  taken a s  being r e f e r e n t i a l ,  t he  sentence i s  
understood t o  have a spec i f ica t iona l  sense, and when t h e  NP 
i s  taken t o  be  non-referential ,  t he  sentence i s  understood a s  
having a predicat ional  sense. Such examples show t h a t  t he  
ambiguity i n  question is not associated with t h e  spec i f ic  
derivat ion of c l e f t e d  sentences. Thus, the ambiguity i n  (23) 
i s  not accounted f o r  by posi t ing a dua l  source (as i n  (26) 
and (2711, but r a the r  it i s  a function of t h e  general pheno- 
mena of r e f e r e n t i a l i t y  of nominal expressions. 
Even i f  w e  leave a s ide  such considerat isns,  however, 
$ 
posi t ing a dual source such as  (26)-(27) t o  account f o r  t he  
ambiguity of (23) would be mistaken on purely syn tac t ic  
grounds. Suppose t h a t  (26) were t he  source f o r  t h e  
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predicat ional  sense of (23), and (27) the  source f o r  t h e  spew 
c i f  i c a t i ona l  sense, and furthermore, t ha t  spec ia l  conditions 
were placed on such s t ruc tures  t o  insure  t ha t  each s t r u c t u r e  
would represent e i t h e r  one or  t h e  other  sense, but not  both. 7 
If t h i s  were t he  case, then the re  would be no reason t o  ex- 
pect t h a t  r e f e r e n t i a l  and non-referential  NPs should have t h e  
same, or  even s imi lar ,  formal syn tac t ic  d i s t r ibu t ions .  It 
would be a t o t a l  accident t h a t  both s o r t s  of NPs appear i n  t he  
same syntact ic  environment. This would be an absurd conse- 
quence. The general formal d i s t r i bu t ion  of NPs i s  not i n  any 
way governed by the  r e f e r e n t i a l i t y  of Ws, which is  why we 
f ind both r e f e r e n t i a l  and non-referential  NPs i n  the  same 
syn tac t ic  environments. Thus, posi t ing a dual source t o  ac- 
count f o r  ambiguities such a s  t h a t  i n  (23) i s  mistaken on 
s evera 1 grounds. 
Returning t o  sentences such a s  (23), we note t h a t  such 
examples can be mult ipl ied f ree ly .  For example, i n  a paper 
by E. C l i f ton  [I9691 cases such a s  t h e  following a r e  discussed: 
(31) What I drew was a piece of t rash.  
This can be  paraphrased e i t h e r  as ,  "There i s  a piece of t r a s h  
which I drew (sketched)", o r  roughly as,  "My drawing was qu i t e  
$ 
poor". Once again, t h e  ambiguity i s  predicated on t h e  bas i s  
of whether o r  not t h e  object NP i s  taken a s  r e f e ren t i a l .  And 
again, it i s  mistaken t o  assume t h a t  t he  ambiguity can be 
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associated with t he  spec i f i c  derivat ion of c l e f t ed  sentences, 
s ince t h e  very same ambiguity appears i n  non-clefted sen- 
tences : 
(32) I drew a piece of t rash .  
The ambiguity can be resolved by changing the  main verb: 
(33)  I wrote a piece of t rash .  
(34) I photographed a piece of t rash.  
Thus, i n  (33) only t he  non-referential  i n t e rp re t a t i on  of t he  
object NP i s  compatible with t h e  se lec t iona l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  of 
the  verb wr i te ;  i n  (34) o ~ l y  t h e  r e f e r e n t i a l  i n t e rp re t a t i on  i s  
compatible with t he  s e l ec t iona l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  of t he  main verb. 
It i s  c l ea r ,  then, t h a t  the specif icat ionaP/predicat ional  
ambiguity i n  sentences such a s  (231, (29), (31) and (32) i s  
a function of c e r t a i n  proper t ies  of noun phrases, and not a 
function of t he  der ivat ion of p a r t i c u l a r  syn tac t ic  f  oms .  
We have been considering cases with i n d e f i n i t e  focal  
NPs, however, cEefted sentences with d e f i n i t e  foca l  NPs a l s o  
manifest c e r t a i n  ambiguities, not en t i r e ly  unrelated t o  t he  
specif i ca t iona l lp red ica t iona l  so r t .  Consider, f o r  example: 
(35) What he to ld  us was t he  answer. 
This can be taken as meaning e i t h e r  t h a t  he in ten t iona l ly  
'. 
t o ld  us what he recognized a s  the  answer, o r  on the  other 
hand, t h a t  he t o ld  us something, and t h a t  we,  perhaps a t  a 
l a t e r  time, l abe l  what he t o ld  us a s  t h e  answer. Note t h a t  
t h e  former sense  i s  p re fe r red  under r e v e r s a l  : 
( 3 6 )  The answer was what h e  t o l d  us. 
while  t h e  l a t t e r  sense  i s  p re fe r red  when t h e r e  i s  non-agree- 
ment of t enses  : 
(37) What he t o l d  us  - i s  t h e  answer. 
Could t h i s  ambiguity be grounds f o r  p o s i t i n g  some dual  source 
f o r  t h e  pseudo-clef t?  Once again,  t h i s  cannot be t h e  case  
s ince  t h e  ambiguity i s  not  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  c l e f t e d  sentences.  
The very same ambiguity appears i n  simple non-clef t e d  sentences 
such a s :  
(38) H e  t o l d  us t h e  answer. 
The ambiguity can be resolved by a d d i t i o n  of appropr ia t e  con- 
t e x t s :  
(39) a .  After  we t o r t u r e d  him f o r  5 hours, h e  f i n a l l y  
t o l d  us  t h e  answer. 
b. When he  t o l d  us  Richard Nixon's b i r t h d a t e ,  he 
d i d n ' t  r e a l i z e  it, but he  t o l d  us  t h e  answer. 
The ambiguity i s  a func t ion  of c e r t a i n  p r o p e r t i e s  of r e f e r -  
ence, namely whether both speaker and hea re r  a r e  committed 
t o  a given desc r ip t ion ,  o r  whether j u s t  t h e  speaker a lone  i s  
committed t o  a desc r ip t ion .  Again, t h i s  has nothing t o  do 
$ 
with t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  de r iva t ion  of c l e f t e d  sentences.  8 
In  Chapter 1 we noted t h a t  c e r t a i n  c l e f t e d  sentences 
could only be der ived i n  t h e  base, whi le  o thers  could only 
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be transformationally derived. However, f o r  a subset of 
ps eudo-clef t sentences w e  noted tha t  e i t h e r  syn tac t ic  source 
i s  possible.  Here we have attempted t o  show tha t  no seman- 
t i c  ambiguity can be associated spec i f i ca l l y  with t h i s  
dua l i ty  of syntact ic  source. This leaves us,  therefore,  with 
the  s i t ua t ion  t h a t  a s ing le  surface s t r u c t u r e  with a s ing l e  
semantic reading can der ive  from two deep s t ruc tu re  sources : 
(40 Semantic Representation 
/R1 \ 
Syntactic Deep Structure  
Syntactic Surface Structure  
In the  sect ions  t h a t  follow w e  w i l l  consi.der t he  semantic 
representat ion of c l e f t ed  sentences, and we w i l l  show why 
( 4 0 )  i s  possible,  given c e r t a i n  assumptions about the  nature  
of semantic in te rpre ta t ion .  
4. The Semantic In te rpre ta t ion  of Clefted Sentences 
In examining the  question of the  semantic representat ion 
of c l e f t ed  sentences, severa l  relevant questions a r i s e .  Most 
obvious, of course, is  the  question of how a s ing l e  surface  
s t ruc tu re  which derives from two formally d i s t i n c t  deep 
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s t ructures  i s  assigned one semantic reading. Since an unam- 
biguous surface s t ruc tu re  expresses s e t  of grammatical 
re la t ions ,  i f  it derives from more than one deep s t r u c t u r e  
source it must be t he  case  t ha t  each d i s t i n c t  deep s t ruc tu re  
expresses j u s t  t h e  same set of grammatical r e l a t i ons  : t h e  
deep s t ruc tu re  sources i n  question, though formally d i s t i n c t ,  
a r e  semantically equivalent. We w i l l  show t h a t  t h i s  i s  t h e  
case. 
After discussing deep s t ruc tu re  aspects  of t h e  in te rpre -  
t a t i o n  of c l e f t ed  sentences, we discuss those aspects  s f  in-  
t e rp re t a t i on  determined a t  t h e  surface  s t r u c t u r e  level ,  i. e. ,  
focus-presupposition re la t ions .  We extend and modify i n  
various ways the  general pr inciples  f o r  in te rpre t ing  focus 
f i r s t  discussed by Chomsky [ 19691, and w e  propose a semantic 
notat ion f o r  representing focus-presupposition re la t ions .  
4.1. D e e p  Structure  Considerations. Consider a pseudo- 
c l e f t  sentence such a s  the  fallowing: 
(41) What w e  must avoid i s  the  d r a f t .  
Sentences such a s  (41) can derive from eieher of t he  follow- 











the  d r a f t  
I I D 
must avoid [ +PRO] 
1t-W I 
We assume tha t  grammatical r e l a t i ons  a r e  determined a t  t h e  
l eve l  of deep s t ruc ture .  Since sentence (41) expresses un- 
ambiguously one s e t  of grammatical re la t ions ,  t he  same s e t  
of ,grammatical r e l a t i ons  must be assigned t o  both (42) and 
( 4 3 ) .  In  f ac t ,  (42) and (43) a r e  semantically equivalent f o r  
reasons which we now discuss.  
2 Beginning with 6 of both (42) and ( 4 3 ) ,  semantic r u l e s  
% 
operate t o  determine t h e  grammatical r e l a t i ons  expressed i n  
t h i s  embedded sentence. The only semantic d i f ference  between 
(42) and (43) a t  t h e  l e v e l  of s2 i s  t ha t  (42) has a  f u l l y  
2 3 
specif ied NP a s  object i n  S ( i .  e. NP ), while (43) has a  
less  semantically speci f ied  NP i n  t h i s  pos i t ion  ( i .  e. a pro- 
form). ThusJ while t h e  mbedded sentences of both (42) and 
(43) express t he  same s e t  of grammatical r e l a t i ons ,  t he  se- 
mantic information they contain d i f f e r s  t o  t h e  extent t h a t  
3 NP of ( 4 3 )  i s  l e s s  speci f ied  than N P ~  of (42). 
There is  an addi t ional  semantic operation in s2 of ( 4 3 ) ,  
since, by convention, a  pro-form receives semantic fea tures  
projected by the  se lec t iona l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  of t h e  items with 
which the  pro-f o m  enters  i n t o  se lec t iona l  r e l a t i ons  (cf.  
Katz and Postal  [1964]). Thus, the  pro-form i n  (43) receives 
semantic fea tures  ~ r o j e c t e d  by the  object se lec t iona l  r e s t r i c -  
t ions of t h e  verb avoid. Further, we assume, a s  discussed i n  
Chapter 1, t h a t  the  semantic fea tures  of t h e  pro-form become 
associated with t h e  l a rge r  NP which dominates t h e  f r e e  r e l a -  
9 2 - t ive .  These operations on S a r e  not c a r r i e d  out by p a r t i -  
cular  i n t e rp re t ive  ru les ,  but a r e  ra ther  general semantic con- 
ventiwns, which form p a r t  s f  t h e  universal  de f in i t i on  sf  'pro- 
form' and ' f r e e  r e l a t i v e ' .  This completes t h e  relevant  se- 
2 
nant ic  operations on S . 
1 Moving now t o  the  l e v e l  of S , consider f i r s t  deep s t ruc -  
t u r e  (42). We assume, wi th  Bnonds [1978], t h a t  empty nodes - a t  
the  l eve l  of d e w  s t r u c t u r e  a r e  ignored by in t e rp re t ive  ru l e s ,  
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i . e .  a r e  semantically empty and cont r ibu te  ne i ther  t o  t he  
semantic ill-formedness nor well-formedness of a sentence a t  
t h i s  level .  They do not make any semantic contr ibut ion i n  
the  determination of grammatical r e l a t i ons  o r  s e l ec t iona l  vio- 
l a t ions ,  and a r e  simply l e f t  a s  u n i n t e q r e t e d  items. This 
means t ha t  the  predicate  of (42) is semantically empty. Re- 
c a l l  now tha t  t h e  semantic i n t e rp re t a t i on  of t he  copula i s  a 
function of t h e  semantic nature of t h e  items which it  l inks .  
(See note 3 . )  For  t h i s  reason, t h e  copula i n  (42) cannot re- 
ceive  an in te rpre ta t ion ,  s ince  t h e  post-copular NP i s  sman- 
t i c a l l y  empty. Thus, a t  the  deep s t r u c t u r e  l eve l  t h e  c l e f t  
1 
superstructure, represented a s  t h e  matrix sentence S , i s  se- 
mantically empty. The semantic info:.mation which (42) ex- 
presses i s  jus t  t h e  semantic information of the embedded sen- 
t ence, and no more, 
Consider now S' of (43).  Since grammatical r e l a t i o n s  a r e  
determined a t  t h e  deep s t ruc tu re  l e v e l  semantic r u l e s  operate 
on ( 4 3 )  t o  mark it a s  a spec i f ica t iona l  statement. ( I t  i s  a t  
t h i s  point t ha t  such sentences would be marked a s  semantical- 
l y  deviant i f  t h e  semantic fea tures  of t h e  items connected by 
t h e  copula did not agree, a s  discussed i n  Chapter 1. Here, 
however, the  relevant  fea tures  a r e  i n  agre&ment (i. e. t h e  NP 
t h e  d r a f t  has those semantic fea tures  which a r e  shared by pos- 
s i b l e  objects of t h e  verb avoid)) .  Note, however, t ha t  t he  
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1 important point here  i s  t h i s :  s ince  NP i s  marked with t h e  
features of t h e  embedded pro-form, and s ince  NP' is  then 
2 
specif ied a s  NP , t h e  net  e f f ec t  of these  two fac tors  i s  t h a t  
2 2 the pro-form of S ends up speci f ied  a s  t h e  post-copular NP . 
Once we .see t h i s ,  it i s  c l e a r  t h a t  (42) and (43) express 
2 the same semantic information. On t h e  l eve l  of S , (42) and 
(43) d i f f e r  only i n  t h a t  (43) contains a less speci f ied  object  
NP. Thus while (43) t e l l s  us t h a t  sornethinq must be avoided, 
(42) te l l s  us spec i f i ca l l y  t h a t  the  d r a f t  must be avoided. How- 
ever, t h i s  semantic d i f ference  i s  neutra l ized a t  t h e  l eve l  of 
1 S . Since the  pro-form of (43) i s  speci f ied  a s  N P ~  a t  t h e  
1 level  of S , t he  two deep s t ruc tu re s  (42) and (43) become 
semantically equivalent, f o r  t h e  same reason t h a t  t h e  follow- 
ing formulations a r e  sernzntically equivalent:  
(44) avoid t h e  d r a f t  
(45) avoid 5, - x = t h e  d r a f t  
The e s s e n t i a l  d i f ference  between (42) and (43) i s  t h a t  (42) 
expresses t he  grammatical r e l a t i o n  between verb and object  a s  
(44), while (43) expresses t h i s  re la t ion ,  i n  e f fec t ,  as i n  
(45). Since these  a r e  log ica l ly  equivalent formulations, t h e  
deep s t ruc tu re s  i n  question a r e  semantically equivalent. 
4.2. Surface Structure  Considerations. The determina- 
t ion of grammatical r e l a t i ons  f o m s  only one aspect of t h e  
t o t a l  semantic representat ion of a sentence. Project ion 
rules operating on t h e  l eve l  of deep s t ruc ture ,  ass ign a gar- 
t i a l  semantic reading t o  a sentence. This deep s t r u c t u r e  
reading contains t h e  basic semantic proposi t ion(s)  expressed 
by t h e  sentence, i n  t ha t  it represents  t h e  basic log ica l  
('grammatical') r e l a t i ons  found i n  t h e  sentence. The deep 
s t ruc tu re  reading of a sentence, i n  a c l e a r  sense, represents  
the  basic l og i ca l  information of t h e  sentence, t h e  semantic 
information which has bearing on t h e  t r u t h  conditions s f  a 
sentence. 
The basic information expressed i n  sentences, however, 
can be 'processed' i n  various ways by speakers. Certain por- 
tions of t h e  information expressed can be highlighted or  made 
semantically prominent, while other  port ions can be t r ea t ed  
as redundant o r  presupposed. Certain port ions of t h e  infor-  
mation may be novel with respect  to a given discourse, while 
other port ions may be known t o  both speaker and hearer.  In 
other words, given a basic l og i ca l  proposi t ion ( i .  e. deep 
s t ruc tu re  reading),  the re  a r e  various modds i n  which the  infor-  
mation contained i n  t he  proposi t ion can be presented. 
Broadly speaking, while t h e  log ica l  propositions 
189 
expressed by sentences are  determined by fac tors  of deep 
s t ructure ,  t he  information 'processing'  (or  mode of presen- 
ta t ion)  i s  determined by f ac to r s  of (phonetically in te rpre -  
1Q ted) surface syn tac t ic  s t ructure .  Such fac tors  of surface  
s t ructures  a s  surface  const i tuent  s t ruc ture ,  placement of in- 
tonation center ,  and shape and scope of intonation contours, 
determine t h e  manner i n  which semantic inf  o m t  ion associated 
with given deep s t ruc tu re s  i s  processed a s  t o  semantic promi- 
nence, novelty, and so  for th .  The system of focus-presupposi- 
t ion  r e l a t i ons  comes under t h i s  general area of i n foma t ion  
processing, t h a t  is, it is  a semantic system determined by 
factors  of surface  s t ruc tures .  Recent research, especia l ly  
tha t  of Chomsky [I9691 and Jackendoff [1969], has s h m  t h a t  
fac tors  of in tonat ion (e. g. t h e  placement of t h e  in tonat ion 
center)  a r e  used t o  s p l i t  up and c a t e g ~ r i z e  t h e  semantic in-  
formation of a sentence i n t o  focus (generally speaking, 
' n ~ v e l '  inf  o m a t  ism) and presupposition. 
5. ' FOCUS ' and 'Presupposition'  
'. 
Chomsky [I9691 defines focus a s  a technical  term re fe r -  
r ing  t o  a const i tuent  of a sentence (where const i tuent  i s  
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defined i n  such a way tha t  t h e  e n t i r e  sentence may be a con- 
s t i t uen t )  which contains t h e  in tonat ion center ,  i. e. t he  
posi t ion of highest p i t ch  and stress, The t e r n  i s  intended 
t o  cover both cases where a const i tuent  receives normal sen- 
tence f i n a l  s t r e s s ,  a s  wel l  a s  const i tuents  which receive  so 
cal led  emphatic s t r e s s .  The presupposition of a sentence, i n  
the  sense i n  which Chornsky uses it ,  i s  defined i n  t e rns  of 
the notion of focus i n  t h e  following way: t h e  presupposition 
i s  a statement derived by replacing t h e  focus of a sentence 
with an appropriate semantic variable.  For example, consider 
the sentences: 
(46) a.  MITCHELL urged Nixon t o  appoint Carswell. 
b. Mitchell  urged NIXON t o  appoint Carswell. 
c ,  Mitchell  urged Nixon t o  appoint CARSWEEL. 
The di f ference  which we i n t u i t  i n  such sentences i s  a function 
of the  s h i f t i n g  f ocus-presupposit ion re la t ions .  In  ( 4 6 a )  
Mitchell  i s  t he  focus (being t h e  const i tuent  which contains 
the  intonat  ion cen te r ) .  The presupposition of t h e  sentence 
( i n  t he  sense of 'presupposition'  used by Chomsky) i s  t h e  
statement derived by replacing the focus with a variable.  
If  w e  replace the  focus const i tuent  Mitchell  with a var iable ,  
x we derive th.e presupposition x urged Nkon t o  appoint 
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Carswell. Turning t o  (46b), according t o  our def in i t ions  
the  const i tuent  Nixon forms t h e  focus (since it  forms t h e  
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in tonat ion  c e n t e r ) ,  and replac ing  t h i s  c o n s t i t u e n t  with a  
var iable  we de r ive  t h e  presupposi t ion Mitchel l  urged x t o  
appoint Carswell. F ina l ly ,  i n  (46c),. v e  i n t e r p r e t  t h e  focus 
as t h e  c o n s t i t u e n t  Carswell, and we de r ive  t h e  presupposi t ion 
Mitchell  urged Nixon t o  appoint  x. I n  sum, t h e  term ' focus '  
i n  one sense r e f e r s  t o  a  c o n s t i t u e n t  which conta ins  t h e  in to -  
nat ion c e n t e r ;  t h e  term 'presuppos i t ion '  i s  defined i n  terms 
of  focus, and, by d e f i n i t i o n ,  i s  always a  statement which 
contains  a va r i ab le .  
As semantic not ions,  focus and presupposi t ion form p a r t  
of t h e  semantic reading of a  sentence.  As f o r  t h e  genera l  i n -  
t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h e s e  not ions,  i f  w e  examine t h e  sentences 
l i s t e d  i n  (46), we i n t u i t i v e l y  understand t h e  focus cons t i -  
tuent  i n  each case  t o  have a  semantic prominence wi th  r e spec t  
t o  t h e  r e s t  of t h e  sentence.  The focus c o n s t i t u e n t  i s  s e t  
apa r t  from t h e  surrounding m a t e r i a l  by i t s  h igher  s t r e s s ,  and 
t h e  speaker s i n g l e s  out t h i s  c o n s t i t u e n t  a s  being semantical ly  
s p e c i a l  and important,  A s  Hal l iday descr ibes  focus [1967, 
p. 2041 : 
(47) "Enf ormation focus i s  one k ind  of emphasis, t h a t  
whereby t h e  speaker marks out a  p a r t  (which may be 
t h e  whole) of a message block ad t h a t  which he  
wishes t o  be i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  informative.  What i s  
f o c a l  is 'new' information; not  i n  t h e  sense t h a t  i t  
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cannot have been previously mentioned, although it 
i s  often t h e  case tha t  it has not been, but i n  the  
sense tha t  the  speaker presents it  a s  not being re- 
coverable from the  previous discourse. The focal  
information may be a feature  of mood, not of cogni- 
t i v e  content, a s  when t h e  speaker confirms an asser-  
ted proposition; but the  confirmation i s  i t s e l f  s t i l l  
'new' i n  the sense intended.. . The focus of the mes- 
sage, i t  i s  suggested, is  tha t  which i s  represented 
by the speaker as  being new, textually (and s i tua-  
t ional ly)  non-derivable information." [Emphasis 
mine -- AA] 
Hence the general interpretat ion of the  notion 'focus' i s  tha t  
portion of a sentence which i s  'new' ( in  the  sense of ( 4 7 ) ) ,  
informative, "interesting", and semantically prominent with 
respect t o  the  surrounding material. This "surrounding ma- 
t e r i a l "  i s  re la t ive ly  low-key, semantically non-prominent ma- 
t e r i a l ,  and forms the  presupposition. The use of the  t e rn  
presupposition r e f l e c t s  the  i n t u i t i v e  feel ing tha t  non-focal 
material i s  generally indeed presupposed by the  speaker t o  be 
known t o  the hearer, and thus i s  material which i s  non-infor- 
mative. t 
A s  we see from the  examples of ( 4 6 ) ,  semantic prominence 
i s  correlated with phonetic prominence. The in te rpre t ive  
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principle implied by such examples can be s t a t e d  a s  follows: 
(48) The port ion of t h e  semantic reading of a sentence 
which i s  t o  be assigned a s  t h e  focus is t h a t  por t ion 
of t h e  reading which i s  associated with any const i -  
tuent  of t he  surface  syn tac t ic  s t r u c t u r e  which con- 
t a i n s  t h e  in tonat ion center .  For every possible 
focus t he re  i s  a presupposition which i s  the  pro- 
pos i t  ion derived by replacing t h e  focus mater ia l  
with appropriate semantic var iables .  
This is, i n  e f f ec t ,  t h e  i n t e rp re t ive  p r inc ip l e  f o r  focus 
given by Chomsky [ 19691. We w i l l  make t h e  p r inc ip l e  more ex- 
p l i c i t  i n  t h e  course of developing a semantic notat ion f o r  
focus and presupposition. 
Before t h i s  can be discussed meaningfully, however, we 
m u s t  f i r s t  approach the  question of t h e  l i n g u i s t i c  s i g n i f i -  
1 cance of these  notions. A r e  t he  notions of focus'  and 'pre- 
supposition'  indeed pa r t  of the  semantic representat ion of 
sentences? I f  so, how do we j u s t i f y  t h i s  posi t ion? Secondly, 
i f  f ocus-presupposition r e l a t i ons  a r e  pa r t  of t h e  semantic 
representat ion of sentences, what evidence indicates  that 
these  r e l a t i ons  a r e  determined by proper t ies  of surface s t ruc-  
tures? We tu rn  t o  these  issues  a t  t h i s  pbint .  
5.1. The Linguistic Significance of t h e  Notions 'FOCUS ' 
and  resu supposition', It has become c lea r  from recent re-  
search tha t  f ocus-presupposition re la t ions  play a cruc ia l  
role  i n  several areas of the  grammar. In par t icular ,  such 
relat ions a r e  c ruc ia l  i n  explicating the s t ruc ture  of well- 
formed discourse (e.g. i n  formulating notions such as "appro- 
pr ia te  response"); and secondly, i n  the  broad area of so- 
called "logical scope' QE negation, questioning, and adverbial 
elements. We s h a l l  review here i n  a general fashion research 
presented by S. R. Anderson [ forthcoming, a ] ,  Chomsky [ 19691 , 
and Jackendof f [ 19691 -, 
5.1.1. The Notion of Focus and the Structure of D i s -  
course. To bsgin with, consider the f ac t  tha t  we understand 
the sentences of (46) t o  answer different  questions, That is, 
the sentences of (46) answer, i n  respective order, the  follow- 
i ~ g  questions: 
(49) a. W ~ Q  urged Nixon t o  appoint Csrswell? 
b. Who did Mitchell usge t o  appbint Carswell? 
c. Who did Mitchell urge Nixon t o  appoint? 
If w e  pair-off questions with answers, we note t h a t  (46a)  
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answers only (49a), (46b) answers only (49b), and s o  on. 
This i s  t h e  only na tura l  pai r ing possible,  s ince  a l l  o ther  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  a r e  judged t o  be unacceptable. For example, 
the following do not form a na tura l  question-answer p a i r :  
(50) a. Who urged Nixon t o  appoint Carswell? 
b. Mitchell  urged Nixon t o  appoint CARSWELL. 
If we look f o r  an explanation f o r  these  i n t u i t i v e l y  c l e a r  
f ac t s ,  it i s  s t r i k i n g  t h a t  the re  i s  no recourse t o  deep s t ruc-  
ture d i f f e r en t i a t i on :  a l l  t h r ee  sentences of (46) express the  
same log ica l  proposition, i . e .  express j u s t  t h e  same grammati- 
c a l  re la t i cns .  I f  t h i s  i s  t he  case, why a r e  not a l l  t h r e e  ac- 
ceptable a s  answers f o r  any of t h e  given questions of (49)? 
To  answer t h i s ,  consider t h e  question (49a). The speaker who 
asks t h i s  question already has c e r t a i n  information given t o  
him, which he presupposes, namely t h a t  someone urged Nixon t o  
appoint Carswell. H e  requests c e r t a i n  novel informat ion, 
namely, the  i d e n t i t y  of the person who urged Nixon. An 
analogous presuppositional analys is  can be given f o r  t h e  other  
questions a s  well: t he  WH-word represents  a request f o r  novel 
information, while t h e  surrounding mater ia l  i s  presupposed t o  
be given. When searching f o r  appropriate responses t o  such 
quest ions, w e  look f o r  answers which share  the  presuppositions 
of the questions, and fu r the r  which indeed specify t h e  seman- 
11 t i c  gap" of the  question, i. e. which provide novel 
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information. I f  we examine the  sentences of (461 ,  w e  note t h a t  
the cons t i tuen ts  which contain t h e  in tonat ion center  a r e  in-  
terpreted a s  representing novel information, while the sur- 
rounding mater ia l  is  taken a s  non-novel, elready given in for -  
mation. In  shor t ,  we match answers with questions i f  they 
share presuppositions, and i f  t h e  focus of t h e  answer i s  a 
spec i f ica t ion  of the  question word of t h e  question. 
To i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  p resuppos i t imal  ana lys i s  of t h e  sen- 
tences w e  have discussed i n  a more revealing fashion, we can 
convert t he  sentences of (49) and (46) i n t o  t h e  following 
paraphrase forms : 
(51) a .  Someone urged Nixon t o  appoint Carswell -- who? 
b. Someone urged Nixon t o  appoint Carswell, namely, 
MITCHELL. 
(52) a.  Mitchell  urged someone t o  appoint Carswell -- 
who? 
b. Mitchell  urged someone t o  appoint Carswell, 
namely, NIXON. 
(53) a .  Mitchell  urged Nixon t o  appoint someone -- who? 
b. Mitchell  urged Mixon t o  appoint someone, namely, 
CARSWELL. 
h e  does not,  of course, hear  such questioh-answer pa i r s  i n  
everyday speech. The point ,  however, i s  that such paraphrase 
forms allow us t o  compare and check questions and answers t o  
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determine i n  a general  fashion which answers form na tu ra l  
responses t o  which questions. The de f in i t i on  of ' na tura l '  
response can then be s t a t ed  general ly a s  follows: 
(54) A ' na tu ra l '  response t o  a given question must share 
the  presupposition of t h e  question, and must contain 
a s  focus an i t e m  which spec i f i e s  t he  semantic 
var iab le  of t h e  question. 
The paraphrase forms of (51) - (53) allow us t o  apply p r inc ip l e  
(54) i n  a s traightforward manner, s i nce  such paraphrase forms 
i s o l a t e  foc i  and presuppositions c l ea r ly .  Insofar  a s  t h e  
notions of focus and presupposition a l l w  us t o  explain pa i r -  
ing phenomena, they a r e  l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  s ign i f ican t  . 
The sentences of (46) a r e  examples i n  which t h e  intona- 
t i o n  center  s h i f t s  within one given surface  s t ruc ture ,  there-  
by causing a corresponding s h i f t  i n  focus-presupposition r e l a -  
t ions .  Consider now the  case of a set of d i s t i n c t  surface  
s t ruc tures  which a l l  derive from t h e  same deep s t r u c t u r e  
source, Even though such surface s t ruc tu re s  a r e  cognit ively 
synonymous, insofa r  a s  the surface const i tuent  s t r u c t u r e  of 
each i s  d i s t i n c t ,  each var iant  determines a d i s t i n c t  (but par- 
t i a l l y  overlapping) s e t  of focus-presupposition re la t ions .  
Such examples are  discussed i n  Chomsky [1969], but t o  take  an 
example which has been ra ised recent ly  (by Lakoff [ l969])  w e  
note the  following p a i r  of sentences: 
(55) a. He ca l l ed  up a g i r l  who he  had met i n  Chicago. 
b. He ca l l ed  a g i r l  up who he  had m e t  i n  Chicago. 
These sentences a r e  i den t i ca l  a t  t he  deep s t ruc tu re  l eve l  
(having a s  a source the s t r u c t u r e  underlying (55a)). (55b) i s  
derived i f  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  underlying (55a) i s  operated on by 
t he  ru l e s  of P a r t i c l e  Movement and Relat ive Clause Extraposi- 
t i o n  (cf .  Ross [1967]). The surface  const i tuent  s t ruc tu re  of 
these  two sentences i s  d i f f e r en t ,  with t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  (55a) 
and (55b) determine d i s t i n c t  (but p a r t i a l l y  overlapping) s e t s  
of focus-presupposition r e l a t i ons .  Assuming t h a t  t he  intona- 
t i o n  cen te r  of these  sentences comes on t h e  f i n a l  const i tuent ,  
Chicago, then there  a r e  severa l  focus-presupposition poss ibi -  
l i t i e s  determined according t o  p r inc ip l e  (48). In both (55a) 
and (55b) t he  e n t i r e  sentence may be t h e  focus, o r  t he  VP may 
be t h e  focus, and t h i s  i s  re f lec ted  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  both may 
answer t h e  following questions: 
(56) a .  What happened? 
b. What did he do? 
However, note t ha t  t h e  phrase a g i r l  who he  had met i n  Chicago 
forms a surface  const i tuent  i n  (55a), but not i n  (55b). (48) 
p red ic t s  t h a t  t h i s  can form a p o s ~ i b l e  focus of (55a) but not 
of (55b), and "Lis i s  borne out by ,noting the  di f ference  i n  
naturalness these  sentences manifest a s  responses t o  (57a) : 
(57) a .  Who d i d  he  c a l l  up? 
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(57) b. H e  c a l l ed  up a g i r l  who he  had m e t  i n  Chicago. 
c. #He ca l l ed  a g i r l  up who he  had met i n  Chicago. 
(The symbol [#I i s  used t o  mark sentences which a r e  judged 
a s  l e s s  na tura l  responses). Sentence (S7c) is  judged t o  be 
less na tura l  a  response t o  (57a) than (57b) is. If we again 
use t he  paraphrase forms of t h e  s o r t  introduced above, we 
see  why t h i s  i s  so: 
(58) a.  Me ca l led  up someone -- who? 
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b. He ca l l ed  up someone, namely, a  , g i r l  who he had 
m e t  i n  Chicago. 
The presupposition "He ca l l ed  up sameone" i s  shared by (57a) 
and (57b), hawever i n  (57c) t h e  const i tuent  s t r u c t u r e  i s  such 
t h a t  t h i s  presupposition cannot be formed according t o  prin-  
c i p l e  (48). Thus, w e  predic t  t h a t  (57c) i s  a less na tu ra l  
response than (57b). Differences i n  const i tuent  s t ruc tu re  
allow one transformational var iant  t o  determine f ocus-presup- 
posi t ion r e l a t i ons  t ha t  another var iant  does not. On the  
other  hand, no te  t ha t  t he re  i s  a sense i n  which differences i n  
const i tuent  s t r u c t u r e  do - not have bearing on focus-presupposi- 
. 
t i o n  re la t ions .  Consider t h e  case i n  which the Vg const i tuents  
of (55) a r e  chosen a s  f o c i :  \ 
(59) a .  ca l l ed  up a g i r l  who he had met i n  Chicago 
b. c a l l ed  a g i r l  up who he  had m e t  i n  Chicago 
Even though the  phrases chosen a s  f o c i  a r e  syn tac t ica l ly  d i s -  
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t i nc t ,  they determine the  same focus i n  each case, since they 
a r e  associated with the  same portion of t h e  semantic reading 
( i .  e. a r e  synonymous). In a s imilar  fashion, consider pa i rs  
of c le f ted  sentences such a s :  
(60) a .  It was a g i r l  fmm CHICAGO tha t  he cal led up. 
b. (The one) who he cal led up was a g i r l  from 
CHICAGO. 
Assuming tha t  CHICAGO is  the  focus, the  presupposition i s  
determined by replacing tha t  constituent with a variable. 
Using the  symbol - x f o r  the  variable, t h i s  would give us the 
following: 
(61) a. [ I t  was a g i r l  from - x tha t  he ca l led  up] 
b. [Who he called up was a g i r l  from - x] 
Even though (61a) and (61b) a r e  formed from syntact ical ly  
d i s t i n c t  forms, they don't form d i s t inc t  presuppositions, 
since they have ident ica l  readings. Hence, differences i n  
constituent s t ruc ture  do not have any effect  on focus-pre- 
supposition re la t ions  jus t  as  long a s  the  syntact ical ly  dis- 
t i n c t  phrases are associated with jus t  the  same semantic re-  
presentation. 
It should be p ~ i n t e d  out thab  any theory must have 
available t o  i t  the  mechanisms fo r  determining the  semantic 
reading associated with given surface s t ruc ture  constituents. 
I f  the  focus i s  determined by factors  of the  surface structure,  
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then a theory, whether it is  in te rpre t ive  o r  not, must have 
some mechanism available t o  locate  the semantic reading asso- 
c ia ted with same given chunk of the  surface structure.  Ray 
Jackendoff has suggested [personal communication] tha t  a pos- 
s i b l e  mechanism might be t h e  use of ' ident i f ica t ion  indices '  
which could be associated with a l l  nodes of the  deep structure,  
and which would serve t o  track given nodes through a deriva- 
tion. These would have no semantic content whatever, and 
would serve only t o  allow surface nodes t o  be traced through 
a derivation t o  determine what portions of the  semantic 
reading a r e  associated with these nodes. 12  
A c l ea r  implication of the  data we have discussed so f a r  
i s  tha t  derived phrases, not present a t  the  deep s t ruc ture  
level ,  can serve a s  foc i ,  For example, note the  following 
pa l r ings  : 
(62) a,  What is  John l ike?  
b. John i s  easy t o  please. 
c .  #1t i s  easy t o  please John. 
d. #TO please John i s  easy. 
(63) a. John is  bound t o  lose, i s n ' t  he? 
b. No, John i s  ce r t a in  t o  win. 
c. #NO, t ha t  John w i l l  win i s  certain.  
d. #NO, it i s  cer ta in  tha t  John w i l l  win. 
202 
(64) a. Were the Cambodians invaded by the  Viet Cong? 
b. No, they were attacked by t h e  Americans. 
c. #NO, t he  Americans attacked them. 
In each ease a surface constituent of the  question is  paired 
with a surface constituent of an answer, It i s  in te res t ing  
t o  note tha t  paraphrases of these answers a r e  judged t o  be 
re la t ive ly  less natural  as  responses. If we examine the  focus- 
presupposition re la t ions  involved, we see that  the  par t icu lar  
constituent s t ructures  of the  (b) sentences above allow cer- 
t a i n  foc i  t o  be fomed which cannot be formed i n  the  (c) and 
(d) sentences because of t h e i r  par t icu lar  surface constituent 
structures.  Thus, the  (b) sentences form more natural  pair-  
ings with the  (a) sentences than e i the r  the  (c) or (d) sen- 
t enc es . 
We have discussed so f a r  one area i n  which the  notions 
of focus and presupposition have l inguis t ic  significance, 
using examples of the  s o r t  discussed i n  Chomsky [l969]. In- 
sofar a s  these notions allow us t o  s t a t e  what const i tutes  a 
'natural  response', they deserve t o  be included i n  the  seman- 
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t i c  representation of sentences. However, there  is stronger 
evidence fo r  inclusion of focus in semantic representation., 
from an area which i s  much less  subject t o  d ia l ec ta l  varia- 
t ion.  W e  r e f e r  here t o  t h e  phenomenon of ' logical  s c ~ p e ' .  
5.1.2. Scope of Logical Elements. The notion of ' logi- 
c a l  scope', which has been discussed primarily by ~ackendoff 
[1969], re fers  t o  tha t  aspect of the  semantic interpretat ion 
of negation, questioning, and adverbial elements which has 
t o  do with the  demarcation of tha t  portion of a sentence 
which i s  taken t o  be modified by these items. The par t icu lar  
portion of a sentence which forms the .  domain of modification 
of these elements forms the  'scope' of such elements. We 
w i l l  discuss here the  adverbial i t e m  -9 even and the  principles 
which determine i t s  scope, as  a typical  example of the  nature 
of scope phenomena. Specifically,  we w i l l  review recent 
work by S.R. Anderson [forthcoming, a ]  dealing with - even. 
Anderson begins with the  f ac t  (noted i n  Fischer [1968]) 
tha t  the  scope of - even i s  associated with a constituent which 
has the intonation center:  
(65) a. John even eats  Skrunkies for  DINNER. 
b. John eats  Skrunkies even f o r  DINNER. 
c. John even eats  SKRUNKIES fo r  dinner. 
If  the  posit ion of the  intonation center i s  invariant ,  no 
semantic difference re su l t s  from moving - even to  various posi- 
t ions  i n  the sentence (within l imitat ions noted by Anderson), 
as i l l u s t r a t e d  by (65a) and (65b), where the  scope of - even 
is  the same i n  both cases. However,. i f  the  intonation center 
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i s  sh i f ted ,  then the  scope of - even i s  a l s o  changed, and s h i f t s  
with t he  intonation center  (compare (65a) and (65c)). This 
f a c t  alone does not argue t h a t  t he  scope of - even (i. e,  t he  
focus of t he  sentence) must be determined i n  surface  s t ruc-  
ture .  Indeed, Fischer [I9681 argues t h a t  a f ea tu re  [+Promi- 
nent] can be associated with any deep s t ruc tu re  const i tuent ,  
and tha t  t h i s  f ea tu re  w i l l  be rea l ized phonetical ly a s  
emphatic s t r e s s ,  and semantically a s  being a marker f o r  con- 
s t i t u e n t s  which form the  scope of even. Such a f ea tu re  would 
allow the  i n t e rp re t a t i on  of t h e  scope of - even t o  be ca r r ied  
out a t  t h e  deep s t ruc tu re  l eve l ,  and t h i s  analys is  would 
pos i t  a transformation which would opt ional ly  move - even 
( a f t e r  i t  has been in terpre ted)  t o  various posi t ions  i n  t h e  
s ent enc e . 
Anderson argues against  t h i s  proposal by showing t h a t  
(a) t he re  a r e  cases where the  scope of - even i s  not a s ing l e  
const i tuent ,  (b) where t h e  scope of even i s  a const i tuent  
present only a t  t he  surface  s t ruc tu re  level ,  and (c) instances 
where an - even-movement rule would have t o  v i o l a t e  general con- 
s t r a i n t s  on movement transformations. (Note t h a t  h i s  argu- 
ments hold f o r  a wide range of adverbials,  a s  well ,  including 
only, j u s t ,  a lso ,  a s  w e l l  a s  cases discussed i n  Jackendoff 
[1969]). 
As an example of t he  f i r s t  so r t ,  Anderson gives t h e  
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following three sentences, along with t h e i r  in te rpre ta t  ions, 
which we quote here: 
(66) a. Jones can ' t  even s e l l  WHISKEY t o  the  Indians. 
(This implies tha t  one can n ~ r m a l l y  s e l l  any- 
thing t o  the Indians: tha t  is, tha t  the  Indians 
a r e  s o f t  touches. ) 
b. Jones can ' t  even s e l l  whiskey t o  the INDIANS, 
(This implies tha t  normally one can s e l l  whiskey 
t o  anyone: tha t  is ,  the  whiskey is  i n  great  
demand, ) 
c. (Jones claims tha t  he can s e l l  re f r igera tors  t o  
the  Eskimos, but i n  f ac t )  he can ' t  even s e l l  
WHISKEY t o  the  IhQIANS. 
(This implies tha t  of a l l  the  se l l ing  tasks one 
could undertake, se l l ing  whiskey t o  the Indians 
would be the easiest .  This could be so e i ther  
because of a tremendous demand f o r  whiskey, or 
because the  Indians a r e  suckers. In  fac t ,  it 
could be t r u e  f o r  reasons d i s t inc t  from both of 
. 
these: it might be tha t  the  government subsi- 
dizes whiskey sa les  dn t h e  reservation, an ad- 
vantage t o  local  whiskey traders which is  exten- 
dable neither t o  other sa les  t o  Indians, nor t o  
whiskey sa les  elsewhere.) 
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The cruc ia l  point of these examples, a s  Anderson points out, 
comes i n  the in te rpre ta t ion  of (66c), which could not be de- 
rived i n  deep s t ruc ture  by associating - even with e i the r  
whiskey or Indians. Furthermore, the  in te rpre ta t ion  of (66c) 
could not be derived by attaching - even t o  - both whiskey and 
Indians. This i s  t h e  case since (66c) i s  not synonymous with 
e i the r  (66a) or (66b), and furthermore, there  a r e  no sen- 
tences such as the  following from which (662) could &rive: 
(67) .*He can ' t  s e l l  even whiskey t o  even the  Indians. 
In other words, the  special  in terpretat ion of (66c) i s  based 
on - one occurrence of even the scope of which consiscs of two 
-' -- 
separate stressed consti tuents.  Since t h e  two stressed con- 
s t i tuen t s  do not form a s ingle  larger consti tuent,  ( i .  e. 
whiskey t o  the Indians i s  not a consti tuent)  it i s  impossible 
fo r  the  deep s t ruc ture  theory to  associate  - one occurrence of 
even with - both of t h e  stressed c ~ n s t i t u e n t s .  This, however, 
i s  jus t  what needs t o  be done. I f ,  on the  other hand, we 
specify that  the  scope of - even is the  focus constituent of a 
sentence, and further,  i f  we allow f o r  more than one focus 
. 
per sentence, then t h e  scope of - even w i l l  be assigned as  the  
two consti tuents whiskey and Indians. 13 
The second s e t  sf examples which Anderson brings up 
demonstrates tha t  t h e  scope of - even can be a constituent which 
i s  not present a t  the  level  of deep .structure:  
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(68) Our new boss i s  a dream; he 's  pleasant, doesn't make 
you work very hard, and he 's  even easy t o  get a 
r a i s e  out of. 
(69) Naked Came the Stranger was printed by a respectable 
publisher, it was carr ied by a l l  the  big bookstores, 
and it was even reviewed seriously by t h e  New York 
Times. 
In (68) the  scope of - even is  t h e  phrase easy t o  pet a r a i s e  
out of, and i n  (69) it i s  the phrase reviewed seriously by 
the  NYT. For reasons which have become familiar ,  nei ther  
phrase is present a t  t he  level  of deep structure.  To take 
one example, t h e  constituent which £oms the  scope of - even 
i n  (69) is  not present. u n t i l  a f t e r  t h e  application of the  
passive rule. Anderson points out tha t  i t  would be no solu- 
t ion  t o  maintain tha t  sentences which undergo the  passive 
r u l e  a r e  marked a s  such i n  deep structure,  and thus that  the  
scope of - even could somehow be determined a t  tha t  level .  
Such a move would mean tha t  some principle  would have t o  be 
formulated t o  the  e f fec t  that  i f  t he  ru le  of passive is  t o  
I 
apply, the  scope of - even (when attached t o  the  W) consists  
of the  verb, and t h e  sub-ject of thk sentence, and specif ical ly  
excludes the  object. In  other words, any a l t e rna t ive  of t h i s  
s o r t  simply builds i n  a semantic repe t i t ion  of the  syntactic 
r u l e  of passive i n  order t o  account for  t h e  scope of even a t  
-
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the  deep s t ruc tu re  l eve l .  
Thus, j u s t  a s  phrases of the  easy t o  p lease  s o r t  and 
phrases formed by t h e  passive can form responses t o  quest ion 
words (cf .  ( 6 2 ) - ( 6 4 ) ) ,  they can a l s o  form the  scope of ad- 
verb ia l  elements such a s  even. Notice t h a t  i f  the  scope of 
even can be a surface  const i tuent ,  then we would expect t o  
-
f ind  other  cases where optional  movement transformations have 
a f fec ted  const i tuent  s t r u c t u r e  and thereby affected t h e  focus- 
presuppositioa.i r e la t ions .  This i s  j u s t  t h e  case, i n  f a c ~ ,  a s  
sentences such a s  t h e  following show: 
(70) Men who don' t  c a re  f o r  her  w i l l  even date  her.  
(71) Men w i l l  even da te  her  who don' t  ca re  f o r  her. 
Let us assume tha t  sentences (70) and (71) contain no in-  
s tances of emphatic s t r e s s ,  but receive normal sentence stress 
pat terns .  This means t h a t  the  in tonat ion center  of (70) f a l l s  
on the  const i tuent  - date,  and i n  (71) f a l l s  on the  const i tuent  
ca re  ( fo r ) .  This i s  a r e s u l t  of t he  f a c t  t h a t  i f  no e m ~ h a t i c  
s t r e s s  is placed i n  these  sentences, then the  normal sentence 
intonation center  w i l l  f a l l  on the  bast major const i tuent  
(hence - da te  and - care ) .  Note, now, t h a t  the two sentences re- 
ceive  q u i t e  d i f f e r en t  i n t e r p r e t a t i ~ n s .  (70) could be used i n  
the following context:  
(72) Men who don' t  c a r e  f o r  her  w i l l  do many things t o  
make her angry -- they w i l l  even date  her.  
On the  o ther  hand, (71) would be used i n  a context such as :  
(73) She i s  so beau t i fu l  t h a t  many men w i l l  da te  her  -- 
even men who don't  c a r e  f o r  her.  
I n  other  words, (71) i s  synonymous with (74) and the  marginal 
(75) : 
(74) Even men who don't CARE f o r  her  w i l l  da te  her. 
(75) Men who don't CARE f o r  her  w i l l  even da te  her. 
The point here i s  pla in:  t h e  d i f ference  i n  meaning between 
(70) and (71) i s  brought about by the  appl ica t ion of t he  op- 
t i ona l  r u l e  of Relat ive Clause Extraposition, which maps (70) 
onto (71). l4 Since the  e f f e c t  of t h i s  r u l e  i s  t o  add addi- 
t i ona l  syn tac t ic  material  t o  t h e  end of t h e  sentence, t he  
normal in tonat ion center  there fore  a l s o  s h i f t s ,  given tha t  
noma1 sentence s t r e s s  r u l e s  p lace  the in tonat ion cen te r  on 
t h e  l a s t  major const i tuent .  Since the  in tonat ion cen te r  
s h i f t s  back i n  (71), the  scope of - even changes accordingly 
and thus t h e  di f ference  i n  meaning between (70) and (71). 
Sentences such a s  (74) and (75) a r e  synonymous with (71), 
s ince  they have the  in tonat ion center  on the  same const i tuent  
a s  tha t  i n  (71). Here, then, is  another case  which i l l u s t r a t e s  
'. 
t he  impossibi l i ty  of assigning t h e  scope of - even a s  a deep 
s t ruc tu re  const i tuent ,  f o r  t h e  simple reason t h a t  movement 
ru les  which apply optionally i n  t h e  course of a derivat ion 
can s ignif icant ly  a l t e r  the  ultimate surface consti tuent 
structure,  and hence the  focus-presupposition poss ib i l i f  9 s .  
Rather, the  relevant generalizations concerning the  scope of 
even a r e  generalizations on surface syntactic structure,  in- 
-
eluding fac t s  of the  phonetic contour. Such cases provide 
evidence tha t  the  scope of even ( the focus of the  sentence) is  
determined a t  the  surface s t ruc ture  level.  
A t h i rd  s e t  of arguments which Anderson uses t o  disprove 
a deep s t ructure  hypothesis involves the  claim tha t  an even- 
movement ru le  would necessarily v io la t e  general constra ints  
on movement rules.  Assume again tha t  even is  t o  be generated 
i n  deep structure,  attached t o  the constituent which forms i t s  
scope, and assme f o r  the  sake of argument tha t  it is  possible 
t o  determine the scope of even a t  the  deep s t ruc ture  level .  
Then assume that  a transformation is  posited which moves ele-  
ments such as even t o  various positions i n  a sentence. Even 
i f  we accept t h i s  so f a r ,  Anderson shows tha t  such a theory 
s t i l l  f a i l s ,  s ince the  movement r u l e  i n  question would have 
t o  move - even out sf complex NPs, a type of movement which is ' 
prohibited (cf. Ross [1967]). For example, Anderson gives 
\ 
t he  following cases : 
(76) a ,  You can do l o t s  of things with bananas: I even 
know a guy who SMOKES them. 
(76) b. ( I  gave many easy problems on t he  test --) I 
even included a problem tha t  FRESHMEN coubd~~sslve.  
In both cases the scope of even i s  understood t o  be the  focus 
of the sentence i n  question ( i .  e. scope = SMOKES i n  (76a), 
and FRESHMEN i n  (76b)). Mote that  i f  - even is  t o  be associated 
with i t s  scope i n  deep structure,  and then l a t e r  moved by a 
syntactic transformation, then such a transformation neces- 
s a r i l y  violates  movement constraints s ince i n  both (76a) and 
(76b) even would have t o  be moved out of a r e l a t ive  clause. 
Similar considerations hold f o r  complex NPs with complement 
s t ructures ,  as  Anderson's examples show: 
(77) a .  John even has t h e  idea t h a t  HE i s  t e l l  f o r  a 
Watusf. 
b. John even has the idea tha t  he is t a l l  f o r  a 
WATUS I. 
In these two sentences, the  scope of even is interpreted a s  
the  consti tuent with the intonation center,  tha t  is ,  - even i s  
interpreted i n  the  same way tha t  it i s  i n  sentences such as: 
(78) a. John has the  idea tha t  even HE i s  t a l l  fo r  a 
Watusi. 
'7 
b. John has the  idea tha t  he is tall even f o r  a 
Once again, i f  even were generated on the  constituent which 
foms i t s  scope, and then transformationally moved, suck a 
transformation would v io la te  ROSS'S Complex NP Constraint 
(Ross [1967]). There is  no need f o r  such violation, however, 
since the scope of even can be determined i n  a straightforward 
manner i n  t a m s  of factors  of surface structure,  I. e. focus. 
Anderson thus argues against a theory which would asso- 
c i a t e  - even with i t s  scope constituent i n  deep s t ruc ture  by 
demonstrating tha t  i n  some cases there  can be no one consti- 
tuent which f o m s  the scope of even, tha t  i n  other cases there  
i s  no deep consti tuent which can be associated with - even as  
i ts  scope, and f ina l ly  tha t  an - even-movement rule would neces- 
s a r i l y  v io la te  general constraints on movement rules.  A s  an 
al ternat ive,  Anderson advances a theory along l ines  proposed 
by Chomsky [I9691 and Jackendof f [l969], namely, one i n  which 
the focus of a sentence i s  determined a t  the  Level of surface 
structure,  and fur ther  tha t  the scope of - even i s  ident i f ied 
with the focus. (Certain l imitat ions on ' the scope of - even 
a r e  noted by Anderson, but need not concern us here since 
they do nsc a f fec t  the  main point. ) Within t h i s  s o r t  of 
framework, one can account f o r  examples such as  (68) and (69), 
', 
and one avoids the  problems connected with a deep s t ruc ture  
theory of - even. We w i l l  discuss the  representation of sen- 
tences with - even i n  section 6.1.2. 
To sum up what we have said  about focus and presuppssi- 
tfon i n  these l a s t  few sections, we have t r i e d  t o  es tabl ish 
the following points : 
(79) a. The - focus i s  tha t  portion of the  semantic reading 
which is marked a s  prominent, i n  the  sense tha t  
it represents 'navel' in£ ormation (cf.  (47)). 
b. Foces-presupposition re la t ions  deserve t o  be par t  
of the  semantic reeding of a sentence, i n  tha t  
these a r e  c ruc ia l  i n  explicating the  s t ruc ture  
of discourse, as well as  logical  scope. 
c. The focus ~f a sentence is  determined according 
t o  generalizations of (phonetically interpreted) 
surface structures.  
In order t o  discuss focus i n  more de ta i l ,  we must turn t o  the 
matter of semantic representation f o r  focus. 
6. The Semantic Notation f o r  Focus and Presupposition 
'. 
We have argued tha t  i n  a question-answer p a i r  such as  
the  following : 
(80) a.  Who urged Nixon t o  appoint Carswell? 
(80) b. MITCHELL urged Nixon t o  appoint Carswell. 
an answer such as  (80b) i s  a 'natural  response' t o  a question 
such as (80a). We a r r i v e  a t  t h i s  on the  theory tha t  the  pre- 
suppositions of the  question and answer a r e  ident ical ,  and 
fur ther  tha t  the  focus of the  answer specif ies  the  variable 
i n  the  question. Conversely, we argue tha t  a sentence such 
as  (81) does not answer (80a) : 
(81) Mitchell urged NIXON t o  appoint Carswell. 
s ince t h e i r  presuppositions do not match. Rather, (81) 
answers a question such a s  (82): 
(82) Who did Mitchell urge t o  appoint Carswell? 
Surface s t ructures  a r e  unfortunately not divided up 
neatly in to  presupposit ions and assert ions,  variables and 
t h e i r  specifications,  and so on, and therefore we must con- 
s t ruc t  a semantic representation which w i l l  express c lear ly  
and expl ic i t ly  the  focus-presupposition re la t ions  of sentences. 
In par t icu lar  suck a semantic notation must allow s t ra ight -  
forward comparison of questions and answers, i n  order t o  deter- 
mine which pairings a r e  "natural pairings"; further,  the  no- 
t a t ion  must allots us t o  s t a t e  semantic generalizations of 
'. 
scope. We have already noted cer ta in  ways i n  which pa i rs  such 
a s  (80) can be paraphrased, i n  a manner which i s  highly sug- 
gestive of a correct  semantic representation. Consider the  
following paraphrase forms f o r  the  sentences of (80): 
(83) a. Someone urged Nixon t o  appoint Carswell -- who? 
b. Someone urged Nixon t o  appoint Carswell, namely, 
MITCHELL. 
When sentences such a s  those of (80) a r e  put in to  a form such 
as (83),  the  focus-presuppositf on re la t ions  are revealed, and 
cas t  i n  the  f o m  of (83) w e  can compare question-answer pa i r s  
such as  (80) in a straightforward manner t o  determine whether 
presuppositions match, and so forth.  Similarly, (81) and (82) 
can be placed i n  t h i s  form: 
(84) a. Mitchell urged someone t o  appoint Carswell -- 
who? 
b. Mitchell urged someone t o  appoint Carswell, 
namely, NIXON. 
To see why (81) does not answer (Boa), we compare paraphrase 
(83a) ( for  (80a)) and paraphrase (84b) ( for  (81)), and we note 
tha t  the  presuppositions of question and answer do not match: 
(85) a. Someone urged Nixon t o  appoint Carswell -- who? 
b. Mitchell urged someone t o  appoint Carswell, 
namely, NIXON. 
', 
Since paraphrases such as  (83) and (84) reveal. the  focus- 
presupposition s t ruc ture  of questions and answers, l e t  us 
construct a semantic representation along these l ines .  In 
par t i cu la r ,  w e  propose t o  represent f ocus-presupposit ion re- 
l a t i ons  i n  t he  following msmer: 
(86) a. [ [x urged Nixon t o  appoint Carswell], [ x  - = ? ] ]  
b. [ [z urged Nixon t o  appoint Carswell], [x = 
Mitchell]  ] 
(86) i s  t h e  representa t ion of t he  sentences of (801, and f o r  
the  sentences (81) and (82) w e  have s imi la r  representat ions:  
(87) a. [ [Mitchell  urged - x t o  appoint Carswell], [ x  - = 
Nixon] ] 
- b. [ [Mitchell  urged - x t o  appoint Carswell], [jy - 
The csr2ressions given i n  (86) and (87) represent t he  par- 
t i t i o n i n g  of t h e  semantic reading i n t o  a foca l  port ion and 
presupposed portion. For every focus-presupposition r e l a t i o n  
which a given sentence has, t he re  is  an expression such a s  
t he  ones above. Such representat ions a r e  formed a s  follows. 
The i n t e rp re t ive  p r inc ip le  f o r  focus chooses a const i tuent  of 
t h e  surface  syn tac t ic  s t ruc tu re  which contains t h e  intonation 
center .  It locates  t h a t  port ion of t h e  semantic reading of 
t he  sentence which i s  associated with t h i s  pa r t i cu l a r  surface  
\ 
const i tuent .  Once t h i s  por t ion of t h e  reading has been loca- 
ted, then expressions such a s  those of (86) and (87) can be 
formed automatically: t he  foca l  por t ion CE t he  reading i s  
replaced with a variable, forming the  presupposition (repre- 
sent ed as the  lef  m o s t  bracketed expression) ; t he  rightmast 
bracketed expression i s  formed by linking the  var iable  of the  
presupposition and the  focal  material  with the  specification 
operator [ = I .  ( In some cases, as  w e  w i l l  see, the  l ink be- 
tween variable and focal  material  is the  predicational oper- 
a to r  [ i s ] ) .  
The presupposition is formally separated from the focus 
expression by the  symbol [ , I ,  which we employ here as an ad- 
koc device t o  represent the  re la t ion  between presupposition 
and focus. The use of an ad-hoc device r e f l e c t s  the  f ac t  
tha t  a t  t he  current stage of research it is  not c lear  how 
presuppositions a r e  t o  be formally re la ted t o  other portions 
of a semantic reading, i. e. what s o r t  of logical  connective(s) 
should be employed, Insofar as we can bring relevant evidence 
t o  bear on the issue, however, it seems tha t  we can say tha t  
conjunction ( i .  e. logical  conjunction with &) i s  not the  
proper device t o  r e l a t e  given expressions with t h e i r  presup- 
positions. One reason has t o  do with ce r t a in  philosophical 
problems which r e l a t e  t o  assignment of t ru th  values. I f  
', 
assert ions and presuppositions a r e  re la ted by c,onjunction, 
then f a l s i t y  of any one conjunct en ta i l s  f a l s i t y  of the  e n t i r e  
conjunction (which we assume t o  be a property of logical  con- 
218 
junction i n  general). Consider, f o r  example, sentences such 
as :  
(88) a. MITCHELL urged Strom Thurmond t o  appoint Carswell. 
b. It was MITCHELL who urged Strom Thurmond t o  
appoint Carswell. 
O n  t he  conjunction hypothesis, t h i s  would be represented as:  
(89) [ [z urged S t r m  Thurmond t o  appoint Carswell] and 
[z = Mitchell] ] 
Suppose tha t the  leftmost expression of (89) were fa lse ,  f .e .  
that  Thumond has not been urged t o  appoint Carswell. Since 
(89) i s  a conjunction, and one of i t s  conjuncts is fa lse ,  
then the en t i r e  conjunction i s  a l so  fa l se .  Insofar as  in tu i -  
t i v e  judgements can be brought t o  bear on such issues, i t  
seems ..%at the  conjunction theory makes f a l s e  predictions i n  
t h i s  case. For example, consider a discourse such as :  
(90) a. Someone urged the  President t o  appoint Carswell, 
but I don' t know who. 
b. In fact ,  it was MITCHELL who urged S t r m  
Thmond t o  appoint Carswell. 
Confronted with a response such as  (gob), i t  would be odd t o  
\ 
say t ha t  it i s  - fa lse .  While it is  the  case that  the  speaker 
who u t t e r s  (90b) has failed t o  make a true ass,.::.~taion, it 
would be more accurate t o  say tb t  it i s  irrelevant t o  speak 
of t r u t h  or  f a l s i t y  f o r  sentences such as (gob). The speaker 
who u t t e r s  (90b) makes the  f a l s e  assumption tha t  Strom .' 
Thurmond i s  the President. In response t o  a speaker who 
I I 
u t t e r s  (90b) we might say, You a r e  mistaken i n  your assramp- 
t ions  about who i s  president", but it would be ra ther  strange 
t o  say, "What you jus t  sa id  i s  false". 17 In  other words, the  
logical  re la t ion  Between presupposition and asser t ion i s  such 
that f a l s i t y  of t h e  presupposition does not e n t a i l  f a l s i t y  of 
the  en t i r e  expression. I f  t h i s  i s  t h e  case, then co2junction 
i s  not the proper device t o  connect presupposition and asser- 
t ion.  
Another reason why the  use of conjunction seems t o  be 
- 
mistaken concerns t h e  representation of questions, such a s  
(86a) and (87b). That is, logical  conjunctions of non-inter- 
rogative statements with in terrogat ive statements a r e  anoma- 
lous. If such conjunctions a r e  possible, then it should be 
possible t o  have sentences such a s :  
(91) *Someone urged Nixon t o  appoint Carewell, and who 
urged Nixon t o  appoint Carswell? 
We assume tha t  in general such conjunctions a r e  not permitted, 
'. 
but this  would be just what i s  required i n  the  conjunction 
theory. That is, representations such a s  (86a) would be i n  
the  following form: 
(92) [ [ urged Mixm t o  appoint Carswell] and [x - = ? I ]  
A 10gical  conjunction such a s  (92) i s  excluded on general '  
grounds, and thus t h e  use  of conjunction i s  inappropriate,  
For reasons such a s  these, it i s  wisest t o  leave open t h e  
question of what s o r t  of l og i ca l  connective i s  used t o  regre-  
sent  t h e  r e l a t i o n  of given expressions t o  t h e i r  presuppssi- 
t ions.  We know tha t  t h e  r e l a t i o n  is such t h a t  f a l s i t y  of t h e  
presupposition should not e n t a i l  f a l s i t y  s f  t h e  e n t i r e  repre-  
sentat ion,  and fu r the r  t h a t  t h e  log ica l  connection permits 
non-interrogatives t o  be connected with in ter rogat ives .  
These proper t i es  a r e  not  proper t ies  of a conjunction r e l a t i on .  
A t  worst, semantic theory must pos i t  a p r imi t ive  r e l a t i o n  of 
presupposition, which i s  taken a s  unanalyzable and universa l ly  
defined. A t  any rate, w e  leave open t h i s  question, and use  
the  device [ , ]  i n  our representat ions.  -. 
Before discussing the  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  proposed 
semantic notat ion,  w e  should discuss here an important aspect 
- .  
of. t he  way ~'Tocus~~fsS'~represented in t h i s  ncta t ion.  That is, 
note that the focus sentence, i n  t h i s  notat ion,  not  
-
j u s t  a const i tuent  of t h e  sentence, but r a t h e r  it i s  a s e n -  
\ 
t i c  proposi t ion which contains a spec i f ica t ion  r e l a t i o n  be- 
tween a var iab le  and some const i tuent .  Consider a typ ica l  
example: 
(93) a. Mozart wrote 4 piano QUARTETS. 
b. [ [Mozart wrote 4 - x],  [x - piano quarte ts]  1.. 
The rightmost expression is the  representation of f %us, and 
thus the  focus i n  semantic representation is  a specification 
re la t ion,  and it i s  not merely a constituent i so la ted  from 
the  r e s t  of the  sentence. We s h a l l  examine the  reasons fo r  
t h i s  i n  a moment. The term 'focus' i s  thus ambiguous. When 
we use the  term 'focus' (or 'focus consti tuent ' )  with regard 
t o  surface syntactic s t ructures  it re fe r s  t o  a surface con- 
st i tuent  which contains the  intonation center. However, when 
t h e  term is  used i n  regard t o  semantic representations, it 
re fe r s  t o  the semantic proposition which specif ies  a variable. 18 
6.1. Jus t i f i ca t ion  of the  Proposed Semantic Notation. In 
t h i s  section w e  s h a l l  discuss i n  greater  d e t a i l  the  proposed 
semantic notation, and we w i l l  j u s t i fy  t h i s  par t icu lar  nata- 
t i o n  on several grounds. F i r s t ,  w e  show that  from the  stand- 
point of the general interpretat ion of focus, t h e  proposed 
\ 
notation captures what i s  meant when w e  say tha t  the focus of 
a sentence represents 'novel ' information. Secondly, we shuw 
tha t  the notation allows us t o  r e l a t e  semantically a wide 
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range of diverse syntact ic  forms. It allows us t o  s t a t e  clear-  
l y  t h e  semantic pa ra l l e l s  between WH-questions, yes/no ques- 
t ions,  and declarative sentences of both c le f ted  and non- 
c le f ted  sor t s .  Finally, w e  show t ha t  the  notation proposed 
provides jus t  the  s o r t  sf representation needed t o  account 
for  so-called "at t ract ion t o  focus" phenomena i n  the  area of 
logical  scope. 
6.1.1. Focus a s  ' ~ o v e l '  Information. We have s ta ted  
tha t  the  focus consti tuent of a sentence i s  interpreted a s  
representing novel information (within some universe of dfs- 
course). To phrase the  matter i n  this  way, however, is  m i s -  
leading, s ince i t  implies tha t  what i s  interpreted as novel 
is  the  lex ica l  material which makes up the  focus constituent.  
It i s  clear ,  however, t ha t  t h i s  i s  not the  correct  formula- 
t ion.  Consider a sentence such as  t h e  following: 
(96) Nixon conferred with LAIRD on the  Cambodian question. - 
Let us suppose that  the  focus is  the  consti tuent LAIRD. It 
$ 
would be misleading t o  say that  t h i s  consti tuent is novel, 
i . e .  t ha t  the l ex ica l  and semantic information associated 
with t h i s  constituent is  novel. The simplest counterexample 
i s  the  case i n  which two speakers have been discussing Nixon, 
Laird, Mitchell, and s o  on, i n  a cemversatisn i n  which each 
of these persons has been mentioned repeatedly. If sentence 
(96) is put i n  such a context, then there  is nothing a t  a l l  
novel about t h e  consti tuent LAIRD and the  sementic information 
it contains. We r e c a l l  here Hafliday's statement (cf, (47)) 
tha t  what i s  focal  i s  novel, - not i n  the sense tha t  it cannot 
have been mentioned, but i n  the  sense t ha t  it i s  presented 
1 as  being nsn-recoverable'. Even i f  t he  consti tuent LAIRD 
has been previously mentioned, it i s  s t i l l  interpreted as 
representing novel information i n  some sense. When we examine 
i n  what sense we mean the  term 'novel', we note that t he  
novelty associated with the  constituent LAIRD i n  (96) i s  t h e  
novelty associated with the  ident i f ica t ion  of Laird as the  
m e  who Nixm conferred with. In  other words, it is not the  
constituent - Laird which i s  novel, it is  the  par t icu lar  stman- 
t i e  r e l a t ion  i n  which t h i s  constituent par t ic ipates  tha t  is 
- 
novel. If w e  examine the  semantic representation which t h i s  
sentence would have i n  our proposed notation, w e  see  that  the  
representation of focus i n  t h i s  notation i s  i n  f ac t  a propo- 
\ 
s i t i o n  expressing a semantic re la t ion:  
(97) [ [Nixon conferred with - x on t h e  Cambodian question], 
[z = Laird] ] 
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Given that  w e  take the  constituent LAIRD i n  (96) t o  be t h e  
focus, the  in te rpre t ive  pr inciple  marks off the  portion 6f 
the  reading associated with t h i s  constituent.  Once t h i s  psr- 
t i on  is marked off ,  a r e p r e s e n t a t i ~ n  such a s  (97) is  formed. 
Given t h i s  so r t  of representation we can s t a t e  qui te  precisely 
jus t  what aspect of the  reading is  interpreted as  novel infor-  
mation. W e  simply s t a t e  tha t  the  rightmost bracketed expres- 
sion, as  a whole, is  interpreted as  novel information i n  the 
semantic reading. This captures qui te  accurately the  f ac t  
tha t  the  lex ica l  material associated with the  focus i s  not 
interpreted as  novel, but ra ther  tha t  the  par t icu lar  semantic 
re la t ion  i n  which the  focus constituent par t ic ipates  i s  in te r -  
preted as  novel. This aspect of the  proposed representation 
will become even more important when discussing the  matter of 
scope and a t t r ac t ion  t o  focus. 
6 .1 .2 .  Logical Scope and Attraction t o  Focus, W e  have 
discussed the adverbial element even and we have seen tha t  i ts  
'. 
scope i s  associated with a surface constituent which contains 
the  intonation center,  i. e. a possible focus of the  sentence 
i n  which - even occurs. We w i l l  consider now fur ther  examples 
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of what Jackendoff [I9693 has termed ' a t t r ac t ion  t o  focus', 
i n  order t o  s e e  how a t t r ac t ion  phen~mena are. represented ' in 
the  notation we propose. 
Consider f i r s t  yes/no questions, such as  the  following 
s e t :  
(98) a. Did NIXON confer with Mitchell on the  Cambodian 
quest ion? 
b. Did Nixon CONFER with Mitchell on the Cambodian 
quest ion? 
c.  Did Nixon confer with MITCHELL on the Cambodian 
quest ion? 
Even though each sentence i s i n  the  form of a question, it i s  
c l ea r  that  what i s  under question. i n  each case is  only a por- 
t ion  of the  sentence, not the  en t i r e  sentence. As we see 
from the  questions i n  ( 9 8 ) ,  the  portion understood t o  be i n  
question i s  just  the  constituent which contains the intonat ion 
center,  and fo r  t h i s  reason we can say that  questioning i n  
these cases ' a t t r a c t s '  t o  the  focus constituent.  
The question now a r i ses  as  t o  how t o  represent the  f a c t  ' 
t ha t  the  scope of questioning i n  these cases consists  of the  
', 
focus constituent.  What does it mean t o  say that  questi-oning 
i s  limited t o  just  one constituent of a sentence? Sennanti- 
cal ly ,  questions a r e  formed from propositions, not from s ingle  
const i tuents .  However, given t h e  nota t ion w e  propose, it i s  
poss ible  t o  s t a t e  t h e  f a c t s  concerning scope of questioning 
i n  a na tu ra l  manner, precise ly  because t h e  f ~ c u s  is  repre- 
sented a s  a proposition. Thus, t h e  questions of (98) would 
be represented as: 
(99) a. [[z conferred with Mitchell  on t h e  Cambodian 
question],  [ [z = Nixon] ? ]  ] 
b. [ [Nixon did  - x with Mitchell  on t he  Cambodian 
quest ion],  [ [x = confer] ? ]  ] 19 
- 
c .  [ [Nixon conferred with - x on t h e  Cambodian 
question],  [ [z = Mitchell]  ?]  ] 
We can make the notion of a t t r a c t i o n  t o  focus p rec i se  i n  t h i s  
case, by s t a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  question operator i s  t o  be associated 
with t he  rightmost expression. Since t h i s  expression i s  i n  
f a c t  a proposition, t he re  i s  no semantic problem about asso- 
c i a t i n g  t h e  question operator with j u s t  a const i tuent  of t h e  
sentence. Furthermore, such representat ions cor rec t ly  indi-  
c a t e  t h a t  t he  questions of (98) a r e  a l l  questions of iden t i ty .  
WH-questions a r e  a l s o  questions of i den t i t y ;  however, instead 
of requesting'  confirmation of a given iden t i t y  (as i n  (98)), 
$ 
such questions request complete spec i f ica t ion  f o r  t h e  var iab le  
of the  presupposition. In order t o  represent t h i s  difference,  
and the regu la r ize  t h e  nota t ion w e  a r e  using, we represent  
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WH-quest ions a s  follows : 
(100) a. Who did Nixon confer with on the Cambodian ,. 
quest ion? 
b. [ [Nixon con£ erred with - x on the  Cambodian 
question], [ [x - = A] ?] ] 
An expression such a s  [ = A] ?I represents a request f o r  
specif icat ian of the  variable, while an expression such as 
[ [ E  = Mitchell ] ? ]  represents a request f o r  confirmation 
of the  given specification.  
I f  we sum up what w e  have said so fa r ,  w e  note tha t  the  
sentences i n  (101) receive the  representations of (1C2) : 
(101) a. Who did Nixon confer with on the  Cambodian 
quest ion? 
b. Did Nixon confer with MTCHELT, on the  Cambodian 
quest ion? 
c. Was it MITCHELL tha t  Nixon conferred with on 
the Cambodian question? 
d. Was the  me who Nixon conferred with on the  
Cambodian question MITCHELL? 
e. Nixon conferred with MITCHELL on the Cambodian 
\ 
question. 
f . It was MITCHELL tha t  Nixon conferred with on 
the Cambodian question. 
(101) g. The one who Nixon conferred with on the  
Cambodian question was MITCHELL. 
(102) a. [ [Nixon conferred with - x on the  Cambodian 
question], [ [z = A] ?] ] 
b. [Nixon conferred with - x on the  Cambodian 
question], [ [ E  = Mitchell] ? ]  ] 
c. [ [Nixon conferred with - x on the  Cambodian 
question], [ [x - = Mitchell] ] 
(101a) i s  represented as (102a), (i0lb- (10ld) a r e  represented 
as  (102b), and (101e) - (101g) a r e  represented as (10Zc). The 
s ignif icant  point here is  tha t  the  notation allows us t o  cap- 
tu re  the semantic para l le l s  holding among a wide range of 
syntactic forms. By inspection of tbe leftmost bracketed 
expression we can so r t  sentences in to  natural semantic 
classes ( i .  e, sets of presupposition-sharing sentences). W e  
can c i t e  precisely how they are similar,  and, by inspection 
of the  rightmost bracketed expression, w e  can c i t e  jus t  how 
they d i f f e r .  
If we examine now examples sf logical  scope of negation, ' 
we see that arguments analogous t o  those involving scope of 
'. 
questioning can be made fo r  the  notation we propose. Once 
again, the s ignif icant  feature  of our analysis is tha t  the  
focus i s  represented as a semantic proposition. Consider, 
then, sentences such as the following: 
(103) a .  The NAVY doesn't want new bombers. 
b, The Navy doesn't want NEW bombers. 
c. The Navy doesn't want new BOMBERS. 
Each of the sentences of (103) contains a negative, and i n  
each case the scope of the  negative i s  taken t o  be only a 
pcrt ion of the sentence. The par t icu lar  part ion which forms 
the  scope of the negative must i n  f ac t  be a constituent which 
i s  a possible focus constituent of the sentence. Hence i n  
(103a) it i s  not denied tha t  some organization wants new 
bombers, it i s  only denied tha t  t h i s  organization i s  the  
Navy; i n  (103bj it is  not denied tha t  the  Navy wants bombers, 
it i s  only denied tha t  itwants bornbers; f ina l ly ,  i n  (103c) 
it i s  not denied tha t  t h e  Navy wants something mew, it i s  
only denied that  the  Navy wants bombers which a r e  new. In 
each case the scope of the negation is the  focus constituent.  
This phenomenon i s  qu%te general, and i s  not limited tD sen- 
tences i n  which the negative p a r t i c l e  - not appears, The same 
a t t r ac t ion  t o  focus occurs when the negative i s  incorporated * 
i n t o  a given morpheme, a s  well a s  when the  negative occurs i n  
$ 
such phrases as it is not the  case that .  Furthemore, the  
same phenomenon occurs with inherently negative verbs such as  
deny and doubt. Consider, fo r  example: 
(104) a. Nixon sa id  nothing about AMERICAN sanctuaries.  
b. Nixon sa id  nothing about American SANCTUARIES. 
(105) a .  It is  not t he  case t h a t  t h e  NAVY wants bombers. 
b. It is  not t he  case  t h a t  t h e  Navy wants BOMBERS. 
(106) a.  I {:I:~/ t h a t  t h e  SENATE w i l l  back Nixon. 
b. I {l~:~/ t h a t  t h e  Senate w i l l  back NIXON. 
In  (104a) t h e  negation contained in  t h e  morpheme nothing i s  
a t t r a c t e d  t o  t he  focus const i tuent .  The sentence presupposes 
t h a t  Nixon sa id  something about - some sanctuaries,  and t h e  
den.ial i s  only t h a t  he spoke about American sanctuaries.  
Similar considerat ions hold f o r  (104b) and the  sentences of 
(105). In (106) the scope of doubt o r  denial  i s  governed a s  
wel l  by a t t r a c t i o n  t o  focus. Thus, i n  (106a) t he re  is  a pre- 
supposition t h a t  someone or  something w i l l  back Nixon, and 
the doubt is  l imi ted t o  t he  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  Senate a s  
t h a t  which w i l l  back him. 
Once again, we ask what i t  means t o  say tha t  negation 
is  a t t r a c t e d  t o  t h e  focus const i tuent .  Once again t h e  answer 
\ 
is  tha t  negation is  not associated with a const i tuent ,  but 
r a the r  i s  associated with the  proposi t ion which represents  
the focus i n  t h e  reading sf the  sentence. This r e s u l t s  i n  
representat ions such a s  t h e  following f o r  t h e  sentences of 
(107) a.  [ [The - x wants new bombers next year] ,  
[ NEG [q = t h e  Navy] ] ] 
b. [ [The Navy wants bombers which a r e  - x] 
[ NEG [ z =  new] ] ] 
c. [ [The Navy wants new 51, [ NEG [x = bombers] ] ] 
On the  same pr inciple ,  t he  sentences of (104) - (106) receive 
the  following representa t ions  ( i n  respect ive  order) : 
(108) a. [ [Nixon sa id  something about - x sanctuar ies] ,  
[ NEG [q = American] ] ] 
b. [ [Nixon sa id  something about American - x],  
[ NEG ['= sanctuar ies]  ] ] 
(109) a. [ [The wants bombers], [NEG f - x = t he  Navy ] ] ] 
b, [ [The Navy wants z], [NEG [x - = bombers] ] ] 
(110) a. [ [ x  - w i l l  back Nixon], [ I  
Senate] ] ] 
b. [ [The Senate w i l l  back z ] ,  [ I  
Nixon] ] ] 
The proposed nota t ion thus allows us t o  i s o l a t e  precise ly  t h e  
$ 
port ions of t h e  sentences which come under negation. 
If we consider now o ther  elements which have log ica l  
scope,. it i s  poss ible  t o  s h m  t h a t  t h e  nota t ion proposed f o r  
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focus and presupposition allows us t o  s t a t e  general iza t ions  
over a wide range of cases.  Returning t o  a considerat ion '  of 
t h e  adverbial  p a r t i c l e  even, we have already noted t h a t  - even 
takes a s  i t s  scope t h e  focus of a sentence: 
(111) a .  The A i r  Force even wants to spray Cambodian 
VILLAGES. 
b. The A i r  Force even wants t o  spray CAMBODIAN 
vi l l ages .  
c. The A i r  Force even wants t o  SPRAY Cambodian 
v i l l ages .  
d. The A i r  Force even WANTS t o  spray Cambodian 
v i l l ages .  
Ignoring the  placement of even f o r  a moment, we represent  t h e  
focus-presupposition r e l a t i ons  of (111) a s  follows : 
(112) a. [ [The A i r  Force wants to spray Cambodian x] , 
[X = v i l l ages ]  1 
b. [ [The A i r  Force wants t o  spray - x v i l l ages ] ,  
1% = Cambodian] ] 
c.  [ [ The A i r  Force wants [ the A i r  Force - x 
Cambodian v i l l ages ] ,  [z = spray] ] 
$ 
d. [ [The A i r  Force [ t h e  A i r  Force spray 
Camb~dian villages], [x = want] ] 20 
We have talked about the  scope of - even so f a r ,  however, 
we must examine a  l i t t l e  f u r t h e r  what - even means and what i t  
means t o  say that  some i t e m  forms t h e  scope of - even. ~ o l l o w -  
ing Bruce Frsser  [1969], w e  can say tha t  a  sentence with - even 
such a s  ( l l l a )  has a t  l e a s t  t h e  following i s o l a b l e  pa r t s  i n  
i t s  in t e rp re t a t i on  (cf. Fraser  [1969, 11-33) : 
(113) a.  The A i r  Force wants t o  spray Cambodian v i l l ages .  
b. The A i r  Force wants t o  spray other  Cambodian 
things.  
c.  The speaker would not expect (and would not ex- 
pect the  hearer  t o  expect) that v i l l ages  would 
be one of the desired t a r g e t s  of t h e  A i r  Force 
spraying campaign. 
05 these  port ions of t h e  i n t e rp re t a t i on  of ( I lPa) ,  (113a) re- 
presents  t ha t  semantic information read from the deep s t ruc-  
tu re ,  i. e. grammatical r e l a t i ons .  The semantic contr ibut ion 
of -- even is  found i n  (113b) and ( 1 1 3 ~ ) .  Leaving a s ide  (113b) 
f o r  t he  moment, w e  note t h a t  (113c) i s  t he  c e n t r a l  aspect of 
t h e  i n t e rp re t a t i on  of - even. The presence of even i n  a  sen- 
tenc,e such a s  ( l l l a )  ind ica tes  t h a t  the speaker judges as  
unexpected (or,  assumes t h a t  t h e  hearer  w i l l  judge as  tanex- 
'. 
pected) t h e  f a c t  t h a t  v i l l ages  a r e  desired ta rge t s .  Such a  
speaker might assume t h a t  Cambodian jungles o r  Cambodian 
mi l i t a ry  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  a r e  appropriate t a r g e t s  f o r  spraying, 
but it is unexpected tha t  c i v i l i a n  vi l lages  a r e  targets.  In 
other words, the  asser t ion of specification i n  representations 
such as  (112a) i s  precisely tha t  portion of the  reading which 
represents tha t  information which i s  taken t o  be unexpected. 
Once again, scope i s  taken t o  be the proposition which 
represents the  focus. I f  even contains as  par t  of i t s  mean- 
-
ing a predicate unexpected, then what we mean when we say tha t  
the  scope of - even a t t r a c t s  t o  focus is  that t h i s  predicate 
of unexpectedness i s  predicated of t h e  focus expression: 
(114) [ [The A i r  Force wants t o  spray Cambodian x], 
- 
[ [ z  = vi l lages]  UNEXPECTED] ] 
Whether or  not t h i s  i s  viewed a s  t h e  correct  way t o  represent 
the  meaning of even, the  point to be made here is tha t  the  
semantic e f fec t  of even i s  limited t o  the  rightmost bracketed 
-
expression. 
A t  t h i s  point we ask whether there  a r e  fur ther  aspects 
of the  interpretat ion of even which must a l so  appear i n  repwe- 
sentations suck a s  (114). In  par t icular ,  does (113b) appear 
expl ic i t ly  i n  the semantic representation of sentences con- . 
ta ining - even? (113b) represents tha t  aspect of t h e  interpre- 
', 
t a t ion  of - even which w e  can labe l  the  implication of non- 
_1 
uniqueness: t o  say tha t  the  A i r  Force even wants t o  spray 
vi l lages  i s  t o  imply tha t  vi l lages  a r e  not the  only thing 
t he  A i r  Force wishes t o  spray, tha t  there  a r e  other things 
the  A i r  Force wants t o  spray. 
With respect t o  t h i s  aspect of the  interpretat ion of 
even Fraser [1969, 11-41 s t a t e s :  
-9 
The ef fec t  of - even on t he  [item which forms i.ts 
scope] permits the  hearer t o  make the  inference 
tha t  the  referent  of [ t h e  scope item] must be 
viewed a s  a member of a s e t  of s imilar  tokens with 
which it (the referent)  can be contrasted within 
the  context of the  remainder of the  sentence. 
Thus, Fraser 's  v i m  i s  tha t  the  portion of the interpretat ion 
of - even represented i n  (113b) is t o  be regarded as  an impli- 
cation ( in  the  sense of Austin [ 19623). I f e e l  that  t h i s  
-
view i s  correct  ( i .e .  (113b) does - not appear expl ic i t ly  i n  
the  reading). 
The evidence w e  can present here for  t h i s  view i s  based 
on the  f ac t  tha t  it is  impossib1.e t o  determine what the  ana- 
logue of ( 1 1 3 )  would be. Consider, f o r  example, a sentence 
such as:  
(115) The A i r  Force even WANTS t o  bomb peasants, 
'. 
We can say tha t  t h i s  sentence expresses the proposition that  
the  A i r  Force wants t o  bomb peasants, and tha t  one would not 
expect the  A i r  Force t o  - want t o  bomb peasants. However, what 
is  the analogue of (113b) f o r  (1P5)? Perhaps we could say 
that  (115) implies tha t  the  Air Force has other a t t i tudes  
toward bombing peasants. This is reasonable since w e  can 
have contrasts  such as :  
(116) The A i r  Force not only l ikes  t o  bomb peasants -- it 
even WANTS t o  bomb peasants. 
However, i f  t h i s  were the  only implication of (115), then we 
would not expect t o  have contrasts  such as:  
(117) The A i r  Force has not only been ordered t o  bomb 
peasants -- it even WANTS t o  bomb peasants. 
In fac t ,  as t he  following examples show, we cannot i s o l a t e  
any s ingle  implication of sentence (115) as  being par t  of i t s  
reading, since many different  kinds of contrasts  a r e  possible 
with the  verb WANT: 
(13.8) a. The Air Force not only must -bomb peasants -- it 
even WANTS t o  bomb them. 
b. The A i r  Force not only bomb peasants -- it 
even WANTS t o  bomb them. 
c ,  The immorality of the  Vietnam War is qui te  c lear .  - 
F Q ~  example, not only does the A i r  Force - bomb 
'. 
peasants, it even WANTS t o  bomb peasants. 
In other words, t he  verb WANT can be contrasted i n  a great 
number of ways, and it is h p o s s i b l e  t o  i s o l a t e  any s ingle  
implication of non-uniqueness a s  being - t h e  implication found 
i n  t h e  reading of sentences such a s  (115). For t h i s  reason 
we maintain t h a t  t h e  readings of sentences containing - even do 
not e x p l i c i t l y  contain anything analogous t o  (113b), s ince  
t h i s  implication of non-uniqueness cannot be uniquely deter-  
mined. 2 1  
To sum up what we have discussed i n  t h i s  sect ion,  we have 
attempted t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  proposed semantic nota t ion on the  
grounds t h a t  it allows us t o  express c e r t a i n  semantic gener- 
a l i za t i ons .  It allows us t o  express t h e  semantic r e l a t i o n  
between questions, c l e f t e d  sentences, and non-clefted sen- 
tences (cf .  (101) and (102)). As a r e s u l t  of t h i s  property, 
it allows us t o  def ine  i n  a simple way such notions a s  
t I na tu ra l  response". Furthermore, by representing the  focus 
as a proposi t ion i n  which a var iab le  is  specif ied,  t he  nota- 
t i o n  allows us t o  s t a t e  general izat ions concerning log ica l  
scope of negation, questioning and items such a s  even. The 
general p r inc ip l e  f o r  scope which we have a r r ived  a t  i s  the 
following : . 
(119) The log ica l  scope of negation, questioning, and 
'. 
adverbial  items such a s  even i s  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  t he  
proposi t ion i n  t h e  semantic reading which repre- 
sen t s  t h e  focus. 
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The proposed notation i s  ju s t i f i ed  insofar as it allows us t o  
capture these generalizations. 
6.2.  Intonation and Semantic Representation. In discus- 
sing the  logical  scope of negation and i ts  semantic represen- 
t a t ion  we concluded tha t  the  scope of negation is  always lo- 
cated outside the expression which represents the  presupposi- 
t ion,  as  s ta ted i n  (119). However, t h i s  account leaves out 
a s ignif icant  fac tor  i n  interpreting such sentences: namely, 
the  intonation contour. In  fact ,  the  semantic representation 
of such sentences changes s ignif icant ly  depending on various 
factors  of tone contour. 
6.2.1.  Contradictive vs. Conclusive. The examples of 
negation w e  have discussed so f a r  a re  a l l  examples i n  which 
the  scope of negation is  res t r ic ted  t o  the focus constituent.  
'. 
Under cer ta in  conditions, however, the  negation can b e  par t  
of t he  presupposition, and t h i s  has t o  do with the  intonation 
pat tern of the  sentence. In par t icu lar -  the  examples we have 
been dealing with could be read with a t  l eas t  two d i s t inc t  
intonation patterns, which we re fe r  t o  a s  the  contradictive 
intonation pat tern and the  cencPusive intonation pat tern ( the 
term 'conclusive' is taken from Bolinger [1965, p. 313)). 
The contradictive pat tern can be i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  the  following 
context: 
(120) Mitchell urged Nixon to appoint Carswell, didn' t  
he. 
(121) N o ,  MITCHELL didn't  urge Nixon t o  appoint Carswell 
( -- FINCH did). 
(122) No, it wasnf t MITCHELL who urged Nixon t o  appoint 
Carswell ( i t  was FINCH). 
(123) No, the  one who urged Nixon t o  appoint Carswell 
wasn't MITCHELL ( -- it was FINCH). 
Sentences (120) - (123), excluding the  parenthesized phrase, 
have the  contradictive intonation pattern. A s  the  Esae im-  
p l ies ,  t h i s  pat tern is  typical ly  used i n  contradicting or  
correcting another speaker' s statements. The primary char- 
a c t e r i s t i c  of t h i s  intonation pattern i s  a r i s i n g  tone pat- . 
t e rn  a t  the  end of the  sentence. Furthemore, the  sentence- 
\ 
long intonation contour i s  perceived t o  have a r is ing-fal l ing-  
r i s ing  pattern:  
c (124) MITCHELL d idn ' t  urge Nixon t o  appoint Carswell-, 
(125) It wasn't MITCHELL t h a t  urged Nixon t o  appoint 
- 22 Carswell. 
The contours of sentences such a s  (124) and (125) a r e  no 
doubt more subtle;  however, t h e  rough pa t t e rn  indicated i s  
enough t o  d is t inguish  t h e  s ign i f i can t  fea tures  of t h e  contra- 
d i e t i v e  pa t t e rn  from others.  In  our discussion of such pat-  
t e rns ,  w e  w i l l  represent  r i s i n g  tone a t  t h e  end of a sentence 
with an arrow [ P ] placed a t  t h e  end of t h e  sentence; t h e  
r i s ing - f a l l i ng - r i s ing  tone pa t t e rn  w i l l  be indicated by t h e  
symbol [1/] a t  t he  end of t h e  sentence, 
The conclusive in tonat ion pat tern ,  on the  other  hand, 
can be i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  a context such a s :  
(126) Who was t h e  one who didn ' t  urge Nixon t o  appoint 
Carswell? 
(127) MITCHELL d idn ' t  urge Nixon t o  appoint Carswell. 
('128) It was MITCHELL who d idn ' t  urge Nixon t o  appoint 
Carswell. 
$ 
(129) The one who d idn ' t  urge Nixon t o  appoint Carswell 
was MITCHELL. 
The concPusive intonation pat tern ,  a s  t h e  name implies, i s  
used a t  the  end s f  an utterance, and indicates tha t  the  
speaker has f inished with h i s  discourse and has no fur ther  
information t o  add. The cent ra l  difference between t h i s  
pat tern and the  contradictivce pat tern is  tha t  i n  the  conclu- 
s ive  pa t te rn  the  tone f a l l s  a t  t he  end of the  sentence ( f a l l -  
ing tone a t  the  end of the  sentence w i l l  be indicated by the  
use of the  period [ . I ) .  Furthermore, the  sentence-long into- 
nation pat tern of the conclusive pat tern is  perceived t o  be 
level, (except, of course, on a consti tuent with emphatic 
s t r e s s )  and s teadi ly  drops : 
- (130) MITCHELL didn ' t  urge Nixon t o  appoint Carswell 
(131) It was MITCHELL t ha t  didn't  urge Nixon t o  appoint 
W e  w i l l  represent t h i s  tone pat tern with t h e  symbol [ j, 1 a t  
the end of the  sentence. If we re-examine the sentences (121)- 
(123) w e  see  tha t  both cmt rad ie t ive  and conclusive intona- 
tion pat terns  are present: 
(132) Ir wasnk MITCHELL who urged Nixon t o  appoint 
s 
Carswell [ f 1 -- It was FINCH who urged Nixon 
t o  appoint Carswell. [ 1 
Thus the patterns a r e  different ia ted on t h e  basis of r i s i n g  
tone vs. f a l l i n g  tone a t  t h e  end of the sentence, a s  w e l l  a s  
a contour of r is ing-fal l ing-r is ing vs. a contour of level-  
fa l l ing .  Even though these a r e  rough properties, they are  
suf f ic ien t  t o  dist inguish the  patterns. 
Note now t h a t  the  semantic interpretat ion of suck sen- 
tences changes rad ica l ly  according t o  whether the  sentence 
has a contradictive pa t te rn  or a conclusive pattern. This i s  
especially t r u e  f o r  non-clefted sentences such a s  (121) and 
(127) which a r s  otherwise formally ident ica l  i n  surface struc- 
ture. Specifically, the  negation goes with the focus consti-  
tuent when the  sentence has a contradictive intonation pat- 
tern,  but is par t  of the  presupposition when the  sentence 
has a conclusive intonation pattern. Thus, sentences (121)- 
(123) have the  representation (133), and the sentences (127) - 
(129) have the representation (134) : 
(133) [ [ z  urged Nixon t o  appoint Carswell], [ [ x  - = 
Mitchell] NEG] ] 
(134)  [ [ x  - didn' t  urge Nixon t o  appoint Carswell], [x - = 
Mitchell] ] . 
The non-clefted sentences (121) and (127) receive two d i f f e r -  
\ 
ent interpretat ions  s t r i c t l y  on the  basis of the intonation 
patterns,  s ince they are lexical ly  and s t ruc tura l ly  identical .  
(Note a l so  the f a c t  tha t  even though c le f ted  sentences r e f l e c t  
t h i s  difference i n  interpretat ion formally -- t ha t  is, the  
negative can e i the r  appear on the  copula or  i n  the  embedaed 
clause -- t he  intonation pat terns  described above a re  s t i l l  
required. Sentences (122) and (123) must have the  contra- 
dic t ive intonation pattern, and sentences (128) and (129) 
must have the  conclusive pattern.  ) 
Isolat ing the conclusive and contradictive intonation 
patterns has important consequences f o r  the  semantic in te r -  
pretat ion of a wide range of sentences. These involve prob- 
lems connected with the in te rac t ion  of negation with adver- 
b i a l ~ ,  as well a s  interact ion of negation with quantif iers.  
For exampie, consider the  much-discussed ambiguity i n  sen- 
tences such a s  the  following (discussed f i r s t  by Lakoff [1965], 
and more recently by Jackendoff [I9691 and Lasnik [ 19701 : 
(135) John doesn't beat h i s  wife because he lbves her. 
This can mean e i ther  tha t  John does not beat h i s  wife, the  
reason being tha t  he loves her, or it can mean that  John i n  
fac t  does beat h i s  wife, however, we cannot ascr ibe t h i s  habi t  
t o  h i s  loving her. In e i t h e r  sense the  intonation center of 
the sentence i s  on the item loves, and fur ther ,  there  is  no 
r, 
formal l ex ica l  or s t ruc tura l  difference associated with the  
ambiguity. In  fac t ,  only the  intonation pa t te rn  d i f f  eren- 
t i a t e s  these senses. Consider (135) read with the 
contriadictive pa t te rn  and a l so  the  conclusive pat tern:  
(136) a. John doesn't beat h i s  wife because he LQWS 
her* Cb 1 
b. John doesn't beat h i s  wife because he LOVES 
her. [ \ ] 
According t o  what we have stated above, i n  (136a), which has 
a contradictive pattern,  the  negation must be associated 
with the  focus of t h e  sentence. However, i n  (136b), with a 
conclusive pattern, t h e  negation must be placed within the  
presupposition. This pr inciple  w i l l  give us the  following 
representations (where (137a) represents (136a), and (137b) 
represents (136b)) : 
(137) a. [ [John beats h i s  wife because he x - her],  
[ [z = love] NEG] ] 
b. [ [John doesn't beat h i s  wife because he - x her],  
[z = love] ] 
Let us note again t h a t  t h e  c le f ted  sentences corresponding t o  
t h e  two sentences of (136) a l so  have the  same intonation pat- 
te rns  : 
(138) a. It is  not because he LOVES her that John beats 
$ 
h i s  wife 
b. It is because he LOVES her tha t  John doesn't 
beat h i s  wife 
These receive the same interpretat ion a s  the  sentences of 
(1361, namely, the  representations of (137). 
So f a r ,  we have discussed examples which contain the  
negative p a r t i c l e  not; however, the  same considerat ions hold 
for  cases involving instances of consti tuent negation and 
adverbial clauses. For example, consider the  following sen- 
tence (from Lasnik [1970]): 
(139) No one g r w s  cotton because of government subsidies 
This cart be read with e i the r  the  contradictive or conclusive 
patterns,  and would receive the  f ~ l l o w i n g  representations: 
(140) a. [ [People grow cotton because of 21, [ [q = 
government subsidies] NEG] ] ( 8 , [ ~f ] )
b. [ [People don't grow cottong because of 51, 
la = government subsidies] ] ( . , [ 1) 
As we have seen i n  previous examples, the  negative, even 
though it i s  a par t  of a pro-form morpheme, s t i l l  a t t r a c t s  t o  
focus with contradictive intonation. 
Analogous considerations hold when w e  exarniqe the  in te r -  
action of the  scope of negation and quantification. The dis- . 
t inc t ion  between contradictive and conclusive intonation d i f -  
\ 
fe rent ia tes  those readings i n  which the  quant i f ier  is under- 
stood t o  be within the scope of negation from those readings 
i n  which it i s  taken t o  be outside the  scope of negation (s f .  
Jackendoff [ 19691). Consider, fo r  example, sentences such as  : 
(141) a. ALL the  boys don't  want i c e  cream 
b. MOST of the  boys don't want i c e  cream 
(142) ALL t he  boys don't read many books 
(143) a. THE BOYS don't want a l l  of tR,e i c e  cream 
b. THE BOYS don't  want most of the  i c e  cream 
Each of the  sentences l i s t e d  above (with the  intonation ten- 
t e r s  as  indicated) can be read with e i the r  the  contradictive 
pat tern or the  conclusive pattern.  Taking (141a), read with 
a conclusive pattern, the  quant i f ier  is  understood t o  be out- 
s ide  the scope of negation, and read with the contradictive 
pattern the quant i f ier  i s  understood t o  be within the  scope 
of negation. Consider: 
(144) a. I t ' s  a l l  the  boys tha t  don't want i c e  cream 
[ conclusive] 
b. I t ' s  not a l l  the  boys tha t  want i c e  cream 
[contradictive] 
The sentences of (141) w i l l  receive the  fs11owing so r t s  of 
representations following the  principles we have discussed: 
(145) a, [ [ x  - don't want i c e  cream], [x = a l l  the  boys]] 
b. [ [x want i c e  cream], [NEG [& = a l l  the  b o ~ s l l l  
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(146) a. [ [x don't want i c e  cream], [x = most of the  
b o ~ s l l  ( 9 3  r b  1) 
b. [ [x - want i c e  cream], [ NEG [z = most of the  
boysll] ( )' 9 [v I )  
Thus, even though the quant i f iers  a r e  t o  the  l e f t  of the  
negation i n  surfact  structure,  they may be interpreted as be- 
ing within the  scope of negation when the  sentence i s  read 
with the  contradictive pattern. This happens when the quan- 
t i f i e r s  a r e  pa r t  of the  focus phrase (or, a l ternat ively,  a r e  
the  foc i  themselves). Since negation a t t r a c t s  t o  focus with 
t h i s  intonation pattern, the  quant i f ie r  w i l l  automatically 
come within t h e  scope of negation within the system we pro- 
pose (cf. (145b), and (146b)). However, when the  sentence 
i s  read with conclusive intonation, the  negation remains as  
par t  of the  presupposition, and the focus phrase i s  removed, 
thus removing the  quant i f ier  f r ~ m  the  scope of negation (cf. 
(145a) and (146a) ) . 
Consider now (142). The in te rpre t ive  system we have pro- 
posed predicts  tha t  when the quant i f ie r  - a l l  i s  perceived as  , 
being within the  scope of negation, then the  quant i f ie r  many 
$ 
i s  taken t o  be outside the  scope of negation, and vice-versa. 
This i s  due t o  the  f a c t  tha t  (142) receives t h e  following 
representations: 
(147) a. [ [x - donst  read many books], [x  - = a l l  the  boys] 3 
( * ,  [L I )  
b. [ [x  - read many books], [NEG [z = a l l  t he  boys] ]] 
( / 9  C v l )  
These in terpretat ions  can be made c learer  by noting the  c l e f t  
counterparts f o r  (142) : 
(148) a. I t 's  a l l  the  boys tha t  don't read many books 
[ conclusive] 
b. I t ' s  not a l l  the  boys tha t  read many books 
[contradict  ive] 
Thus, the  ambiguity of (142) is again a consequence of the  
d i f fe rent  principles of interpretat ion associated with d i f -  
ferent  intonation patterns.  
Finally consider the  sentences of (143). The quant i f iers  
i n  these cases came within the  scope of negation with the  con- 
clusive patterm, when t he  negation remains i n  the  presupposi- 
t ion.  The quant i f ier  is  not interpreted a s  being within the  
scope of negation when t he  sentence 1s read with a contradic- 
t i v e  pattern,  sfnce the  negation is  a t t r ac ted  t o  the focus. 
The difference, again, can be paraphrased a s  follows: 
\ 
(149) a. It 's  the boys who don't want a l l  the  i c e  cream 
[conclusive] 
(149) b. It 's not the  boys who want a l l  t h e  i c e  cream 
[contradictive] 
The representations f o r  (143) (using only (143a) a s  an ex- 
ample) would work out as follows: 
(150) a. [ don't want a l l  t he  i c e  cream], [x = a l l  
t he  boys]] 
b. [ [' want a l l  the  i c e  cream], [NEG [x - = a l l  t h e  
boys1 1 I 
From such examples, and examples discussed ea r l i e r ,  we 
see tha t  various fas tors  of phonetically interpreted surface 
s t ructures  play a r o l e  i n  marking off focus-presupposition 
relat ions.  The Iscat i \m of the  intonation center is  the  
c ruc ia l  fac tor  Ln determining the  focus constituent of a 
sentence, and we see tha t  intonation patterns play a sigmif i- 
cant r o l e  i n  t h e  determination of scape of negation. These 
f a c t s  argue tha t  in te rpre t ive  principles must be sens i t ive  t o  
a var ie ty  of intonational phenomena (and not merely the  loca- 
t ion  of the  intonation center) ,  s ince these, along with sror- 
face constituent structure,  a f fec t  i n  a s igni f icant  way how 
C 
various portions of a semantic reading are inter-related.  
7. Concluding Remarks on Clefted Sentences 
Given the s o r t  of framework w e  have outlined above, we 
can see how it i s  possible tha t  c le f ted  sentences deriving 
from more than one source can be assigned only one reading. 
Consider again the  following s i tua t ion:  
1 
(151) Semantic Reading 
DS d R L l D S 2  Deep Structure 
SS Surface Structure 
We have t r i e d  t o  show tha t  in  the  s o r t  of s i tua t ion  repre- 
sented by (151) the  two deep s t ruc ture  sources i n  question 
are semantics hly equivalent. Since these express the  same 
semantic information, no ambiguity can a r i s e  from t h i s  level.  
Furthermore, we have attempted t o  demonstrate tha t  the  focus- 
presuppositisn re la t ions  a r e  determined by factors  of surface 
structures.  If t h i s  i s  true,  there  a r e  several consequences 
of relevance t o  the  theory w e  have outlined, 
F i r s t  of a l l ,  t he  deep s t ruc ture  source containing the  
empty [ A ]  need not have any indication as  t o  which consti-  
tuent is  the  focus constituent,  s ince t h i s  w i l l  be determined 
a t  a point a f t e r  the  application o'f t he  extraction rule.  
Thus, the  syntact ical ly  motivated deep structure posited by 
the  extraction theory causes no semantic problems, and indeed, 
given tha t  focus-presupposition re la t ions  a r e  not determined 
by properties of deep s t ruc ture  phrase markers, it i s  not. sur- 
prising t o  find tha t  (a t  l eas t  a c lass  of) deep phrase markers 
provide no indication what ever of what the  f ocus-presuppssi- 
t i o n  re la t ions  are. 
Secondly, and more d i rec t ly  re la ted t o  (151), i f  focus- 
presupposition re la t ions  a r e  determined by factors  of surface 
1 
structure,  then SS of (151) w i l l  be assigned only one s e t  
of these re la t ions ,  there  being only a s ingle  surface struc- 
ture. Thus, there  can be no ambiguity a r i s ing  with respect 
t o  focus-presupposition re la t ions .  Since the  deep s t ruc ture  
sources a r e  equivalent, only one s e t  of grammatical re la t ions  
a r e  assigned, end since the focus-presupposition re la t ions  
are determined by factors  of surface s t ruc ture  only one s e t  
sf  such re la t ions  i s  assigned t o  one surface s t ructure .  
8. A Note on Syntactic Representation vs. Semantic Represen- 
t a t ion  
The issues w e  have discussed above and i n  the l a s t  
several chapters have some bearing on the  question sf  the  
re la t ion  between syntactic rqpresentation and semantic re-  
presentation. In  par t icular ,  t he  f ac t  tha t  a s ingle  unam- 
biguous surface s t ruc ture  can derive from more than one deep 
s t ruc ture  source provides support fo r  a theory which pos i t s  
a level  of syntactic deep s t ruc ture  d i s t inc t  from semantic 
representation. There is  no non-ad-hoc way t o  prevent such 
a s i tuat ion,  and i n  f ac t  there  i s  some posi t ive  evidence f o r  
positing a dual source for  pseudo-cleft sentences, as  we have 
seen. 
The deep s t ruc ture  source for  c le f ted  sentences i n  the  
extraction theory posi ts  an empty [ A ]  i n  predicate position, 
whish i s  motivated on purely formal grounds: posit ing such 
s t ructures  allows one t o  account fo r  a range of f a c t s  having 
t o  do with the shape of s l e f t ed  sentences (e. g. prepositional 
phrases i n  focus position). This s o r t  of deep s t ruc ture  i s  
not motivated on semantic grounds, i. e. on t he  grounds tha t  
it accounts f o r  t he  interpretat ion of c le f ted  sentences. As 
w e  have seen, it i s  not a t  a l l  relevant i n  the  determination 
of a s ignif icant  portion of the  semantic interpretat ion of 
clef ted sentences (namely, f ocus-presupposition re la t ions) .  
The base source f o r  copula sehtences generates pseudo- 
c l e f t  sentences of a ce r t a in  c lass ,  and we have proposed 
tha t  there  a r e  ce r t a in  pseudo-cleft sentences which can only 
be generated by this source. Thus, there are two poss ible  
sources, and w e  have shown that this formal distinction be- 
tween two sources in  deep structure plays no semantic ro le .  
This situation i s  logically poss ib le  only fn a theory which 
postulates a level  of syntactis deep structure, distinct from 
semantic representation. 
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3 
1. We assume here t h a t  it is  poss ible  t o  determine the  
r e f e r e n t i a l i t y  of given nominal phrases. However, 
the  problem of i n t e rp re t ing  r e f e r e n t i a l i t y  i s  a complex 
one, and beyond t h e  scope of t h i s  work. 
These facts a r e  r e f l ec t ed  i n  questions, a s  well :  
(i) What i s  he? 
A gentleman. 
*The gentleman I know. 
(ii) Who i s  he? 
*A gentleman. 
The gentleman I know. 
Notice, incidenta l ly ,  t h a t  r e f e r e n t i a l  and non-referent ia l  
\ 
NPs a r e  a l s o  d i f f e r en t i a t ed  with respect  t o  c e r t a i n  
motanent ru les .  C ~ n s i d e r ,  f o r  example: 
(cont'd.) 
( i i i )  a. Ta l l  though John is, he can s t i l l  f i t  i n  
t h i s  doorway. 
b. A gentleman though John claims t o  be, he 
always says something rude anyway. 
c. *The bank robber though John is, w e  uon't 
have enough evidence t o  convict him yet. 
As ( i i i )  indicates,  preposing across though can take place 
i n  predicational statements, but not specif ica t iona l  
statements ( i .  e. r e fe ren t i a l  NPs cannot be preposed) . 
3. The observations we have made here a r e  i n  accord with the 
observation by Bach [I9471 t ha t  the  interpretat ion of the 
copula i s  a function of t h e  semantic nature of the  items 
which a r e  connected by the  copula. That is, the  copula 
has a specif ica t iona l  interpretat ion when the  post -copular 
NP is  r e fe ren t i a l ,  and has a predicatisnal  interpretat ion 
when the post-copular i t e m  is  a non-referential NP o r  
adjective. In t h i s  sense, then, the  interpretat ion of 
the  copula (or, more accurately, the  in te rpre ta t ion  of the  , 
sentences containing the copula) i s  completely determined 
\ 
by the environment i n  whBch the  eopula occurs. 
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4. Note tha t  not a l l  cases invoiving predicate adjectives can 
be ambiguous, since t h e  subject NPs i n  question m y  f a i l  
t o  s a t i s f y  the  select ional  r e s t r i c t ions  of the  adjectives. 
Thus : 
(i) What John t r i e d  t o  be was careful .  
( i i )  What John t r i e d  t o  be was not apparent. 
( i )  i s  interpreted m l y  a s  a s l e f t ed  sentences, since the  
predicational sense would en ta i l  t ha t  the NP what John 
t r i e d  t o  be could be a possible subject of careful.  
-
However, careful  can be predicated only of human subjects. 
Conversely, ( i i )  has only the  predicationa). sense. (If  
it had ehe specif icat ional  sense we would then expect 
sentences such as:  
( i i i )  ?John t r i e d  t o  be not apparent.) 
Thus, ambiguities of the s o r t  represented by (16) a r e  
possible only when t h e  select ional  r e s t r i c t ions  of t h e  
adject ive a r e  s a t i s f i e d  by both the  matrix NP and the  
embedded NP. 
5. The symbol [ i s ]  f o r  predication may i n  f ac t  be a cover 
term which represents a ser ies  of semantic relat ions.  
\ 
For example: 
(i) He is  a f o ~ l .  
( i i )  He is  a doctor. 
(5) (cont'd.) 
While ( i )  represents assignment of quality, ( i i )  represents 
a statement of c l a s s  membership. However, nothing crubial  
w i l l  r e s t  on separating these various senses associated 
with [is]. ,  s ince we need only keep these senses separate 
from specif ica t i sn .  
6. Note fur ther  tha t  i n  the  sense represenged by (30b) it  i s  
not possible t o  a t tach an apposit ive r e l a t i v e  clause t o  
the  NP i n  question: 
(i) I donf t know what he threw away; I only know 
tha t  he thrj% away a valuable piece of 
equipment ("which, by the  way, I need t o  use 
r ight  now). 
7. Such conditions would represent, of course, an absurd 
complication of the  grammar. Somehow it would have t o  be 
s ta ted  tha t  only indef in i te  NPs could be generated i n  
post-copular position, and any de f in i t e  NPs found there  
would have t o  be derived transformationally. This would , 
then insure that s t ructures  such a s  (26) would generate 
% 
only predicational statements. 
8. Cl i f ton [1969] a l so  discusses ambiguities such as the  
following: 
(i) What I don" eat i s  f o ~ d  fo r  the  dog. 
This is  paraphrased e i the r  by, "I don't eat  food f o r  the  
dog", or, roughly as, "What i s  l e f t  over i s  given a s  food 
f o r  the  dog". Note tha t  t h e  two senses a r e  resolved when 
the  r e fe ren t i a l i ty  of the  i n i t i a l  clause i s  made un- 
ambigilous ehther way : 
( i i )  Whatever I don't eat  i s  food fo r  the  dog. 
( i i i )  The thing which I don't eat  i s  food f o r  the  dog. 
This suggests, again, tha t  the  ambiguity hinges on 
re fe ren t i a l i ty  and not on duali ty of syntactic source. 
Furthermore, there  a r e  cases i n  which the  ambiguity i n  
f ac t  appears f o r  which one cannot, i n  any event, posi t  a 
dual syntactic source: 
(iv) My supper i s  food f o r  the  dog. 
This can be used e i the r  t o  denote the  s i tua t ion  i n  which 
the  dog Rood i s  eaten fo r  supper, or the  s i tua t ion  i n  
which the  supper i s  given t o  the  dog a s  i t s  food. Since 
scch sentences a r e  generated i n  the  base and do not under- * 
go the extraction transformation one cannot appeal t o  
\ 
duali ty of source t o  account f o r  the  ambiguity of ( iv) .  
9. This i s  assumed i n  order t o  account f o r  select tonal  
re la t ions  which the  larger  MP enters into:  
( i )  I a t e  what he cooked. 
( i i )  *I a t e  what he said. 
10. This is, of course, t r u e  only i n  the  very broadest sense. 
That is, it is  not the  case tha t  the  logical  s t ruc ture  of 
a sentence (i. e. those aspects of meaning which have 
bearing on the t r u t h  conditions of a sentence) is  deter- 
m'ined exclusively i n  deep structure.  Specifically, the  
scope of logical  elements i s  determined by factors  of 
surface s t ructure .  A s  we point out i n  section 6 
(especially 6.1.2 and 6.21, t he  scope of negation i s  
determined by location of the  focus of a sentence, and 
fur ther ,  it can be s ignif icant ly  a l te red  by variat ions 
i n  intonation patterns. Thus, one aspect of the  logical  
s t ruc ture  of sentences determined by factors  of surface 
s t ructures  i s  the scope of logical  elements and ce r t a in  
adverbials (e. g. even, only, e tc  . ) . Aside from consider- 
a t ions  of scope (and possibly coreferent ia l i ty) ,  it 
appears tha t  aspects of surface s t ructures  do not other- 
'. 
wise have bearing on the t r u t h  conditions of sentences. 
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11. Note a l so  the  difference i n  the possible scope of elements 
such a s  even: 
-
( i )  He even cal led up a g i r l  who he had met i n  '. 
Chicago. 
( i i )  He cal led up even a g i r l  he had met i n  Chicago. 
( i i i )  Me wen called a g i r l  up who he had met i n  
Chicago. 
In ( i ) ,  the  phrase a g i r l  who he had met i n  Chicago can 
function a s  the  scope of -9 even and i f  t h i s  i s  chosen as 
scope then ( 6 )  i s  synonymous with ( i i ) .  In  ( i i i ) ,  
predictably, t h i s  is not a possible scope of - even. This 
can be seen more c lear ly  i n  the  following context: 
(iv) H e  cal led up h i s  mother, he cel led up h i s  
brother, # and he even called a g i r l  up 
who he had met i n  Chicago. 
Thus, the  f i n a l  clause of (iv) i s  not taken as  a natural  
pairing with the  previous clauses, since there  i s  no 
constituent a g i r l  who he had met i n  Chicago which can 
pa i r  with the previous object Ws. Thus, the  sentences 
of (55) d i f f e r  i n  naturalness a s  responses, and fur ther  
specify d i f fe rent  foc i  which can ac t  as t he  scope of - even. 
\ 
It must be mentioned tha t  Lakoff [I9693 s t a t e s  without 
argument that  pairs  such as  (55) do not d i f f e r  i n  pre- 
suppositions and do not d i f f e r  i n  the  questions they 
(11) (cont'd.) 
answer. But w e  see  tha t  there  i s  evidence which bears on 
t h e  issue, which indicates the  opposite. 
12. A s  Jackendoff points out, the  use of such indices is  
already implied i n  t h e  notation used t o  s t a t e  transforma- 
t ions,  i n  which numerals ident i fy  portions of the  s t ruc ture  
description i n  t h e  s t ruc tura l  change. 'Their use i s  a l s o  
presupposed i n  any theory involving 'derivational  
constraints (Lakoff [ 19691). 
13. We point out i n  Chapter 4 tha t  there  can be more than one 
focus per sentence, however, f o r  the  remainder of the  
discussion i n  t h i s  chapter we speak of - the  focus of a 
sentence. 
14. Recall here t h e  sentences of (55), which a r e  re la ted  
examples. The examples here a r e  even c learer  cases i n  




15. A s  Anderson points out, sentences such as (77b) and (78b) 
a r e  not interpreted i n  just  t h e  same way, s ince i n  (77b) 
the  focus i s  ambiguous. It could be jus t  WATUSI, or it 
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(15) (cont 'd.)  
could be a const i tuent  such a s  t h e  idea t k a t  he is  t a l l  
f o r  a WATUSI. Thus, i n  (77b) - even has a poss ible  scope 
which it does not have i n  (78b). 
16. The nota t ion foz questions i s  modified shor t ly .  
17 .  Discussion of these  issues  and r e l a t ed  ones is found i n  
Strawson [ 19561. 
18. The expression which represents  t h e  focus i s  not necessar- 
i l y  always an expression which contains a spec i f ica t ion  
r e l a t i on ,  s ince  it appears t ka t  f o c i  may be represented 
a s  predicat ional  r e l a t i ons  also.  Consider, f o r  example, 
sentences we have discussed e a r l i e r :  
( i )  a. What he drew was a p iece  of TRASH. 
b. He drew a piece of TRASH. 
Recall  t h a t  these  sentences a r e  both ambiguous between a 
predicat ional  and spec i f ica t iona l  sense. Taking a s  focus 
t h e  phrase a p iece  of TRASH, these  sentences receive e i t h e r  
of t he  f o l l m i n g  representat ions : 
'. 
( i i )  a. [ [ he drew - x 1, [ r = a piece of t r a sh  ] ] 
b. [ [ he drew - x 1, [ 5 is a piece  of t r a s h  ] ] 
Thus, i f  t h e  focus const i tuent  i s  a r e f e r e n t i a l  NP, t h e  
(18) (cont ' d. ) 
focus i s  represented as a s p e c i f i c a t i m a l  statement; i f  
t he  focus constituent i s  a non-referential NP, it i s  .- 
represented a s  a predicational statement. Such represen- 
ta t ions  accurately r e f l ec t ,  f o r  example, tha t  i n  (ib) we 
do not know what -was drawn, only that  it was badly dane, 
while i n  ( ia )  we know what was drawn. Consider now the 
case with adjectives:  
( i i i )  a.  What he wants h i s  next wife t o  be is  
FASCINATING. 
b. [ [ he wants h i s  next wife t o  be - x 1, 
[ x = fascinating ] J .  
c .  [ [ he wants h i s  next wife t o  be - x 1, 
x is fascinating] 1. [, 
Recall t ha t  sentences such a s  ( ibia)  can derive from 
structures  such a s  (20) or (21). . Structures such as  (20) 
are interpreted as predicational statements (i. e. the  
adjective fascinat ing is  predicated of the  complex subject 
NP what he wants h i s  next wife t o  be) and when t h i s  i s  
t h e  case, the  representation ( i i i c )  is  assigned t o  such . 
sentences. On the  other hand, (21) does not receive a 
t 
predicatisnal  interpretat ion;  t h e  adject ive is  extracted 
and moved i n t o  predicate position, but it i s  not in te r -  
preted a s  modifying the  complex embedded subject.  When 
(18) (cont ' d. T) 
t h i s  i s  the  case, we assign representation ( i i i b )  t o  such 
sentences. This seems t o  be a reasonable means of ac,dount- 
ing f o r  such ambiguities, and indicates tha t  foc i  may be 
represented a s  re la t ions  other than specification. A s  f a r  
as I can see, specification and predication a r e  the only 
semantic re la t ions  i n  the representat ion of focus. 
19. The use of the  expression do x as  a variable here is  
purely fo r  reasons of readabil i ty.  W e  assume tha t  there  
sse semantic variables which represent given classes of 
predicates and nominals, and tha t  these can be distinguish- 
ed. Since the  context w i l l  make c l ea r  what so r t  of 
variable is  involved, we simply use [HI a s  a generalized 
semantic variable. A more accurate representation f o r  
(99b) would be: [Nixon x with Mitchell on the Cambodian 
question], where q would be a predicate variable. 
Furthermore, again f o r  reasons of readabil i ty,  we 
represent presuppositions i n  essent ia l ly  t h e i r  surface 
s t ructure  forms, but it must be kept i n  mind tha t  the  , 
presupposition i s  a section of a semantic reading, and 
% 
thus takes the  fsm of a semantic reading, not a surface 
structure.  In short,  the  leftmost expression i n  
representations such a s  (99b) is intended t o  represent 
(19) (cont 'd. ) 
a portion of a semantic reading i n  which a var iable  occurs 
f o r  some term. The forms i n  which such expressions are 
given a r e  merely technical enougtn to1 make t h e  point, but 
a r e  not intended a s  precise  repl icas  sf semantic 
representations. 
I t  should be emphasized again tha t  the  presupposition 
need not resemble a possible surface structure.  T'hus, i n  
t h i s  case, there  is  no sentence which expresses t h e  
statement i n  the  leftmost expression of (1126). A t  best 
one can paraphrase the  presupposit ional statement as ,  
roughly, "The A i r  Force bears some re la t ion  t o  the  action 
of spraying Cambodian villages". This r e l a t ion  i s  
specified i n  the  focal  expression as  t h e  r e l a t ion  - want. 
A s  Chomsky [I9691 has pointed out, there  is  no reason t o  
expect tha t  semantic representations can be expressed i n  
grammatical sentences, 
21. The implication of non-uniqueness of - even actual ly  has t o  , 
do with so-called natural  pairing. A sentence such as:  
$ 
( i )  She w i l l  even win the  contest.  
sets up implied contrasts  with anything which could be 
said t o  p a i r  natural ly  with the phrase win the  contest:  
( i i )  She w i l l  enter  the  contest, she w i l l  t r y  her 
best, and she w i l l  even win the  contest. , 
Sentences such as  ( i )  , however, do not imply contrasts  
such as:  
( i i i )  She w i l l  drink sane water, she w i l l  stand on 
her head, and she w i l l  even win the  contest ,  
unless drinking water and standing on one's head a r e  i n  
f a c t  associated with the  contest i n  same way. Thus, the  
implictit ions associated with even a r e  not uniquely deter- 
minable, since they can simply be any so-called 'natural  
pairing ' . 
22. Mote tha t  the  specif ic  shape which the  r is ing-fal l ing-  
r i s ing  pat tern takes depends on the  location of the  
intonation center. Thus, consider t h e  pseudo-cleft : 
d Nixon t o  appoint Carswell 
The r is ing-fal l ing-r is ing curve here i s  located a t  t h e  
very end of the  sentence, where the intonation center i s  
located. Hence, the  r i s i n g  tone begins on the sy l lab le  
'. 
with main s t r e s s ,  and the  fa l l ing- r i s ing  pat tern which 
follows i s  determined by how much of the  sentence i s  l e f t .  
Thus, i n  (124), the  r is ing-fal l ing-r is ing pat tern begins 
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(22) (cont'd.) 
right a t  the beginning of the sentence, where the inton- 
ation center i s  located; i n  (125) i t  does not begin unti l  
the focus constituent has been reached; and i n  (i) above 
it does not even occur unt i l  the end of the sentence. 
CHAPTER 4 
FOCUS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF ANAPHBRIC J2XPRESSIONS .- 
1. Focus and Anaphora 
The purpose of t h i s  chapter is t o  discuss c e r t a i n  ways 
i n  which the  nota t ion we have developed fo r  focus-presupposi- 
t i o n  r e l a t i ons  can h e  put t o  use i n  areas  of the  grammar 
other  than those we have discussed. W e  w i l l  attempt t o  show 
t h a t  the  notat ion developed i n  Chapter 3 plays a c r u c i a l  r o l e  
i n  t h e  i n t e rp re t a t  ion of c e r t a i n  anaphoric expressions. These 
anaphoric expressions include anaphoric items such a s  it, t h i s ,  
t h a t  , t h '  l n ~ ,  and s o  ma, which appear i n  anaphoric expressions 
such a s  it happens, do it, do t h i s ,  do tha t ,  do t h e  same 
( thing),  e tc .  The basic claim is t h a t  f o r  a c e r t a i n  c l a s s  
of expressions, t he  focus-presupposition r e l a t i ons  p lay  a cru- 
c i a l  r o l e  i n  determining the  r e a d i n s o f  the  pro-forms i n  ques-. 
t ion .  
% 
While f ocus-presupposition r e l a t i ons  have a s ign i f i can t  
e f f ec t  on co re fe ren t i a l i t y  re la t ionships  involving personal 
pronouns (he, she, it, etc .  ), it is  beyond the  scope of this 
study t o  consider t h i s  area.' The inves t igat ion here  i s  
limited t o  those pro-forms which r e f e r  t o  ac t ions  o r  proposi- 
t ions, r a t h e r  than so-called personal pronouns. Our p r inc ipa l  
task is the  fomula t ion  of p r inc ip les  f o r  i n t e rp re t a t i on  ~f 
pro-forms such a s  those i n  t h e  following environments: 
(1) a. The US invaded Cambodia once, but - it couldn't  
happen again. 
b. The US may have destroyed Vietnam, but could the 
US get  away with doing it  t o  Laos? 
The pos i t ion  we adopt here with regard t o  such anaphcuic 
expressions i s  t h a t  such expressions a r e  generated i n  t h e  
base. In  o ther  words, t h e  second clauses i n  (1) a r e  generated 
i n  e s sen t i a l l y  t h e i r  surface  f o m ,  W e  must assume tha t  t he  
item it (and s imi la r  forms) i s  marked a s  a pro-form, and . t h a t  
it has a minimal semantic fea ture  composition t o  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  
it from other  pro-forms. Such anaphoric expressions contain 
no fu r the r  semantic content,  and thus, i f  t h e  second clauses 
of (1) ( I t  cou ldnqt  happen again, Could the  US pet away with 
doing it t o  Laos?) happen t o  be generated as independent sen- 
tences, t h e i r  semantic representat ions must ind ica te  t h a t  I 
the re  i s  a "gap" i n  such sentences. That is ,  i n  both cases 
'. 
it r e f e r s  t o  some act ion,  but no specific ac t ion  i s  re fe r red  
-
to.  
In contexts such a s  those represented in (I), t he  pro-form 
it (and analogous ones such a s  t h i s  t ha t ,  e tc . )  is  under- 
- ' -
stood a s  r e f e r r ing  t o  some por t ion of t he  antecedent sentence. 
We w i l l  attempt t o  formulate i n t e rp re t ive  p r inc ip les  by which 
such pro-forms a r e  assigned semantic readings. 
Consider a s  a background examples such a s  t he  following: 
(2) a.  John LECTURED Mary and then he SCOLDED t h e  l i t t l e  
g i r l .  
b. JOHN lec tured MARY and then HE scolded the  LIT'ILE 
GIRL, 
In (Za), the  subject  and object of t he  second c lause  a r e  
understood t o  be anaphoric (Johnshe and Mary=the l i t t l e  g i r l ) ,  
however, i n  (2b) t h e  subject  and object of t he  second c lause  
a r e  understood t o  be d i s t i n c t  from t he  subject  and object of 
the  first clause,  Conversely, while t he  two verbs i n  (2a) a r e  
understood t o  have d i s t i n c t  senses, i n  (2b) we understand them 
t o  have equi-valent senses. m a t  is ,  t h e  speaker who u t t e r s  
(2b) is ,  i n  e f f ec t ,  using the  verbs l ec tu re  and scold a s  i f  
they were semantically equivalent. I n  such examples, t he  
pai r ing of f o c i  i s  understood a s  a pai r ing of semantically 
mutually exclusive items, while t he  pa i r ing  of non-f ocal e 
mater ia l  (low-stressed material)  is  understood a s  a pai r ing 
% 
of semantically equivalent material .  
By 'semantic equivalence' we do not mean synonymy, but 
r a the r  a more general notion. Consider examples of t he  s o r t  
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discussed by Lakoff [ 19701 : 
(3) JOHN called MARY a Republican and then SHE insulted 
HIM. 
This sentence, which has 'reciprocal contrast ive s t r e s s ' ,  has 
an interpretat ion which allows the inference tha t  t o  c a l l  
someone a  Republican is t o  insu l t  him. Chomsky [I9701 has 
suggested tha t  the  interpret ive pr inciple  associated with such 
cases takes inputs of the  f o l l m i n g  s o r t :  
and 
(4, A 
[but]  C y D 
(where cap i t a l  l e t t e r s  indicate foci ,  and lower case l e t t e r s  
indicate re la t ive ly  unstressed items) and associates the  fo l -  
lowing interpretat ion with them: 
(5) t o  - x i s  t o  y 
This would give us f o r  (3) the  interpretat ion tha t  t o  c a l l  
someone a  Republican i s  t o  insu l t  him. Essentially, the  un- 
stressed material i n  such sentences is taken t o  be equivalent 
( in  the sense of ( 5 ) ) ,  while the  stressed material is  taken 
t o  be non-equivalent. 
The claim of t h i s  chapter is  tkat  the  interpretat ion of ' 
cer ta in  anaphoric elements i s  a  pa r t  of the  general phenomenon 
s 
i l l u s t r a t e d  by sentences such as those w e  have jus t  discussed. 
Thus, cons f der : 
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(6) The R6ssians to r tu re  1t6lian spies and the  ~mhricans 
do it t o  ~ l b i n i a n  spies. 
-
The paired foci ,  again, a r e  interpreted a s  d i s t inc t ,  however, 
the unstressed material, a s  before, is interpreted as equi- 
valent i n  some sense. Here, the  verbal expressions to r tu re f  
and 'do it  a r e  re la t ive ly  unstressed; further,  these a re  
understood a s  equivalent i n  the  sense tha t  the  pro-form has 
the same semantic reading a s  the  antecedent verbal expressions. 
In  t h i s  context, do it can be said t o  'meanf torture.  In  
sum, when the  verb of the  second clause is  - not a pro-form (as 
i n  (3)) , an interpret ive pr inciple  such as (5) is  required. 
When t h i s  verbal expression .a i s a pro-form, as  i n  (61, a 
stronger sense of equivalence is  required, namely tha t  the  
pro-form has the  same reading as  some portion of the  ante- 
cedent sentence. 
2. An Interpret ive Principle: Pairing of Foci 
Let us begin with a simple example such a s  : 
s 
(7) sill d i l igent ly  studied fo r  t h e  exam, and ~6rn did it 
too. 
The in terpretat ion of the  second clause here is tha t  Sam a l so  
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di l igent ly  studied f o r  the  exam. The interest ing property of 
such sentences is tha t  the  pro-form - it (or do i t )  does not 
r e fe r  back t o  the  e n t i r e  antecedent sentence, but r e fe r s  ,only 
t o  a port ion of the  antecedent. The portion of the reading of 
the f i r s t  clause which ca r r i e s  over t o  the second clause i s  
just  tha t  portion which includes [...studied fo r  the  exam], 
and the  interpretat ion of the  pro-form of the second clause 
specif ical ly  excludes the  i t e m  B i l l .  The task before us is  
t o  determine what principles govern such exclusion of ante- 
cedent material : how do we know which portions of the  ante- 
cedent w i l l  carry over in to  the  reading of subsequent pro-forms, 
and which portions w i l l  be excluded? 
I propose tha t  the  answer i s  given t o  us by the  repre- 
sentation f o r  focus and presupposition w e  have already devel- 
oped on independent grounds. Thus, consider the  representa- 
t ion  of the  focus-presupposition re la t ions  f o r  the  f i r s t  
clause of (7), given sill a s  the focus i t e m :  
(8) [ [x - di l igent ly  studied fo r  the  exam], [q = Bi l l ]  ] 
Notice that  it is  the representation of the presupposition 
which forms precisely that  portion of the reading of the  f i r s t  
clause which ca r r i e s  over in to  the  reading of the  second 
\ 
clause. The claim here i s  tha t  the  second clause of (7) 
shares t h i s  presupposition of the  f i r s t  clause, i n  tha t  - the  
variable(s)  of t h i s  presupposition a r e  specified by the focus 
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item(s) of the  second clause. The focus item - ~hrn i n  t he  
second c lause  of (7) can specify t he  same var iab le  of the  
same presupposition which is speci f ied  by the  item sill i n  
t he  f i r s t  clause. I n  o ther  words, sentences with t he  pro- 
form do it function t o  provide new - f o c i  which specify var iables  
of presuppositions already present i n  previous clauses.  
A s  a f i r s t  approximation, then, we can represent  t he  
meaning of the  e n t i r e  sentence (7) a s  follows : 
(9) [ [x - d i l i gen t ly  s tudied f o r  t h e  exam], [z = B i l l ]  
and [x - = Sam] 
The expression [ x  - = Sam] represents  t he  semantic contr ibution 
of the  second c lause  of sentence (7) .  (We discuss i n  a moment 
the  non-focal items i n  such clauses,  and where they f i t  i n t o  
representat ions.  ) 
The essence of t h e  i n t e rp re t ive  p r inc ip l e  we propose is  
t h i s  : t he  p r inc ip le  p a i r s  f o c i  of two clauses with respect  t o  
one given presupposition, namely the  presupposition of t h e  
more f u l l y  speci f ied  clause. When we say tha t  t he  second 
c lause  of some sentence shares the  presupposition of the  
f i r s t  clause,  we mean t h a t  the  f o c i  i n  t he  second sentence 
specify t he  var iables  of t h i s  presupposition of the  f i r s t  
s 
sentence. In  t h i s  way, we can explain precise ly  which items 
of t he  f i r s t  sentence do not carry  over i n t o  the  in te rpre ta -  
t i o n  of t h e  pro-form of t he  second sentence: namely, a l l  f o c i  
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of t he  f i r s t  sentence. We w i l l  consider now more complicated 
examples, 
2.1.  Sentences With More Than One Focus. We have implied 
above t h a t  a sentence can have morerthan one focus const i tuent .  
This is, i n  f ac t ,  possible,  and shows up most c l e a r l y  i n  con- 
t r a s t i v e  sentences such a s  ( 6 ) ,  where there  a r e  four  d i s t i n c t -  
l y  perceived intonation peaks. Also, q u i t e  i n  Pine with what 
we have sa id  e a r l i e r ,  these  four const i tuents  a r e  in te rpre ted  
a s  representing novel information. Thus, t he  f i r s t  c lause  of 
(6) would have a representa t ion such a s :  
(11) [ [s t o r t u r e  y] , [x - = Russians] and [y = I t a l i a n s ]  ] 
Both focus const i tuents  of t he  f i r s t  c lause  a r e  replaced by 
var iables ,  r e su l t i ng  i n  a representat ion such a s  (11). 
In order t o  derive t h e  reading of t he  second clause of 
(61, the  var iables  i n  t he  presupposition of the  f i r s t  c lause  
a r e  now speci f ied  a s  those foca l  items which a r e  present  i n  
the  surface  form of t he  second clause. The following speci- 
f i ca t i ons  a r e  set up: 
(12) [ [x = Americans] and [E = Albanian sp ies ]  ] 
Thus, t he  representat ion f o r  the  e n t i r e  sentence would look 
\ 
l i k e  : 
(13) [ [X - t o r t u r e  X I ,  [ [z = Russians] and [y = I t a l i a n  
sp ies ]  ]  and [ [L = Americans] and [l = Albanian sp ies ]  ] j 
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Each s e t  of f o c i  is  represented as  a conjunction, and these  
two conjunctions a r e  i n  t u rn  conjoined (since t h e  sentence it- 
s e l f  contains the  conjunction nd) . I n  representat ions such 
as  (131, w e  i n t e rp re t  the  symbol [ , I  a s  binding the  presup- 
posi t ion t o  - both s e t s  of foc i .  
2 .2 .  shift in^ Intonation Centers. I f  what we have sa id  
so f a r  i s  true,  then it should be t h e  case t h a t  s h i f t i n g  the  
intonation center  i n  t he  f i r s t  c lause  changes t h e  readings 
both i n  t he  f i r s t  c lause  and second clause. This i s  i n  f a c t  
the  case. Consider examples such a s  t h e  following: 
(14) a.  The RUSSIANS beat t he  Czechs but i t  wouldn't have 
happened wi th  t he  BOLES. 
b. The Russians beat t he  CZECHS but i t  wouldn't have 
happened with the  POLES. 
In  (14a) t he  i n t e rp re t a t i on  of the  second clause i s  t h a t  t he  
Poles would not have beaten the  Czechs. In ( 1 4 b ) ,  however, 
the  i n t e rp re t a t i on  i s  t h a t  the  Russians would not have beaten 
the  Poles. This follows from the  f a c t  t ha t  the  pai r ing of 
f o c i  i n  (14) d i f f e r s :  i n  (14a) t h e  pairing i s  Russians-Poles, . 
and i n  (14b) t h e  pa i r ing  is Czechs-Boles. The focus-presuppo- 
'. 
s i t i o n  r e l a t i ons  i n  t he  f i r s t  clauses i n  each case d i f f e r ,  as  
the  following representa t ion shows: 
(15) a. [ [z beat t h e  Czechs'], [x - = t h e  Russians] '] 
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(15) b. [ [The Russians beat - x], [x - = the Czechs] ] 
Given that the second clause in sentences such as (14) shares 
the presupposition of the first clause, the focal item POLES 
in the second clause specifies either the variable in (15a) 
or the variable in (15b), depending on the intonation of the 
first cla~se. Hence, the ambiguity of interpretation of the 
second clause. 
Similarly, consider cases in which the intonation center 
is invariant (and comes on the final constituent of the sen- 
tence), but where optional syntactic transformations have 
applied to alter surface constituent structure: 
(16) a. The Russians beat the CZECHS, but it wouldn't 
have happened with the POLES. 
b. The Czechs were beaten by the RUSSIANS, but it 
wouldn't have happened with the POLES. 
The second clause in (16a) has the interpretation that the 
Russians wouldn't have beaten the Poles. However, in (16b) 
the interpretation is that the Poles wouidn't have beaten the 
Czechs. The representations assigned to the first clauses of 
(16) would be es follows: 
(17) a.  [ [The Russians beat - x], [x - = the Czechs] 1 
\ 
b. [ [z beat the Czechs], [x - = the Russians] ] 
Once again, the focal item of the second clause 1:.? each case 
specifies either the variable in (17a) or in (17b), depending 
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on which presupposition is determined by the  intonation pat -  
t e r n  of t he  f i r s t  clause. 
2.3. Combining Presuppositions. Consider for a moment 
j u s t  t he  second c lause  i n  sentences such a s  (16) : 
(18) . . . it wouldn't have happened t o  t he  POLES. 
We have already discussed the  focus const i tuent  of t h i s  clause,  
POLES, noting tha t  it spec i f ies  t he  var iab le  of t he  presuppo- 
s i t i o n  of the  f i r s t  clause.  Thus, p a r t  of the  reading of t h i s  
clause i s  the  expression: 
(19 )  [z = POLES] 
Leaving asi.de t h e  focus, what about t he  r e s t  of t he  ma-  
t e r i a l  i n  a clause such as  (h8)? Clearly the  nonfocal ma- 
terial i n  (18) has a semantic in te rpre ta t ion ,  and makes a 
semantic contr ibut ion t o  the  sentence a s  a w h ~ l e  ( i . e .  t o  t h e  
t o t a l  reading of both clauses) .  In f a c t ,  t he  clause i n  (18) 
i s  an independent sentence i t s e l f ,  and has i t s  own focus-pre- 
supposition re la t ions ,  which can be represented a s  follows : 
(20) [ [ it wouldn't have happened t o  y] , [y = POLES] ] 
The property of t h i s  pa r t i cu l a r  reading i s  t ha t  it contains , 
t he  pro-form it, an element which is  semantically empty 
, 
(though it  does have a minimal s e t  of semantic fea tures  t o  
d is t inguish  i t  from other  pro-forms). 
The claim here i s  t h a t  t h i s  pro-form i s  assigned a 
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semantic reading, namely, t he  presupposition of t h e  f i r s t  
clause, Thus, taking (Ma),  t h e  presupposition of t he  f i r s t  
clause, a s  shown i n  (17a), is  a s  follows: 
(21) [ t h e  Russians beat 53 
This por t ion of the  reading of t he  f i r s t  clause i s  then as-  
signed a s  t he  reading of t h e  pro-form i n  t he  second clause. 
This operation i s  i n  essence a replacement of t h e  pro-form by 
the  presupposition of t h e  previous clause. The representat ion 
of (20), with t h e  pro-fom assigned a semantic in te rpre ta -  
t ion,  would then look look l i ke :  
(22) [ [ [ t h e  Russians beat g] wouldn't have happened 
t o  1 1 ,  [y = POLES] ] 
The foca l  item POLES not 05iy spec i f ies  t h e  var iab le  of t h e  
presupposition of the  second clause, but a l s o  spec i f ies  t h e  
var iable  of t h e  presupposition of the  f i r s t  clause, which has 
been car r ied  over t o  t he  second clause. Thus, an addi t ional  
expression must be added t o  (22) t o  ind ica te  t h i s :  
(23)  [ [ [ t he  Russians beat  51 wouldn't have happened 
to y3, [ [X = POLES] and [x = POLES] ] ] 
Thus, t he  focus is a conjunction of speci f ica t ions ,  and indi-  - 
ca tes  t h a t  POLES functions a s  a spec i f ica t ion  within i t s  own 
\ 
clause, a s  well  a s  with respect  t o  the  presupposition of t h e  
f i r s t  clause.  
To sum up what w e  have sa id  s o  f a r ,  w e  begin by considering 
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sentences such as  (7).  It i s  argued t h a t  i n  such sentences, 
t he  presence of t h e  anaphoric element - it (or do i t )  i n  t he  
second clause i s  in te rpre ted  a s  an ind ica tor  t h a t  t he  foci11 
items of t he  second c lause  a r e  t o  be in terpre ted a s  speeifb-  
ca t ions  of t h e  var iab les  of t he  presupposition of t he  f i r s t  
clause.  Where t he re  i s  more than one foca l  item i n  each 
clause,  then there  i s  more than one var iab le  which i s  speci-  
f i ed .  The i n t e rp re t a t i on  of clauses containing pro-forms in- 
volves a blending of t h e  presupposition of the  f i r s t  c lause  
wi th  t he  presupposition of t he  second c lause  ( i . e .  t h e  pro- 
form i t e m  i n  the  presupposition of t h e  second c lause  i s  re- 
placed by the  presupposition of t he  f irst  clause).  
This l a s t  point  should be made a bit more precise.  It 
i s  only these por t ions  of the  presupposition of t he  f i r s t  
c lause  which a r e  d i s t i n c t  f r m  the  presupposition of t he  
second clause which replace the  pro-form item. Consider, f o r  
example, a sentence such a s :  
(24) sill bel ieves  t h a t  the  world i s  f l a t ,  but S&m 
doesn't  be l ieve  it ,  
The focus-presupposition r e l a t i ons  of the second clause,  wi th  * 
Sam taken as the  focus, a r e  represented a s  follows: 
-
'. 
(25) [ [x - believes i t] ,  [MEG Tx ,. - = Sam] ] ] 
where the scope of negation goes wtth the  focus. In order  t o  
ass ign a reading t o  the empty pro-form element &, we replace 
it by the  presupposition of t he  f i r s t  clause. The focus- 
presupposition r e l a t i ons  of the  f i r s t  c! suse a r e :  
(26) [ [x - believes [ t h a t  t he  world i s  f l a t ]  1, [ x  - = . B i l l ]  j 
and thus t h e  expression [s - believes tha t  t h e  world i s  f l a z ]  
should replace  t he  pro-form it i n  (25). However, t he  presup- 
posi t ions  of both clauses conta in  the  phrase x believeis, and 
s ince  t h i s  phrase i n  both clauses i s  iden t ica l ,  i t  'cancels 
out1 when the presupposition of t he  f isst c lause  i s  car r ied  
out t o  t h e  second clause. Only t he  por t ion [ t h a t  t he  w ~ r l d  
is  f l a t ]  replaces the pro-form i n  (25), and t h i s  i s  the  
reading assigned t o  t he  pro-form i t e m .  When t h i s  expression 
replaces t h e  pro-form item of (25) ,  we derive t he  following 
representa t ion f o r  the  second c lause  of (24) : 
(27) [ [H believes [ t h a t  the world i s  f l a t ]  1, [NEG [ x  - = 
Sam] ] 
Thus, i f  the presupposition of t he  f i r s t  sentence happens t o  
contain mater ia l  which is  iden t i ca l  with mater ia l  of t he  pre-  
supposition of the  second sentence, it i s  canceled out when 
i t  replaces t he  pro-fonn of the  presupposition of the  second 
sentence, 
2.4. F i l t e r ing  Deviant Cases. The i n t e rp re t ive  p r inc i -  
p l e  we have been developing operates i n  cases where t he re  i s  
a pa i r ing  of foci ,  t h a t  i s  t o  say, cases i n  which in tonat ion 
peaks mark items i n  two clauses such tha t  these items a r e  
interchangeable a s  given specifications f o r  a variable i n  a 
given presupposition. Let us now consider some of the  c.&- 
di t ions  under which two clauses can fa:l t o  "share" presup- 
positions. 
Consider, f i r s t  of a l l ,  sentences such as:  
(28) * ~ 6 h n  read a book, but it wasn't done t o  ~i11. 
The intonation peaks mark off the  MPs John and B i l l  i n  the  
two clauses, however, these a r e  not paired foci .  The reason 
fo r  t h i s  is  that  s ince they do not f u l f i l l  the  same grammati- 
c a l  function, they cannot be interchangeable a s  specifications 
of the same var iable  i n  a given presupposition. To see th i s ,  
consider t h e  f ocus-presupposition rePat ions cf the two clauses 
of (28) : 
(29) a. [ [y read a book], [y = John] ] 
b. [ [it  wasn't done t o  - x], [& = Bi l l ]  ] 
The item - John specif ies  a variable which represents an item 
which has the function of semantic agent, while the  item - B i l l  
specif ies  a var iable  which has a non-agentive function. 
Recall that  the  notation w e  have been using is insuf- 
f i c i e n t l y  precise i n  the sense tha t  i n  an expl ic i t  represen- 
\ 
t a t ion  variables representing d i s t i n c t  semantic functions 
should themselves be formally d i s t inc t .  (We have simply used 
a s ingle  variable, 5, fo r  convenience alone.) Thus, the  focus 
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expressions i n  ( 2 9 )  should be expl ic i t  enough t o  indicate tha t  
they d i f f e r  as  t o  what s o r t  of variable i s  being specified. 
Given such an expl ic i t  representation, one can t e l l  by in- 
spection tha t  the  foc i  of (28) do not pair ,  s ince the repre- 
sentations of ( 2 9 )  indicate tha t  they f u l f i l l  d i s t i n c t  s e n -  
t i c  functions, and thus they a r e  not interchangeable. This 
predicts  correct ly  tha t  t h e  sentences of (28) do not share 
presuppositions, and the pro-form of the  second clause remains 
m i n t  erpret  ed. 
Another condition under which two clauses can f a i l  t o  
share a presupposition has to do with the  more general pro- 
perty of the  f i l t e r i n g  function of semantic rules,  ra ther  
than with any property of pairing. Consider, fo r  example, a 
sentence suck as :  
(30) ~ 6 h n  a t e  hear t i ly  and 1 4 k y  did it t o  B i l l .  
The intonation peaks mark off the  NPs -- John and Mary, both 
function as seinantic agents, and let us assume f o r  the sake of 
argument tha t  they a r e  ident ica l  i n  semantic function. The 
focus-presupposition re la t ions  of both clauses would be re- 
presented a s :  
(31) a. [ [z a t e  hear t i ly] ,  [x - = John] ] 
\ 
b. [ [z did it t o  B i l l ] ,  [x  - = Mary] ] 
I f  the  two foc i  f u l f i l l  t he  same grammatical function, then 
Mary is a possible specification f o r  the  variable of tb.e 
presupposition of the f i r s t  clause. Hawever, not ice  t h a t  
when the  presupposition of the f i r s t  clause is associated 
with the  pro-form of the  second clause, we derive the  follow- 
ing expression : 
( 3 2 )  [ [x - did [x  - a t e  hear t i ly]  t o  B i l l ] ,  [x = Mary] ] 
The presupposition expression is semantically anomalous, i n  
the  sense tha t  sentences such as:  
(33) What Mary did t o  B i l l  was eat  hear t i ly .  
are anomalous, Sentences such a s  (30) are therefore marked 
as semantically anomPous. 
2.5. Cases With No Pairing of Foci. If  we examine the  
interpretat ion a£ anaphoric it, we see t ha t  there  is  a dis-  
t i n c t  difference i n  interpretat ion between those cases i n  
which there  is pairing and those cases i n  which there  is  no 
pairing, When f o c i  a r e  paired, then only the presupposition 
of the  previous clause is assigned a s  the reading of it; how- 
ever, when there  is  no pairing of foci ,  - it re fe r s  t o  the 
en t i r e  reading of the  previous sentence (i. e. includes i n  i t s  
interpretat ion both the  presupposition - and foc i  of the  pre- . 
vious sentence). 
\ 
Consider an example such as:  
( 3 4 )  Naked Came the Stranger was even taken seriously by 
the c r i t i c s ,  but one can hardly believe it. 
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The in terpretat ion of the  second clause here i s  tha t  one can 
hardly believe tha t  - NCS was even taken seriously by the  c r i -  
t i c s .  In other words, the interpretat ion of - it i n  f ac t  - in- 
eludes the  focus expression ( i .  e. derived scope of even) i n  
i ts  interpre.:ation. 
In the  previous cases w e  have discussed, the  f o c i  of 
previous clauses a r e  precisely those elements which a r e  - ex- 
eluded. However, t h e  difference, as  we see, i s  tha t  i n  (34) 
there  is no pairing of foc i  ( in  our technical sense). Thus, 
given the focus taken seriously by the c r i t i c s  i n  the f i r s t  
clause, there  i s  no presupposition of t h i s  clause such tha t  
the  variables can be specified by focal  items i n  the second 
clause. If the  derived verb phrase is focus, the  presuppo- 
s i t i o n  would be: 
(35) [Naked Came the  Stranger was - x] 
I f  the  i t e m  believe i n  the  second clause is  the  focus of tha t  
clause, it cannot specify the variable of the  presupposition 
(35), since it  is a predicate which cannot f i l l  the  posit ion 
represented by the variable. Further, there  i s  no other pair-  
ing, i n  the  sense we have discussed. 
We s h a l l  say, then, tha t  when there i s  no pairing of 
$ 
foci,  the  anaphoric items such as - it include i n  t h e i r  readings 
not only presuppositions from previous clauses, but i n  fac t  
the t o t a l  semantic reading of previous clauses. Thus, the  
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representation of it i n  (34) is  the  e n t i r e  semantic reading 
of the  f i r s t  clause. 
Not ice, incidentally, tha t  sentences such as  (34) provide 
evidence tha t  pro-forms such as - it include i n  t h e i r  interpre- 
t a t ion  not only the  deep s t ruc ture  reading of previous clauses, 
but aspects of the  reading of previous clauses determined by 
the  surface s t ructures  of such clauses ( i .  e .  scope of 'even'). 
T o  take another case analogous t o  ( 3 4 ) ,  consider the  sen- 
tence: 
(36) B i l l  believes tha t  the  world i s  flAt, but Sam 
doesn't belteve it. 
This sentence is  ident ica l  t o  (24) except tha t  here the  into- 
nation peaks f a l l  a t  the  end of each clause. The difference 
i n  interpretat ion between (36) and (24) i s  s ignif icant ,  how- 
ever. In (36) the  second clause means tha t  Sam doesn't be- 
l ieve that  B i l l  believes tha t  the  world is  f l a t .  Here, again, 
there i s  no pairing of foc i ;  hence, no foc i  of t h e  previous 
2 
clause a r e  excluded. The t o t a l  reading of the  previous 
clause i s  assigned a s  the  reading of the  pro-form - it. 
In  a recent paper, J.W. Poss [I9691 has argued agairist 
a theory of the  general s o r t  proposed above, and instead main- 
t a ins  tha t  the  data under consideration is  t o  be handled trans- 
formationally, by a ru le  known as - S-Deletion. We w i l l  con- 
s ider  h i s  arguments here, and we hope t o  show tha t  Ross's ob- 
jections can be m e t ,  and fur ther ,  t ha t  h i s  proposed solutions 
a re  inadequate as they stand. 
3.1. ' Sluicing'. Ross's chain of argumentation is  
b r i e f ly  as  follows. He considers the  r e l a t ion  between sen- 
tences such as  the  following: 
(37) a. They a r e  going t o  inv i t e  sameone, but I don't 
know who they a r e  going t o  invi te .  
b. They are going t o  inv i t e  someone, but I don't 
know &. 
Ross r e fe r s  t o  sentences such as (37b) as  sluiced sentences; 
that  is, sentences which have undergone a rule which he terms 
'Sluicing', the  e f fec t  of which is  t o  delete  a l l  material from ' 
an embedded question except the  preposed WH word, under ident i -  
% 
ty  with material i n  an antecedent embedded question, Hence, 
(37a) is  mapped onto (37b). 
Ross argues that  s luic ing m u s t  be carr ied out by a 
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s y n t a c t i c  dele t ion rule, and he argues agains t  what he terrns 
an  ' i n t e rp re t ive '  theory for such sentences. On Ross' analy- 
s i s ,  an ' i n t e rp re t ive  theory' would pos i t  a s  the underlying 
form of t h e  second c lause  of (37b) the  following: 
I 1 
knuw who 
In  other  words, the  i n t e rp re t ive  theory which Ross s e t s  up i s  
one which simply pos i t s  t he  surface  form of such sentences as 
t he  underlying form, and would have t o  provide an in te rpre ta -  
t i o n  f o r  such sentences i n  some manner. 
Ross then provides a s e r i e s  of arguments against  such an 
in t e rp re t ive  theory, largely  on the  grounds tha t  ser ious  syn- 
t a c t i c  problems would a r i s e .  The arguments center  around the  
fac t  t h a t  an i n t e rp re t ive  theory which pos i t s  (38) does not 
recognize the  WH-word w& as  a remnant of an embedded clause, 
and Ross shows t h a t  the syntax of sentences such as  (37b) re-  
quires  t h a t  the re  be a f u l l  c lause  a t  the pre-surface leve l .  
. 
We w i l l  consider b r i e f l y  t he  main arguments which Ross pre- 
sen ts .  t 
3.1.1. Syntact ic  Arguments i n  Favor of Sluicinq. Tke 
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f i r s t  argument presented has t o  do with the  d i f f i cu l ty  of ac- 
counting for  case marking i f  sluiced clauses a r e  generated i n  
surface form: 
(39) a. They w i l l  i nv i t e  someone, but I donf t know whom. 
b. They said someone w i l l  come, but I don't  know who. -
Given that  the sluiced clause would be represented by (38) i n  
the proposed interpret ive theory, it would be qu i t e  compli- 
cated t o  s t a t e  the  conditions under which the WH-word could 
be marked a s  accusative. However, i n  Ross's theory, the  s t a t e -  
ment of case marking i s  qui te  general, since sentences such 
a s  (39) derive from f u l l e r  forms: 
(40) a. They w i l l  i nv i t e  someone, but I don't know 
[Q--they w i l l  i nv i t e  who] -
b. They sa id  someone w i l l  come, but I don't know 
[Q--w& w i l l  come] 
Since the WH-s~rd ~ r i g i n a t e s  a s  an object i n  (40a) but a sub- 
j ect  i n  (40b), it i s  marked as accusative in  (40a) ,  and hence 
the surface form i n  (39a). 
Ross considers next sentences such as the following: 
(41) M e  w i l l  give us some problems on the  t e s t ,  but which 
problems i s n ' t  c lear .  
\ 
If the  sluiced clause is generated i n  surface form, there  is  
no non-ad-hoe way t o  account f o r  the fac t  tha t  the  superf ic ia l  
subject, which problems, which is marked as plural ,  does not 
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cause p lura l  verb agreement; rather, there  i s  singular verb 
agreement. This is not a problem i n  ROSS'S theory s ince t h e  
WH-word i s  a remnant of a f u l l  clause, and embedded clauses 
always cause singular verb agreement: 
(42) H e  w i l l .  give us some problems on the  t e s t ,  but 
[QL-he w i l l  give us which problems] i s n ' t  c lear .  
The general form of the  f i r s t  two arguments is adopted 
for t he  remainder of the  examples Ross presents, and we P i s t  
here the  more important ones : 
(43) She's eating same apples, but I wo~der  how many 
apples. 
(44) a. We know t h a t  he was eating, but what i s n ' t  c lear .  
b. We know t h a t  he was eating but it i s n ' t  c l ea r  
what. 
Consider the  problems involved i f  it is  claimed tha t  the  
sluiced clauses i n  each case a re  generated in  surface form. 
I f ,  i n  (43), the sluiced clause I wonder how many apples is  
generated as such, with t h e  phrase how many apples a s  an ob- 
ject  NP, then how can one account for  the  f a c t  that  sentences 
such a s  the  following are impossible: 
(47) *I wonder apples. 
\ 
which a l so  has an object NP a f t e r  the  verb wonder. Clearly, 
wonder does not take object NPs of t h i s  so r t ,  and i n  a theory 
such as  Ross's t h i s  fact is explained by deriving (43) from: 
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(48) She's eating some apples, but I wonder [Q--she is 
eating how many apples] 
Finally, the  examples of (44) indicate tha t  the sluiced 
clauses can undergo extraposition. On ROSS'S theory t h i s  
would be accounted for, since a f u l l  embedded clause appears : 
(49) a. We know tha t  he was eating, but [ it  [Q--he was S 
eating whatIs ] i s n q  t clear.  
b. W e  know tha t  he was eating, but it i s n ' t  c lear  
S [Q--he was eating what] S 
I f  sluiced clauses such as those of (44) a r e  generated i n  
surface f om, however, s t a t ing  the  extraposit ion process 
would be qu i t e  complicated since, presumably, one would need 
t o  allow f o r  t h e  poss ib i l i ty  of NP extraposit ion a s  well as 
S extraposition. 3 
On the basis of f ac t s  such as t h e  ones w e  have discussed, 
Ross concludes tha t  sluiced clauses must be derived by a dele- 
t ion  transformation. Having established t h i s  point,  Ross then 
presents a transformational theory fo r  anaphoric expressions. 
3* 2. The Transformational Approach: Syntactic Deletion, , 
Ross begins by considering sentences of the  following so r t :  
s 
(50) Harold scratched h i s  a m  and so did I. 
This sentence, as Ross notes, can have e i the r  of the  follow- 
ing in te rpre ta t  ions : 
(51) a .  Haroldi scra tched h i s i  arm and I scra tched h i s i  j 
arm too. 
b. Haroldi scratched h i s i  a m  and I .  scratched my 
J j 
arm too.  
If sentence (50) is  t o  be derived by a d e l e t i o n  r u l e  which 
d e l e t e s  an occurrence of a verb phrase i n  t h e  second c l a u s e  
under i d e n t i t y  with a verb phrase i n  t h e  f i r s t  c lause ,  then, 
a s  Ross argues,  t h e r e  i s  a problem i n  der iv ing  (51b), s i n c e  
t h e  f i r s t  phrase i s  s c r a t c h  h i s ,  arm while  t h e  second verb 
A 
phrase i s  s c r a t c h  my, arm. 
J 
I n  order  t o  d e l e t e  t h e  second verb  phrase of (50b) 'under 
i d e n t i t y  with '  t h e  verb phrase i n  t h e  f i r s t  c lause ,  some con- 
d i t i o n  must be placed on t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of i d e n t i t y  which 
allows t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  pronouns i n  t h i s  case  t o  be over- 
looked. Ross proposes a not ion  of 's loppy i d e n t i t y '  which i s  
e s s e n t i a l l y  t h a t  given i n  Ross 11967, g5.2.3.11 : 
(52) "Consti tuents a r e  i d e n t i c a l  i f  they have t h e  same 
c o n s t i t u e n t  s t r u c t u r e  and a r e  i d e n t i c a l  morphme- 
for-morpheme, o r  i f  they d i f f e r  only a s  t o  pronouns, 
where t h e  pronouns i n  each of t h e  i d e n t i c a l  cons t i -  , 
t uen t s  a r e  commanded by sn tecedents  i n  t h e  non- 
\ 
i d e n t i c a l  por t ions  of t h e  phrase marker. " 
Thus, sloppy i d e n t i t y  means, e s s e n t i a l l y ,  t h a t  commanded pro- 
nouns a r e  overlooked i n  determining i d e n t i t y  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  
Ross then  argues t h a t  s i n c e  i t  i s  necessary t o  have a 
not ion  of sloppy i d e n t i t y ,  it i s  then  p o s s i b l e  t o  de r ive  sen- 
tences with anaphoric % by a r u l e  of S-Deletion, along w.ith 
properly cons t ruc ted  deep s t r u c t u r e s .  For example, i n  Ross's 
framework, a sentence such as  ( 6 )  would de r ive  from a s t r u c -  
ture  such a s  t h a t  shown i n  ( 5 3 ) .  The su r face  form of (6) can 
5 4 be derived by d e l e t i n g  S under sloppy i d e n t i t y  wi th  S : even 
though t h e  pronouns i n  t h e  two embedded sentences d i f f e r ,  they 
a r e  overlooked i n  determining i d e n t i t y  because they a r e  com- 
manded by antecedents.  




NP j NP 
I 
theyi V NP 
I I 
t o r t u r e  them 
I 
t o r t u r e  theml j 
A s  Ross po in t s  out ,  swR ev2dence is  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  
demonstrate t h a t  t h e  genera l  c l a s s  of sentences i l l u s t r a t e d  
by (6) - must be der ived by d e l e t i o n  r u l e s  which opera te  on a 
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condi t ion  of sloppy i d e n t i t y .  Showing t h a t  ( 6 )  - can de r ive  
from s t r u c t u r e s  such a s  (53) by a d e l e t i o n  r u l e  does not  show 
t h a t  such sentences cannot be accounted f o r  by i n t e r p r e t i v e  
p r i n c i p l e s .  I f  it can be shown t h a t  d e l e t i o n  under sloppy 
i d e n t i t y  must be involved i n  a t  l e a s t  some cases  ( i . e .  i f  arty 
theory must p o s i t  deleti .on under sloppy i d e n t i t y  for some 
case ) ,  then, s-ince d e l e t i o n  under sloppy i d e n t i t y  can geizer- 
a l i z e  t o  handle o t h e r  cases ,  it w i l l  be shown t h a t  i n t e r p r e -  
t i v e  r u l e s  a r e  superf luous and are not  required.  
Ross claims t o  have such a case  i n  t h e  following sen- 
tence:  
(54) (=ROSS'S (55))  Bob knows how t o  crane  h i s  neck, but 
I don ' t  know how. 
Ross argues t h ~ t  s i n c e  t h i s  sentence has a s l u i c e d  c lause ,  
and s i n c e  it has been shown t h a t  s l u i c e d  c lauses  must be de- 
r ived  by de le t ion ,  the re fo re ,  t h e  s lu iced  c l a u s e  of (54) de- 
r i v e s  by de le t ion .  Given t h e  meaning of the second c lause ,  
sloppy i d e n t i t y  must be involved ( i n  t h a t  t h e  de le ted  VP i s  
crane  my neck, which must d e l e t e  under i d e n t i t y  wi th  crane  
h i s  neck). 
Ross acknowledges t h a t  one could answer t h i s  argument 
$ 
by claiming t h a t  t h e  underlying VP i n  ques t ion  i s  a c t u a l l y  
c rane  neck, u n t i l  some pos t -de le t ion  s t a g e  a t  which t h e  pos- 
s e s s i v e  pronoun would be f i l l e d  in .  TRis would render  
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superfPuous the notion of sloppy iden t i ty .  He then argues 
t ha t  t h i s  is  not possible,  due t o  sentences such as the  
following : 
(55) (=Ross's ( 6 4 ) )  I know how t o  say I'm sorry,  and 
B i l l  knows how, too, 
The second clause has t he  in te rpre ta t ion ,   ill knows how t o  
say - he ' s  sorry. " This means t h a t  the  deleted VP t o  say he ' s  
sorry must have deleted under sloppy iden t i t y  with the VP i n  
the  f i r s t  clause. Ross argues t h a t  one cannot claim t h a t  t he  
personal pronoun does not appear i n  these  expressions, s ince,  
1 f [p. 2741, . . . it is obviotzsly unlikely t ha t  the  subject  of 
be sorry  does not appear i n  deep s t ruc ture ,  being f i l l e d  i n  
only later." Thus, de le t ion  under sloppy iden t i t y  i s  re-  
quired, and, s ince  such dele t ion can handle other  cases in- 
volving anaphorie express ions (given properly constructed 
de* s t ruc tu re  forms), i n t e rp re t ive  p r inc ip les  a r e  not 
needed. 4 9 5  
3 . 3 .  "Sloppy Identity".  The c ruc i a l  s tep  i n  Ross's 
argument i s  t o  e s t ab l i sh  t he  necessi ty of so-cal led 'sloppy . 
i den t i t y ' .  I f  t he re  i s  no notion of sloppy iden t i ty ,  then 
% 
the  r u l e  of - S-Deletion cannot be extended t o  cover sentences 
such a s  ( 6 ) ,  (since i n  s t ruc tures  such a s  (53), t h e  sentence 
t o  be deleted i s  not i den t i ca l  with the  sentence which i s  i t s  
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antecedent). Clearly, then, it is not merely t he  existence 
of syn tac t ic  dele t ion ru l e s  which poses a t h rea t  t o  an in t e r -  
p re t ive  theory, rather, the  existence of de le t ion  ru l e s  along 
with a notion of sloppy iden t i t y  renders i n t e rp re t ive  prin-  
c ip l e s  unnecessary. However, t h e  not ion of sloppy iden t i t y  
a s  Ross s t a t e s  i s  inadequate, i n  t h a t  it makes f a l s e  predic- 
t i ons  about t he  range of poss ible  ambiguities. 
3.3.1. Defects i n  the Notion of Sloppy Ident i ty .  F i r s t  
o f  a l l ,  w e  can note t ha t  sloppy iden t i t y  is  not necessary 
f o r  most of the  cases which Ross discusses.  Phrases such a s  
crane one's neck o r  sc ra tch  one's arm (which involve a d i s -  
t i n c t i o n  of a l i enab le l ina l ienab le  possession) can be derived 
from underlying s t ruc tures  of t he  form crane the  neck and 
scra tch the  arm. Hence, a sentence such a s  (50) could der ive  
from e i t h e r  of t he  following: 
(56) a. Harold scratched the  arm and I scratched the  arm. 
b. Harold scratched h i s  arm and I scratched h i s  arm. 
Deletion could operate i n  e i t h e r  case, and no notion of sloppy 
iden t i t y  would be necessary. . 
There is, by t he  way, pos i t ive  evidence f o r  representa- 
$ 
t ions  such as (56a). As Michael Helke has pointed out [per-  
sonal communication] t he  d e f i n i t e  a r t i c l e  appears i n  expres- 
s ions such a s :  
(57) He h i t  me on - the  arm. 
(58) It i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  crane - t he  neck. 
Thus, i n  a sentence such a s  (541, it i s  not necessary that '  
the re  be a notion of sloppy iden t i t y  involved. 
I f  we turn t o  (55), it seems t o  me t h a t  s imi la r  consider- 
a t ions  a r e  involved here. ?"ril~ sentence has only t he  i n t e r -  
p re ta t ion  t h a t  - B i l l  knows how t o  say & is  sorry,  and cannot 
have an in t e rp re t a t i on  such t h a t  B i l l  knows how t o  say 1 am 
sorry. I n  other  words, the expression t o  say one i s  so r ry  is  
an idiomatic re f lex iva  expression, with a meaning equivalent 
t o  a phrase such a s  t o  excuse oneself.  Hence, i t  may very 
well  be t ha t  t he  subject  of such a phrase, i f  it i s  i n  f a c t  
ref lexive ,  would not be speci f ied  a t  t he  deep s t ruc tu re  level .  
I have no wish t o  press t h i s  point,  however, s ince  it is 
poss ible  t o  f ind  cases where t he re  a r e  no idiomatic possessive 
expressions, and where t he re  a r e  ambiguities of t he  s o r t  Ross 
intends : 
(59) John knows why he is  s ick  but B i l l  doesn't  know why. 
This can have e i t h e r  of t he  following readings: 
(60) a.  Johni knows why hei i s  s ick  but B i l l .  doesn't  
3 
know why he is  sick.  j \ 
b. Johni knuws why hei i s  s ick  but B i l l .  doesn ' t  
3 
know why hei i s  sick.  
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Thus, i t  would appear t h a t  sloppy i d e n t i t y  i s  necessary f o r  
such cases .  Before d iscuss ing  t h e s e  p a r t i c u l a r  cases ,  however, 
l e t  us  consider  i n  what ways sloppy iclent i ty  f a i l s .  
Basical ly ,  t h e  not ion  of sloppy i d e n t i t y ,  as  Ross has  
s t a t e d  i t ,  is t o o  unconstrained. The not ion  a s  it s t ands  
p r e d i c t s  t h a t  the s o r t  of ambi.guity w e  have discussed should 
occur i n  a much wider range of cases than  it a c t u a l l y  does. 
Consider, f o r  example, a sentence such a s :  
(61) John feared  t h a t  he had cancer,  but I d i d n ' t  men- 
t i o n  it t o  Mary. 
This sentence i s  unambiguous, the second clause having t h e  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t h a t  I d i d  not  mention t o  Mary t h a t  John 
fea red  t h a t  he had cancer. However, on Ross's hypothesis,  
t h e r e  ought t o  be two f u r t h e r  readings,  namely, t h a t  I d id  
not  mention t o  Mary t h a t  - I had cancer;  or ,  t h a t  I d i d  not  men- 
t i o n  t o  Mary t h a t  & had cancer.  These two readings a re  pos- 
s i b l e  s i n c e  (61) can have t h e  following s o r t  of representa-  
tion i n  Ross ' s theory:  
I 
John, V 
/ \  
NF' 
I ' \ 4  
feared it *SI 1 / \ 5  /\ mention it S t o  NP 
5 The embedded sentence S can delete  under sloppy ident i ty  with 
4 S since the pronoun subjects (whether I o r  shqJ a r e  corn- 
-+ 
3 manded by antecedents i n  the  higher sentence S . Hence, 
delet ion under sloppy ident i ty  allows a greater  range of am- 
bigui t ies  than i s  actual ly  the case. 
Note, of course, tha t  as fur ther  NBs a r e  added t o  sen- 
tences such as ( 6 1 ) ,  the theory of sloppy ident i ty  predicts  
a proportionately increasing range sf ambiguities. Consider, 
t o r  example: 
(63) John feared that he had cancer, but I to ld  Mary not 
t o  mention it t o  J ~ h n ' s  mother OF John's father.  # 
Again, (63) is  unambiguous, and has the interpretat ion tha t  I 
5 
cautioned Mary not t o  mention tha t  John feared that  he had 
cancer. Ross's theory, however, predicts  tha t  ( 6 3 )  is  five 
ways ambiguous. It can have the  reading jus t  mentioned; it 
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can have the two further readings derivable i n  the  manner of 
(62) ( i .  e. where - I or  Mary command the  pronoun subject i n  the  
5 
embedded sentence S ); and f ina l ly ,  it can have the two addi- 
t i o n a l  readings derivable i n  case the NPs John's mother or  
~ o h n '  s fa ther  command anaphoric pronouns i n  the  subject  posi- 
5 t i on  of the  embedded sentence S . 
If we consider ways i n  which t o  constrain the notion of 
sloppy ident i ty ,  we a r e  led t o  a theory which makes use of t h e  
notion of pairing. If we examine what propert ies of (61) pre- 
clude the  ambiguities i n  question, we note tha t  i n  (61) there  
i s  - no pairing of foc i  i n  t h e  sense w e  have discussed. That 
is, there  a re  no pairings i n  (61) such tha t  the  focal  items 
i n  question are  interchangeable a s  specifications f o r  the  same 
semantic variable representing a given smant  i c  function. 
For example, even i f  the  NPs - John and - I were t o  form intona- 
t i o n  peaks, these items would not be paired foci ,  s ince each 
f u l f i l l s  a d i s t inc t  semantic function. The NP - I i n  the 
second clause has an agentive function, while the NP - John has 
a non-agentive function, hence, these two items do not speci- 
fy  the same semantic varia'bles. 
. 
A s  discussed i n  section 2.5., i n  cases i n  which there  i s  
$ 
no pair ing of foci ,  the  anaphoric expression i s  assigned the  
t o t a l  semantic reading sf the  previous clause ( i .e .  no ele-  
ments a r e  omitted). Thus, i n  (61) the  reading assigned t o  
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the  pro-form i s  the reading of the  e n t i r e  antecedent clause, 
i .e .  John feared tha t  he had cancer. This is, i n  fac t ,  t he  
6 
correct  reading i n  t h i s  case. The s ignif icant  property , in 
(61), then, ' is the  - lack of pairing. 
Sloppy ident i ty  would operate, of course, i n  just those 
cases where foc i  happen t o  be paired. In  order t o  constrain 
i t s  operation, - s m e  equivalent of a pair ing pr inciple  would 
have t o  be bu i l t  in. Otherwise, there  would be no way t o  
account f o r . p a i r s  such as  those of (14) and (16), a s  well as  
the  difference between (24) and (36). 
4. An Interpret ive Approach t o  Pronoun Ambiguities 
To return now t o  cases such as  (59), w e  ask huw these 
a r e  t o  be accounted f o r  within the  framework we propose ((59) 
is repeated here as (64)) : 
(64) John knows why he i s  sick but B i l ? .  doesn't know why. 
The most obvious condttion which we can impose i s  the follow- , 
ing : 
% 
(65) If some item i s  chosen as focus and is replaced by 
a variable i n  the semantic reading, then a l l  follow- 
ing pronominal references t o  the focus i t e m  can a l so  
be replaced by var iables .  
Thus, i n  (64), i f  t he  item - John is  chosen a s  focus, and is  
replaced by a variable,  then t h e  fol1.awing pronominal ref.er- 
ence he can optionally be replaced by a va r i ab l e  a s  w e l l .  
Thus, e i t h e r  of t h e  presuppositions, [x - s a i d  t h a t  hei was 
s ick]  o r  [x - sa id  t ha t  q w a s  s i ck ]  can be formed. The focus 
of t he  second clause, B i l l ,  can thus f i l l  e i t h e r  t h e  s ing l e  
var iable  posi t ion,  or  both va r i ab l e  posi t ions ,  
4.1. Intonation and Prorioun Ambiguities. I should point  
out here, however, t h a t  a t  l e a s t  f o r  my own speech intona- 
t i ona l  phenomena are,  again, relevant  t o  t he  determination of 
the  presuppositions i n  question. Consider t h e  f u l l y  speci f ied  
paraphrase form of (64); it can have e i t h e r  of t h e  following 
intonation pa t te rns  : 
(66) a.  ~ 6 h n  knows why h& i s  s ick  but sill doesn't  know 
why he i s  s ick .  
b. ~ 6 h n  knows why hZ is sick but ~i11 doesn't  know 
why hZ i s  s ick .  
(66a) has t h e  i n t e rp re t a t i on  i n  which B i l l  doesn't  know why 
, 
B i l l  i s  s ick ,  while (66b) has  t he  i n t e rp re t a t i on  tha t  B i l l  
\ 
doesn't know why John is s ick .  Where t h e  personal pronoun - he  
r e f e r s  t o  d i s t i n c t  persons, then it has stress i n  each ease;  
where t h e  personal pronoun r e f e r s  t o  the  same person, it i s  
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unstressed i n  both cases. 
This stress pat tern i s  brought out even more c l ea r ly  i n  
sentences such a s  : 
(67) a. ~ 6 h n  knows why h& is s ick but Bl6ry doesn't know 
why sh& i s  sick. 
b. ~ 6 h n  knows why h5 is sick but M6ry doesn't know 
why hS is  sick. 
Even thoug3 there  could be no chance of confusion as t o  the  
reference of the personal pronoun, t h e  s t r e s s  pat terns  on 
such sentences is s t i l l  obligatory. When we consider the  re- 
duced forms, as with (64) ,  we note tha t  the  same pa t te rn  is  
present. Consider, f o r  example: 
(68) a. ~ b h n  knows why h6 is s ick but l&ry doesn't know 
why. 
b. ~ 6 h n  knows why h5 is sick but &ry doesn't know 
why. 
The f i r s t  sentence, (68a) ,  has t h e  interpretat ion tha t  Mary 
doesn't know why Mary is  sick, while the  second sentence has 
the  interpretat ion tha t  Mary doesn't know why John is  sick. 
The focus-presupposition re la t ions  which would be assigned 
t o  such sentences would be derived by replacing s t ressed items 
$ 
with variables, while leaving unstressed items in tac t  : 
(69)  a. [ [X  knms why y is s ick]  , [?Johni I and [ yahei I I 
b. [ [ x  - knows why hei is  sick], [x=Johni] - ] 
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Taking Mary a s  t h e  focus of t h e  second clause, it specif ies  
e i the r  both variables i n  (69a), o r  it specif ies  jus t  one 
var iable  i n  (69b). Hence, there  is a dval reading of suck 
sentences. 
The same consideratians hold f o r  previous examples w e  
have discussed. For example, note the intonation pat tern on 
sentences such as:  
(70) a. ~ 6 h n  scratched his arm and - f scratched rn? arm. 
b. ~ 6 h n  scratched hIs  arm and - 1 scratched hTs arm. 
This same pat tern ca r r i e s  over i n  sentences such a s :  
(71) a. ~ 6 h n  scratched h i s  a m  and - 3 did too. 
b. ~ b h n  scratched hZs arm and - f did too. 
In one case, the  presupposition of the  f i r s t  clause contains 
two var iable  posit ions t o  be specified, while i n  the other 
case the  presupposition contains only one variable posit ion 
t o  be specified. 
Finally, w e  can take a more complicated example, such as :  
(72) a. ~ 6 h n  thinks tha t  h i s  fa ther  hates h h  and ~ S r y  
thinks tha t  h&r father  hates h&r. 
b. 36hn thinks tha t  h'is fa ther  hates hum and M&ry , 
thinks tha t  h 3  fa ther  hates h'kn, 
$ 
Compare the sentences of (72) with those of (73) : 
(73) a. ~ 6 h n  thinks tha t  h i s  fa ther  hates h h  and P6ry 
does too. 
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(73) b. ~ 6 h n  thinks tha t  hXs fa ther  hates h b  and M&ry 
does too. 
Once agatn, when intonation peaks mark off more than one .focus, 
then the presupposition contains more than one var iable  posi- 
t i on  which can be f i l l e d  by the  focus of the  second sentence. 
For such eases, we need t o  modify condition (65) a s  fol-  
lows (which., by t h e  way, is  required i n  a_ny theory) : 
(74) Given an antecedent and a s t r i n g  of pronominal 
forms which are coreferent ia l  with tha t  antecedent, 
i f  one of the  pronominal foms  is  taken as  a focus 
and is  replaced by a var iable  i n  the reading, then 
a l l  t he  pronominal fonns must be replaced by varf- 
-
ables, whether these have intonation peaks o r  not. 
This is simply t o  express the f ac t  tha t  there a r e  no readings 
f o r  sentences such as  (73a) i n  which t h e  second clause could 
mean samething l ike ,  "Mary thinks tha t  Maryis fa ther  hares 
.John." Thus, with respect t o  an antecedent and subsequent 
pronominal references t o  t h i s  antecedent, the  theory needs an 
" a l l  or none" condition with respest t o  the pronominal refer-  
ences: e i the r  a11 are pulled out and replaced by variables, 
o r  none are. 
4.1.1. Perceptual Cues f o r  Intonation Peaks. In  discus- 
sing intonational phenomena and the  r o l e  which intonation 
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plays i n  marking foci ,  it must be s t ressed tha t  the! intona- 
t ion  peaks on the  pronouns i n  sentences w e  have been dfscus- 
sing need - not be perceived a s  loud contrast ive s t r e s s  peaks. 
To es tab l i sh  a pronominal item as  focal  it is suf f ic ien t  tha t  
the  i t e m  be r e l a t ive ly  more prominent than the  surrounding 
material, and, i n  fac t ,  s t r e s s  on pronouns (as i n  (71a)) is 
jus t  heavy enough t o  d i f f e ren t i a t e  them minimally from the  
unstressed, pro-c l i t fc  pronominal forms (as i n  (71b)). 
It is  reasonable t o  assume tha t  intonation peaks a r e  per- 
ceived re l a t ive  t o  the  pi tch levels  of surrounding material,  
and thus an intonation peak, i n  t h i s  sense, need not repre- 
sent  heavy s t r e s s ,  i n  some absolute sense. It seems a l so  
tha t  there  a r e  other cues i n  the  speech signal  which indicate 
the  intonational  s t ruc ture  of a sentence. Consider i n  t h i s  
regard a f ac t  pointed out by James McCawley [MZT lecture,  
spring, 19701 tha t  i n  unstressed th i rd  person pronouns, the  
i n i t i a l  - h drops, while i n  stressed pronouns it does not. 
Thus, i n  (71b) the  pronoun & i s  heard as [ iz ] ,  while i n  
(71a) t h e  pronoun is heard as  [hiz]. This, then, functions 
as  a cue tha t  the  pronoun is unstressed i n  one case, while 
s t ressed i n  the  other, even though there  may not be a per- 
$ 
cetved s t r e s s  peak an t he  pronoun i n  (71a). 
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4.2. Cases with Two or More Anaphoric Expressions. In- 
te res t ing  confirmation f o r  the  in te rpre t ive  approach is  found 
i n  a s1.ass of sentences i n  which there  is more than one a.na- 
phoric expression. For example, consider the following case 
[examples of t h i s  general form a r e  due t o  Edward Whitten, i n  
personal communication t o  Morris Halle] : 
(75) John always t e l l s  people t h a t  he is sick, and a l -  
though Max does it also, Mary doesn' t do it. 
The interpretat ion of the  two e l l i p t i c a l  clauses is e i the r  
(a) although Max a l so  always tel ls  people tha t  John is  sick, 
Mary doesn't t e l l  people tha t  John is sick, or, (b) although 
Max a l so  always t e l l s  people tha t  he (Max) is sick, Mary 
doesnt t t e l l  people that she (Mary) is sick. In  other words, 
each addit ional  anaphoric clause has the  understood pronomi- 
nal references coreferent ia l  with i t s  a ~ n  surface subject ,  o r  
coreferent ia l  with t h e  subject of the i n i t i a l  clause i n  the  
ser ies  of clauses which make up the  whole sentence. Thus, 
fo r  example, the  final clause of (75) cannot have the  in te r -  
pretatiorr tha t  Mary doesn't t e l l  p s q l e  tha t  = is sick. 
This s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  is predicted by the  in te rpre t ive  . 
theory, fo r  the  following; reasons. The i n i t i a l  clause of (751, 
\ 
i n  a manner we have already discussed, receives e i the r  ~f the  
following representat ions : 
(76) a. [?I always te l ls  people that hei is sick] 
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(76) b. [g always tel ls  people tha t  - x i s  s ick]  
The variables i n  these presuppositions a r e  specified by the  
focal  items i n  the  subsequent anaphoric clauses. Thus, i f  
presupposition (76a) is chosen, then a l l  following focal  
items specify jus t  the  subject variable;  hence, f o r  the  
second clause we form [Max t e l l s  people t h a t  hei i s  sick], j 
and fo r  the  th i rd  clause w e  form [Maryk doesn't t e l l  people 
tha t  hei is  sick].  I f  presupposition (76b) is chosen, then 
for the  second clause we form [Max t e l l s  people t ha t  Max j j 
is sick], and fo r  the  th i rd  clause we form [Ma- doesn't 
t e l l  people tha t  Maryk i s  sick].  
In  other words, i n  the  system w e  have proposed, it is 
t he  case tha t  only the f i r s t  clause determines the form of 
the  presuppositions, because t he  other following clauses are 
generated with anaphoric expressions and with the  fu l ly  
specified set of antecedents and pronouns. Since the  preeup- 
posit ions of the  f i r s t  clause a r e  carr ied over i n t o  the fo l -  
lowing clauses, it simply follows tha t  each addit ional  clause 
w i l l  e i the r  have pronominal references coreferent ia l  with i t s  
own subject, - or  coreferentiall with j u s t  the  subject of the  
i n i t i a l  clause, For example, it is impossible t o  derive the  
\ 
reading [Maryk doesn't t e l l  people tha t  Max is sick] because 3 
there  is no presupposition [z tells people tha t  Max is  sick]. 3 
In a theory with deletion under sloppy identi ty,  however, 
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it is possible t o  derive the  impossible reading. Consider 
t h e  following representations : 
(77) a. Clause 1: [Johni te l ls  people [hei is s ick]  ] 
b. Clause 2: [Max tells people [he is sick] ] j 3 
c. Clause 3: [Maryk doesn't t e l l  people [he is j 
sick] ] 
Deletion can occur i n  Clause 2 ( t o  produce Max does it), 
since the  cmmanded pronoun can be overlooked. Deletion 
occurs i n  Clause 3, since the  pronoun is ident ical .with  the  
pronoun i n  Cl.ause 2. This derivation would thus allow the  
impossible interpretat ion:  "John always tells people tha t  he 
is sick, and although Max t e l l s  people tha t  he (Max) is  sick, 
Mary doesn't t e l l  people t h a t  Max is  sick." Once again, a 
theory with deletion under sloppy ident i ty  makes f a l s e  pre- 
d i c t  ions. 
5. Deletion Rules and Interpret ive Rules 
We have seen t h a t  the  notion of sloppy ident i ty  is not 
< 
suf f ic ien t ly  constrained, and tha t  some equivalent of a 
theory which u t i l i z e s  t h e  notion of pairing of f o c i  must be 
employed. A t  t h i s  point let  us consider what happens i f  
3 10 
sloppy ident i ty  i s  eliminated altogether. 
F i r s t  of a l l ,  t h i s  would mean tha t  the  r u l e  of - §-Deletion 
could not be used t o  derive sentences such a s  (6) , or sen* 
tences of tha t  general sor t .  The reason f o r  t h i s ,  as we have 
seen, i s  tha t  the  embedded sentences t o  be deleted often have 
no antecedents which a r e  s t r i c t l y  ident ical  with them, Let 
us then propose tha t  - S-Deletion be eliminated ent i re ly ,  since, 
i n  the  absence of sloppy ident i ty ,  there i s  a s ignif icant  
range of cases fo r  which it would not work. I f  S-Deletion 
is eliminated, the  pro-£oms i n  question would be handled in- 
terpret ively:  they would be generated i n  the base, and sup- 
plied a semantic interpretat ion by principles discussed i n  
section 2. 
Recall here tha t  the  r u l e  of - S-Deletion is  used t o  derive 
sentences which have pro-form remnants, such as  g. This ru le  
is  used t o  derive sentences which contain anaphoric expres- 
sions such as do it:, mention it, it happens, and so on, By 
eliminating g-Deletion, t h i s  means tha t  sentences which con- 
t a i n  ac tua l  pro-form items such as & a r e  handled interpre- 
t ively.  We must ask now what happens with cases such as ( 6 4 ) ,  * 
(71), and (73), i n  which there  a r e  no pro-form remnants, but 
\ 
which contain so-called ' e l l i p t i c a l '  clauses. 
Such clauses a r e  derived by deletion rules,  namely VP- 
Deletion and Sluicing. These rules  have the e f fec t  of 
311 
deleting syntactic material without leaving behind any pro- 
form traces (i.e. the  clauses can be said t o  contain fl as a 
"pro-f om"). The rules of W-Deletf m and Sluicing account 
fo r  a significant range of syntactic fac ts  (cf. Ross [I9691 
for  discussion of W - ~ e l e t b n ) ,  and i f  one were t o  abandon 
such rules then it would have t o  be shown that the syntactic 
facts  mentioned by Ross could be handled i n  some natural 
fashion. 
/ 
5.1. Compatibility of Deletion Rules and Interpretive 
Principles. It seems to  me that  it is not necessary t o  
eliminate such rules, and that,  i n  fact,  the question here is 
irrelevant. Consider, i n  th i s  regard, the following sor t  of 
example: 
(78) a. Jack l e f t  early and Mary did too. 
b. Jack l e f t  early and Wry l e f t  early too. 
Let us assume that  there  i s  a rule  of V'P-Deletion, which 
operates on (78b) t o  produce (78a). If (78b) is the deep 
structure source fo r  (78a), then part  of the  reading for  (78a) 
w i l l  be the  grammatical relations determined on (78b). Recall, 
however, that f ocus-presupposition relations a r e  determined 
\. 
by factors of surface structure representations, and there- 
fore, the interpretive prtnciple 'for focus w i l l  operate on 
the surface form (78a), whether or not th i s  has been derived 
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Even i f  we assme tha t  (78a) has been derived by dele- 
tion, the interpretive principle fo r  focus operates on the 
surface form (78a). With regard t o  the second clause, it 
marks the constituent Mary a s  focus. Having located the 
focus constituent as Mary, it operates on the  reading which 
has been assigned from the deep structure, and forms expres- 
sions fo r  focus and presupposition, as  we have discussed. 
Thus, the existence sf a ru le  of VP-Deletion is i n  no way in- 
consistent with the  interpretive theory we have proposed, 
since the focus-presupposition relations w i l l  be read off 
the surface form in _any event. 
Naturally, the c w x  of the problem has t o  do with sen- 
tences such as : 
(79) John said that  he was sick, and Mary did too. 
I f  there is no notion of sloppy identity, and i f  (79) derives 
by VP-Deletion, then there is  only one source for  such a sen- 
tence: 
(80) Johni said tha t  hai was sick and Mary said that S 
he. was sick. 
x 
Bow can we then account for  the  other reading of ( 7 9 ) ,  namely, 
$ 
where the second clause means "Mary said that  she was sick"? 
We w i l l  make a tentat ive proposal here, t o  the following 
effect:  
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(81) In sentences i n  which deletion has occurred i n  the  
second clause (such as (77)), i f  the  second clause 
shares a presupposition with the f i r s t  clause (A. e. 
i f  the  focus of the  second clause and the focus of 
the f i r s t  clause a r e  interchangeable as  specif ica- 
tfons of sane variable of a presupposition of the  
f i r s t  clause), then th i s  part icular  presupgosit ion 
C_ 
i s  assigned as part  of the reading of the  second 
clause. 
Recall tha t  (79) is assigned the reading of (80) since it 
derives from (80). The other reading of (79) is derived as  
follows : there i s  a presupposition of the f i r s t  clause, [g 
said that - x was sick], which is shared by the second clause 
(in the sense just  discussed). Therefore, we assign t h i s  
presuppositf on t o  the second clause, and with the item Mary 
as focus, we would have: 
(82) [ [x - said that  5 was sick], [x - 3 Mary] ] 
In other words, t h i s  would be the reading, ''Mary said tha t  
Mary was sick." 
To sum up briefly:  i f  there is a ru le  of W-Deletion, but - 
no notion of sloppy identity, then some means must be devised 
% 
t o  account fo r  ambiguous readings (for which the notion of 
sloppy ident i ty  was originally introdwed). The proposal ad- 
vanced t o  handle these cases is one i n  whisk the second clause 
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i s  assigned as par t  of i t s  reading any presupposition which 
it shares with the f i r s t  clause, This is i n  essence t o  claim 
that  deletion is not "meaning preserving1', i n  the  sense.that 
the  output form of deletion rules can have a semantic inter- 
pretation not associated with the input form of such rules. 
We are  claiming here that  the output of deletion ru les tcan be 
assigned additional semantic information, which derives from 
antecedent clauses, and which is  not present a t  a l l  i n  the 
pre-deletion stage. 
5.2. Evidence that  Deletion is not Meaning Preserving. 
It should be pointed out here tha t  t h i s  appxoach is more than 
Just a means of eliminating sloppy identity. It can be shown 
that  th i s  general approach must be adopted. The argument 
against the sloppy ident f t y  approach becomes decisive when 
w e  note tha t  there i s  independent evidence that  clauses which 
have undergone deletion must be assigned semantic information 
from preceding clauses. This has been pointed out by Chosmky 
[class lectures, 19691 i n  connection with sentences such as 
the  following: 
($3) a. John hasn't been here for 2 weeks. 
t 
b. B i l l  has been here fo r  2 weeks. 
As Chomsky has noted, (83a) has the  interpretation that  a t  
no point i n  time during the previous 2 weeks has John been 
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here. However, t he  interpretat ion of the  temporal expression 
i n  (83b) Is that  f o r  t h e  duration of two weeks B i l l  has been 
here. Let us c a l l  the in terpretat ion of the  temporal exfires- 
s ion  In  (83a) 'non-durativer and tha t  i n  (83b) 'duretive'  . 
The cruc ia l  f ac t  here i s  tha t  (83b) cannot have a non-dura- 
t i v e  sense. 
However, notice now a sentence such as  (84) : 
(84) John hasn ' t  been here f o r  two weeks, but B i l l  has. 
The interpretat ion of (84) is tha t  a t  no point during the  pse- 
vious two weeks has John been here, but tha t  a t  some point  
during the  l a s t  two weeks B i l l  has been here. What i s  s t r i k -  
ing i s  tha t  the  second clause cannot have a durative in te r -  
preta t ion;  however, i f  ST-Deletion has applied i n  the  derfva- 
t i o n  of the  second clause, %ts underlying form must be (83b). 
An example such as (81) shows tha t  with a ru le  of VP- 
Deletion, additional semantic principles must be posited in 
any event t o  account f o r  the  f ac t  tha t  t h e  clause which £oms 
the  output of delet ion i s  assigned semantic information from 
the  antecedent clause. We conclude tht an in te rpre t ive  ap- 
proach, which would allow the  output of delet ion rules t o  be 
assigned additional semantic information from the antecedent 
$ 
clause, gains s igni f icant  support from sentences such a s  (84). 
In the  f i r s t  section of t h i s  chapter we propose an in- 
te rpre t ive  approach t o  account f o r  t h e  interpretat ion of a 
class of anaphoric express ions. The in te rpre t ive  principles 
involved assign various interpretat ions  t o  anaphoric expres- 
sions on the  basis  of presence o r  absence a% pair ing of foci ,  
When w e  examine the  approach proposed by Ross, we note 
tha t  the  notion s f  sloppy ident i ty  is  not suf f ic ien t ly  con- 
strained. We argue tha t  any theory must u t i l i z e  a notion of 
pairing of f o c i  i n  surface s t ruc ture  i n  order t o  explain jus t  
which portions of antecedent sentences a r e  excluded from the  
interpretat ion of anaphoric expressions. If sloppy ident i ty  
is  abandoned, we ask whether deletion rules  should a l so  be 
abandoned. 
We argue tha t  t h i s  is not necessary, and tha t  ambiguities 
of the  s o r t  represented by (79) can be accounted f o r  by 
having in te rpre t ive  principles operate on the  output of dele- 
t i o n  rules.  This is jus t i f i ed  on the basis of the  f ac t  t h a t  , 
in te rpre t ive  rules f o r  focus-presupposition re la t ions  w i l l  
t 
operate on surface s t ruc ture  i n  event (Le .  w i l l  only 
operate on the  output of delet ion rules). Furthemore, sen- 
tences such as  (84) indicate tha t  clauses which have 
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presumably undergone deletion w i l l  have to  bk assigned seman- 
t i c  information from previous clauses; this  example, is, 
furthermore, independent of any considerat ions of the sort 
of ambiguity which motivates sloppy identity. Oarr claim i s  
that in  such a system interpretive rules wauld not "duplicate" 
the work of deletion rules, but rather, interpretive rules 
supplement deletion rules. 
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4 
1. It has been noted i n  recent work (cf . Aha j ian and 
Jackendoff [ 19701 and Lakoff [ 19683) that  s t ress  levels 
play a significant ro le  i n  determining coreferent ial i ty  
relationships, particularly in  tha t  items which enter 
in to  coreferentiali ty relationships a re  typically un- 
stressed, i.e. non-focal. Thus, consider cases with de- 
scr ip t  ions : 
( i )  a. After Herb bought some gisoline, that  d i r ty  
Maoist made a Molotov c6cktail. 
b. After Herb bought some gasoline, that  d i r ty  
G o i s t  made a Molotov cocktail. 
Hn (ib) where the  description that  d i r ty  Maoist contains 
\ 
the  intonation center, it is  not taken as  being coreferen- 
t i a l  with the constftuent Herb, as it is i n  ( ia) .  
Along these l ines,  both Postal 11968, Chapter 191 
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and Lakoff [1968] have noted a dis t inct ion i n  sentences 
such a s  the following, with respect t o  the coreferentfali ty 
relationshtp involved : 
( i i )  a. John w i l l  shiv@ himself. 
b. The one John w i l l  shave is  h h s s l f .  
They note that  i n  ( i i a )  it is  presupposed that  - John and 
himself are  coreferential,  while i n  ( i ib)  it is asserted 
that  John and himselF a r e  core£ eremtial. Note that  t h i s  
bas ie distinction correlates with another fac t  or in  these 
sentences, namely, tha t  the anaphoric expression is the  
focus i n  ( i ib) ,  but is part  of the presupposition i n  ( i i a ) .  
Thus, the interpretive system w e  propose i n  Chapter 3 
automatically assigns the pronoun as part  of the presup- 
position i n  ( i ia ) ,  and assigns it as .part  of the asser- 
t ion  of specification of the  variable i n  ( i ib ) :  
(iii) a. [ [John w i l l  - x himself 1, [x - = shave) ] 
b. [ [John w i l l  shave q], [ x  - = himself] ] 
Note that  the same interpretation of asserted co- 
referent ia l i ty  is present i n  sentence ( i i a )  when the pro- 
noun bears the intonation center: , 
(iv) John w i l l  shave HIMSELF. 
\ 
In  t h i s  sentence, too, it is  mot presupposed, but rather 
asserted, that  John and himself a re  coreferential.  Since 
our system assigns the representation ( i i i b )  t o  (iv), (as 
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w e l l  as  ( i ib) ) ,  it accounts for  the fact  tha t  the inter- 
pretation of asserted coreferentiali ty is  present when 
the anaphoric expression bears the intonation center.,, 
The conditions on asserted eoref erent ia l i ty  d i f fe r  
from conditions on presupposed coreferentialify. This 
can be seen from examples such as the following: 
(v) a. The one John wants B i l l  t o  describe is 
hims6lf. 
b. The one John wants Mary t o  describe is him- 
sklf.  
c .  The one John wants Mary t o  shave i s  himsilf. 
d. The one John claimed had been cheated was 
hhs6l f .  
e. The one 1 thought Mary had baked the cake 
fo r  was mys&lf. 
In (va) the reflexive pronoun can be coreferential  with 
ei ther  of the preceding NPs ; that  it can be coreferential  
with John is brought out clearly i n  the next two sen- 
tences. Note, however, tha t  none of the sentences of (v) 
heve paraphrases of the following sort: 
(vi)a. John wants B i l l  t o  describe himself. 
$ 
b. *John wants Mary t o  describe himself. 
c. *John wants Mae t o  shave himself. 
d. *John claimed that  himself had been cheated. 
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(vi) e. *I thought that  Mary had baked the  cake fo r  
myself. 
(via) i s  unambiguous (the reflexive refers  only t o  Bkll), 
and thus is not a paraphrase fo r  (va). The r e s t  of the 
sentences are ungrammatical. A l l  except for  ,(vid) can, 
however, be improved by addition of s t ress  on the reflex- 
ive : 
(v i i )  a. John wants B i l l  t o  describe HIMSEEIF. 
b. John wants Mary t o  describe HIMSELF (not 
BILL) 
c. John wants Mary t o  shave HIMSELF (not BILL) 
d. I thought that  Mary had baked the  cake for 
MYSELF (not BILL) 
Furthermore, such sentences a re  acceptable with so-called 
' q h a t i c  reflexive forms', that  is, foms such as  - he 
himself. 
These examples a re  raised t o  i l l u s t r a t e  that  intona- 
t ion has significant effect on coreferentiali ty relstion- 
ships. Exactly what the  conditions are  on asserted co- 
referent ia l i ty  is a question which extends beyond the 
scope of t h i s  thesis.  
s 
2. That is, given the  intonation pattern indicated, the 
focus of the f i r s t  clause of sentence (36) i s  the  predicate 
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f l a t .  Replacing th i s  item with a variable gives us the -
presupposition expression : 
( i )  [ B i l l  believes that  the world is z] 
The focus of the  second clause of (36) is the verb 
believe. Notice that  t h i s  focus expression cannot speci- 
fy the variable of the presupposition ( i ) ,  i.e. a predi- 
ca te  suck as  believe cannot f i l l  t h i s  position. Hence, 
the focal expressions of (36) do not pair, in  the in- 
tended sense, and th i s  accounts for  the  difference i n  
interpretation between t h i s  case and sentence (24). 
3. Note that  Ross's arguments against what he terms an 
' interpretive'  theory are  predicated on the as sufnption 
that  such a theory posits fo r  sluiced clauses the i r  mini- 
mal surface forms, as i n  (38). If t h i s  assumption is 
abandoned, many of the arguments are  overcome. For ex- 
ample, i n  the sor t  of framework we have adopted in t h i s  
study, it i s  possible t o  have "empty" nodes i n  phrase 
markers, i. e. lexical insertion is  optional (recal l  the  
empty predicate node i n  the source fo r  clefted sentences). - 
In t h i s  so r t  of theory, phrase markers such as ( i i )  can 
\ 
be generated f o r  sentences such as ( i )  : 
(i) Saneone ate the cheese, but I donf t know who. 
NP 
I 
someone I don't V 
I I I 7\ 4 
a t e  the  cheese know it 
I /\ 
who V MP 
I I 
A A 
Given t h i s  sor t  of structure, then many of Ross's 
arguments no longer hold. Case marking can be accounted 
for, i n  that  the WH word could originate ei ther  as  subject 
4 or non-subject i n  clauses such as  S . The problem con- 
nected with verbal agreement patterns ((41)) is no longer 
relevant, since a f u l l  embedded clause is posited i n  
structures such as  ( i i ) .  Similarly, the problem repre- 
sented by (43) is no longer relevant, since a f u l l  clause 
complement would be generated as  object of wonder, and not 
just  a single MP. Finally, extraposition could apply i n  
the normal fashion, since i n  sentences such as  (44) the ' 
second clause would have a f u l l  clause i n  which the in- 
$ 
terrogat ive pronoun would be embedded. 
There are, however, a rghen ts  which Ross presents 
which the theory sketched here does not overcome. Firs t ,  
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Ross notes the  following pat tern:  
( i i i )  I know he has a picture  of somebody, but I 
don'tknow{":-om 
*a picture  of whm 
This follows from t h e  pa t te rn  associated with embedded 
quest ions : 
ylhd he has a p ic ture  of 
(iv) 9:don'tknow ofwhomhehas  a p i c t u r e  
i c t u r e  of whom he has 
Assume t ha t  an in te rpre t ive  theory were t o  posi t  f o r  t h e  




I I I I 





A DET /?\ M COMP 
1 I I \  
a picture  of who 
Given t h i s  s t ructure ,  it wouad be possible t o  p a r t i a l l y  
predict  the  pa t te rn  given i n  ( iv),  i. e., t he  f u l l  NP could 
not prepose, s ince it never does i n  such embedded questians. 
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The problem, however, is tha t  it should be possible t o  
prepsse the WH word i n  the embedded clause sf (v) , How- 
ever, t h i s  produces an ungrammatical sentence: 
(vi) *I know he has a pic ture  of somebody, but I 
don't know of whom a picture.  
The other argument which Ross presents which has no 
obvious solution i n  the  revised interpret ive theory pre- 
sented here has t o  do with the f ac t  tha t  i n  embedded ques- 
t ions  prepositional phrases cannot be fronted when the  
preposition is  past  of an idiomatic expression, For ex- 
ample: 
(v i i )  a. Who a r e  you going t o  do away with? -
b, *With whom are  you going t o  do away? 
The same f a c t s  hold f o r  sluiced clauses: 
( v i i i )  a. B i l l  is going t o  do away with someone, but 
I don't know who. 
b. *Bi l l  is going t o  do away with someone, 
but I don't know with whom, 
These fac ts  are  eas i ly  s ta teable  i f  t h e  sluiced clause 
derives from a f u l l  embedded question, since the idiomatic ' 
expression w i l l  be present in the  pre-deletion form of 
$ 
t he  sentence. 
The problem f o r  the  interpret ive approach, however, 
is t h a t  i n  a s t ruc tu re  such a s  the  following ( for  the  
second clause of the sentences of (v i i i ) )  : 
A A- T\ 
with who 
there is nothing t o  prevent the PP from preposing, t o  
produce sentence (vi i ib)  . Some ad-hoc principle would 
have t o  be added t o  the  effect  tkat  when i n  the previous 
clause there i s  an idiomatic expression of a cer tain kind, 
then the PP i n  the following clause could not be preposed. 
The point of these examples is  t o  show tkat  (a) 
Ross 's arguments hold only for  one possible interpretive 
theory, but fo r  another possible interpretive theory many 
of h i s  arguments f a i l ,  and (b) i f  one proposes an inter-  
pretive theory of the  so r t  sketched here one must show 
how the  problems mentioned can be overcame i n  same natural  
fashion. 
The basic idea behind ad interpretive theory which 
would posit  unspecified nodes would be t o  reconstruct the  
reading of the  embedded question on the  basis of the 
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reading of t h e  previous clause. However, it i s  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  see how t h i s  could be t ru ly  different  from a treatment 
which u t i l i zed  deletion rules. The posit ion we w i l l '  take 
in  t h i s  chapter, f o r  reasons we discuss shortly, is  tha t  
the  existence of deletion rules such as  Sluicing and VP- 
D e l e t i ~ n  is not inconsistent with an in te rpre t ive  t r e a t -  
ment of amphoric expressions. Thus, there  is no need t o  
press fo r  an in te rpre t ive  approach of the so r t  Aatched 
i n  t h i s  note. 
4. It is interest ing t o  note tha t  t h e  notion of sloppy 
ident i ty  renders superfluous the suggestion by Lakoff 
[I5671 tha t  adverbial clauses or iginate  from 'higher' sen- 
tences, Thus, f o r  sentences such as:  
( i )  Goldwater won i n  the   st, but it couldn' t 
happen h8re. 
Lakoff argues t h a t  the  underlying s t ruc ture  must be 
roughly as  follows: 
it 
Goldwater win Goldwater win 
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The s t ruc ture  i n  ( i i )  is motivated by t h e  f a c t  tha t  the  
anaphoric expression it i n  the  second clause of (i) does 
not include i n  i t s  interpretat ion the  phrase i n  the .vest. 
If t h i s  phrase originates i n  a higher clause, the  deep 
s t ruc ture  can be formulated such tha t  S-Delet.ion can ap- 
5 ply t o  delete  S , with the  proper interpretat ion.  Thus, 
Lakoff argues tha t  adverbial clauses i n  general or iginate  
i n  higher clauses. 
Given sloppy ident i ty ,  hcwever, there  i s  no evidence 
tha t  adverbial clauses or iginate  i n  a higher sentence, 
2 
s ince S i n  (ii) can be represented: 
( i i i )  
/s\ 
it /N\ 4 
/S\ 
be / w ' v  i n  the Westi 
L 
(s3 would be represented i n  an analogous fashion). Ad- 
verbkal clauses can s t i l l  be generated i n  the sentences 
i n  which they appear i n  surface structure,  and g-Deletion 
w i l l  overlook the differences\  i n  commanded pro-f o m s  when 
5 deleting S . Hence, sloppy ident i ty  removes the rnotiva- 
t ion f o r  posit ing adverbial clauses i n  higher sentences. 
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5. Notice, incidentally,  t ha t  the  notion of sloppy ident i ty  
presupposes a specif ic  s e t  of assumptions concerning pro- 
nominelizat ion, i n  par t icular ,  assumptions concerning the  
leve l  a t  which coreferent ia l i ty  relat ionships a r e  estab- 
lished. Since sloppy ident i ty  makes c ruc ia l  -use of the  
re la t ion  antecedent, t h i s  notion (or any other which makes 
use of the  notion 'pronoun commanded by i ts  antecedent') 
therefore presupposes tha t  a t  the  leve l  a t  which various 
deletion ru les  apply, coreferent ia l i ty  relat ionships have 
been established. For example, i n  a s t ruc ture  such a s  
(53), it is cruc ia l  that. a t  the  time the deletion r u l e  
applies, r e fe ren t i a l  indices have already been assigned 
(or any equivalent mechanism) s ince it must be determined 
whether the  embedded proraouns a r e  i n  f ac t  commanded by 
t h e i r  antecedents. 
If  one accepts the  arguments given by Lakoff [I9681 
t ha t  coreferent ia l i ty  relat ionships which a r e  assigned a t  
a pre-surface level  can be f i l t e r e d  by output conditions 
(hence, t h a t  potent ia l ly  well-formed coreferent ia l i ty  re- 
, 
lat ionships can be ruled out a t  the  surface level) ,  then 
sloppy ident i ty  is i n  pr inciple  impossible. If  one wishes 
\ 
t o  maintain sloppy identi ty,  it. must be shown tha t  core- 
ference is determined p r io r  t o  the  application of delet ion 
rules. 
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6. Note, huwever, t ha t  the  in te rpre t ive  principles must be 
fur ther  modified. That is, consider the  possible in t e r -  
pretat ions f o r  t h e  following : 
( i  John said t ha t  B i l l  complained tha t  Mary threw 
garbage on the  lawn, but you don't have t o  
mention it. 
The interpretat ion of the second clause of ( i )  is  as 
follows : 
(ii) a. You don't have t o  mention that John said 
tha t  B i l l  complained tha t  Mary threw garbage 
on t he  Pawn. 
b. You don't  have t o  mention tha t  B i l l  complain- 
ed tha t  Mary threw garbage on t h e  lawn. 
c. You don't have t o  mentfon tha t  Mary threw 
garbage on the  lawn. 
Hence, the anaphosic expression can r e f e r  t o  the most 
deeply embedded clause, or  t o  the  next clause 'up', o r  
f ina l ly  t o  the  e n t i r e  antecedent. 
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